UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STANLEY BOSS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-cv-616 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Stanley Boss, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendant Pillsbury Winthrop
Shaw Pittman LLP (“Pillsbury”) initiated a United States Customs Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) citizenship inquiry into him to disadvantage him in future employment, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Eighth Amendment.
Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 30. The court granted Boss’s motion to amend his complaint, ECF
No. 24, and now Pillsbury moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for insufficient service of
process and lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), and for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 28. Boss moves for
default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF No. 29. For the following
reasons, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Boss, a Black man, was employed by Pillsbury from approximately March 2018 to May
2019. Am. Compl. at 2; Mot. to Dismiss at 1. In June 2019, Boss reached an Equal
Page 1 of 7 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) discrimination settlement with Pillsbury. Am.
Compl. at 1. In 2022, he was hired by Bentall Green Oak, who asked for his W-2 from Pillsbury
during his onboarding process. Id. ¶¶ 3, 21. Boss attributes this request to a 2022 USCIS
citizenship status inquiry that he claims Pillsbury opened with Bentall Green Oak’s help. Id. ¶ 6.
In 2024, Boss applied for a position at Edward Jones Financial and was rejected after a multi-
step interview and testing process. Id. ¶¶ 2, 15–19. He claims he was denied the position
because of the USCIS inquiry, which “Pillsbury used . . . to retaliate and exempt [his] status to
legally work in the United States.” Id. at 2. He contends that Pillsbury’s initiation of the
citizenship inquiry constituted a cruel and unusual practice in violation of the Eighth
Amendment as well as discriminatory treatment under Title VII. Id. ¶ 3. He seeks $394,305 in
punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 6–7.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that he has effectuated proper service by demonstrating that he complied with the relevant
portions of Rule 4 “and any other applicable provision of law.” Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751
(D.C. Cir. 1987). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2022). A “complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court must assume all “well-pleaded
factual allegations” are accurate, id. at 679, and “grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that
Page 2 of 7 can be derived from the facts alleged,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
“Although ‘[p]ro se litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by
counsel to correct defects in service of process and pleadings,’ they still bear the burden of
demonstrating that service was properly effected.” Anderson v. Gates, 20 F. Supp. 3d 114, 121
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir.1993)).
And while they are likewise held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient. Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. ANALYSIS
The court will first address the issue of personal jurisdiction over Pillsbury. To
determine the applicable procedures for service of process, the court looks to the law of “the
state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e),
(h)(1)(A). “In the District of Columbia, service of process may be effectuated by ‘mail
addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt.’ D.C. Code § 13–431; see
D.C. SCR–Civil R. 4(c)(3), (h)(1). If the defendant is a corporation or partnership, a copy of the
summons and complaint must be delivered to an officer or agent authorized to receive service of
process on the entity’s behalf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B); D.C. SCR–Civil R. 4(h)(1).” Hardy v.
Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., 953 F. Supp. 2d 102, 107 (D.D.C. 2013). Because Boss served his
Amended Complaint via certified mail, his proof of service must be accompanied by a signed
receipt attached to an affidavit. D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1)(B). If the return receipt “does
not purport to be signed by the party named in the summons,” the affidavit must include
Page 3 of 7 “specific facts from which the court can determine that the person who signed the receipt meets
the appropriate qualifications for receipt of process set out in Rule 4(e)-(j).” Id. 4(l)(1)(B)(iv).
Here, Boss’s affidavit is not accompanied by a signed receipt, nor does it state that he
served Pillsbury’s registered agent or someone authorized to accept service. See ECF Nos. 25,
26. While Boss asserts that Pillsbury’s counsel in this matter, Meaghan Murphy, accepted
process, there is no evidence that Pillsbury intended to confer such authority on Murphy. See
Fenwick v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding service was
insufficient without evidence that employee who accepted process was specifically authorized to
do so); Mot. to Dismiss at 11.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STANLEY BOSS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-cv-616 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Stanley Boss, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendant Pillsbury Winthrop
Shaw Pittman LLP (“Pillsbury”) initiated a United States Customs Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) citizenship inquiry into him to disadvantage him in future employment, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Eighth Amendment.
Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 30. The court granted Boss’s motion to amend his complaint, ECF
No. 24, and now Pillsbury moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for insufficient service of
process and lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), and for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 28. Boss moves for
default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF No. 29. For the following
reasons, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Boss, a Black man, was employed by Pillsbury from approximately March 2018 to May
2019. Am. Compl. at 2; Mot. to Dismiss at 1. In June 2019, Boss reached an Equal
Page 1 of 7 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) discrimination settlement with Pillsbury. Am.
Compl. at 1. In 2022, he was hired by Bentall Green Oak, who asked for his W-2 from Pillsbury
during his onboarding process. Id. ¶¶ 3, 21. Boss attributes this request to a 2022 USCIS
citizenship status inquiry that he claims Pillsbury opened with Bentall Green Oak’s help. Id. ¶ 6.
In 2024, Boss applied for a position at Edward Jones Financial and was rejected after a multi-
step interview and testing process. Id. ¶¶ 2, 15–19. He claims he was denied the position
because of the USCIS inquiry, which “Pillsbury used . . . to retaliate and exempt [his] status to
legally work in the United States.” Id. at 2. He contends that Pillsbury’s initiation of the
citizenship inquiry constituted a cruel and unusual practice in violation of the Eighth
Amendment as well as discriminatory treatment under Title VII. Id. ¶ 3. He seeks $394,305 in
punitive and compensatory damages. Id. at 6–7.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that he has effectuated proper service by demonstrating that he complied with the relevant
portions of Rule 4 “and any other applicable provision of law.” Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751
(D.C. Cir. 1987). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2022). A “complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court must assume all “well-pleaded
factual allegations” are accurate, id. at 679, and “grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that
Page 2 of 7 can be derived from the facts alleged,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
“Although ‘[p]ro se litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by
counsel to correct defects in service of process and pleadings,’ they still bear the burden of
demonstrating that service was properly effected.” Anderson v. Gates, 20 F. Supp. 3d 114, 121
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir.1993)).
And while they are likewise held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient. Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. ANALYSIS
The court will first address the issue of personal jurisdiction over Pillsbury. To
determine the applicable procedures for service of process, the court looks to the law of “the
state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e),
(h)(1)(A). “In the District of Columbia, service of process may be effectuated by ‘mail
addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt.’ D.C. Code § 13–431; see
D.C. SCR–Civil R. 4(c)(3), (h)(1). If the defendant is a corporation or partnership, a copy of the
summons and complaint must be delivered to an officer or agent authorized to receive service of
process on the entity’s behalf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B); D.C. SCR–Civil R. 4(h)(1).” Hardy v.
Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., 953 F. Supp. 2d 102, 107 (D.D.C. 2013). Because Boss served his
Amended Complaint via certified mail, his proof of service must be accompanied by a signed
receipt attached to an affidavit. D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1)(B). If the return receipt “does
not purport to be signed by the party named in the summons,” the affidavit must include
Page 3 of 7 “specific facts from which the court can determine that the person who signed the receipt meets
the appropriate qualifications for receipt of process set out in Rule 4(e)-(j).” Id. 4(l)(1)(B)(iv).
Here, Boss’s affidavit is not accompanied by a signed receipt, nor does it state that he
served Pillsbury’s registered agent or someone authorized to accept service. See ECF Nos. 25,
26. While Boss asserts that Pillsbury’s counsel in this matter, Meaghan Murphy, accepted
process, there is no evidence that Pillsbury intended to confer such authority on Murphy. See
Fenwick v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding service was
insufficient without evidence that employee who accepted process was specifically authorized to
do so); Mot. to Dismiss at 11. Without such evidence, the court cannot conclude Boss made
proper service upon Pillsbury. See Hardy, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
But because Boss is proceeding pro se, the court will not penalize him for having
assumed delivery to Pillsbury’s counsel constituted proper service, especially when there are
other bases on which to dismiss his complaint. See id. at 108; Dominguez v. Dist. of Columbia,
536 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2008) (“If dismissing the claim without prejudice due to
insufficient service would lead to the refiling of a meritless claim, . . . [this] Circuit has held that
it is proper to consider other means of dismissing the [claim].”). Accordingly, although the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Pillsbury, it will nonetheless analyze and dismiss Boss’s Title
VII and Eighth Amendment claims under Rule 12(b)(6). See Anderson, 20 F.Supp.3d at 120;
Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Title VII prohibits “discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
in “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in executive
agencies” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). A plaintiff may plead a Title VII
discrimination claim by alleging “that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an
Page 4 of 7 adverse employment action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination (that is, an inference that his employer took the action because of his membership
in the protected class).” Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). To state a retaliation claim under Title VII, “a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that (1) she ‘engaged in statutorily protected activity,’ (2) she ‘suffered a
materially adverse action by [her] employer,’ and (3) the two are causally connected.” Spence v.
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Howard R.L. Cook &
Tommy Shaw Found. v. Billington, 737 F.3d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2013)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
3(a).
Boss alleges that Pillsbury engaged in “unlawful employment practices based on race and
national origin to discriminate against [him].” Am. Compl. at 2. But merely invoking race and
national origin as part of the claim’s narrative is insufficient; to plausibly plead the causation
element, Boss must allege specific, non-conclusory facts giving rise to a reasonable inference
that Pillsbury initiated the USCIS inquiry, that it did so because of his race or national origin,
and that his rejection from Edward Jones was connected to that inquiry.
Boss fails on all accounts. He pleads no facts from which the court can reasonably infer
that Pillsbury played a role in initiating the 2022 citizenship inquiry, several years after Boss’s
employment at the firm. Instead, he asks the court to assume Pillsbury’s involvement (which
Pillsbury denies) from the mere fact that Bentall Green Oak requested Boss’s Pillsbury W-2 as
part of routine onboarding procedures. The connection between the two events eludes this court,
and it is not its role to supply one. Notably, neither the W-2 nor the existence of a citizenship
inquiry dissuaded Bentall Green Oak from hiring him, and Boss offers no facts supporting his
theory that either played any role in Edward Jones’s hiring decision. “While no ‘magic words’
Page 5 of 7 are required, the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated
ambition.” Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Boss’s claim that Pillsbury’s conduct violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments is likewise unsupported. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. “Although the
Supreme Court has never definitively addressed the question of whether the Eighth Amendment
generally, or the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause specifically, applies in civil cases,
existing precedent has limited the amendment’s application to criminal cases.” DOE v. Rogers,
139 F. Supp. 3d 120, 169 (D.D.C. 2015); see Browning–Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989) (“[O]ur concerns in applying the Eighth
Amendment have been with criminal process and with direct actions initiated by government to
inflict punishment.”). Pillsbury is not a government actor and Boss offers no “analogy to
criminal punishments sufficient to warrant extending the scope of the Eighth Amendment to
apply to this civil case.” Rogers, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 170.
Finally, Boss argues that default summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) is appropriate because Pillsbury failed to file an answer within 21 days of being
served. Mot. for Default Judgment at 1–2, ECF No. 29. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(a), a defendant must serve a responsive pleading within 21 days of being served with the
summons and complaint. But not only was Pillsbury improperly served, it filed a motion under
Rule 12, rendering the responsive pleading due “14 days after notice of the court’s action” on
that motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). Boss’s Amended Complaint was docketed on April 30,
2025, and the Summons was reissued on the same day. ECF No. 24. Pillsbury filed its 12(b)(6)
motion on May 21, 2025, within the requisite 21-day period, meaning its “time to respond to the
remaining claims is governed by Rule 12(a)(4) and runs from the date of the [c]ourt’s action on
Page 6 of 7 this motion.” Doshi v. Blinken, No. CV 23-3613 (RC), 2024 WL 3509486, at *10 (D.D.C. July
22, 2024). Consequently, Boss’s claim for default judgment fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court will GRANT Pillsbury’s Motion to Dismiss and DENY Boss’s
Motion for Default Judgment. A separate order will follow.
Date: October 27, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
Page 7 of 7