Boss Peterson Saint Louis v. Warden of the Gold State Detention Facility, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-01873
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BOSS PETERSON SAINT LOUIS No. 1:26-cv-1873 DC CSK (A-241-008-786), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER AND FINDINGS AND v. RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLD STATE 15 DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Boss Peterson Saint Louis (A-241-008-786), a native and citizen of Haiti who is 19 proceeding without counsel, who entered the United States on February 7, 2023, has filed a 20 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 Petitioner was initially detained 21 by immigration officials inside the United States and released on February 7, 2023. On January 22 22, 2026 petitioner was arrested and re-detained and has been in continuous detention since this 23 date. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s re-detention. For the reasons that follow, the Court 24 recommends denying respondents’ motion to dismiss, granting the petition for a writ of habeas 25 corpus and ordering petitioner’s immediate release. 26 / / / 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17). 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti. (ECF No. 7-2 at 1.) On February 7, 2023, 3 petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. (Id.) Petitioner was briefly detained then 4 released and paroled into the United States on February 7, 2023. (ECF No. 7-1 at 5.) On 5 February 7, 2023, petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear in Immigration and Nationality Act 6 (“INA”) Section 240 (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) removal proceedings, which are standard removal 7 proceedings.2 (ECF No. 7-2 at 1.) Thereafter, petitioner filed an application for asylum with the 8 immigration court. (ECF No. 7-1 at 5.) Petitioner also applied for Temporary Protected Status. 9 (Id. at 4.) Petitioner has an approved application for Employment Authorization. (Id.) Petitioner 10 has no criminal history. (Id.) The record also contains no evidence that petitioner violated any 11 conditions of his release and respondents do not claim petitioner violated any conditions of his 12 release. (See ECF Nos. 7, 7-1.) 13 On or about January 21, 2026 or January 22, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs 14 Enforcement (“ICE”) officers encountered petitioner and arrested petitioner at the Pilot Travel 15 Center in Fultonville, New York. (ECF No. 7-1 at 4; ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner was not 16 provided a pre-deprivation hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) Petitioner has been in continuous 17 detention since January 22, 2026, beginning in Buffalo, New York, then Texas, Arizona, and 18 since February 12, 2026, at the Golden State Annex in California. (Id. at 6, 8.) Respondents do 19 not contest petitioner’s claim that he was not provided a pre-deprivation hearing. (See ECF No. 20 7.) 21 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 On March 9, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) 23 On March 20, 2026, respondents timely filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner did 24 not file a response to the motion to dismiss. See Docket. Briefing is now complete. 25 /// 26

27 2 Removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240) are standard removal proceedings, which are different from expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1225(b)(1) (INA § 235(b)(1)). 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 3 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 4 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 5 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 6 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 7 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 8 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 9 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 10 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 11 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 12 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen 15 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that 16 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). Petitioner challenges his 17 continued detention based on the violation the Fifth Amendment due process clause.3 (ECF No. 1 18 at 17-18.) Respondents do not argue that petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community 19 and instead argue that as an “applicant for admission,” petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 20 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and he is ineligible for a bond hearing. (ECF No. 7 at 1-2.) Respondents 21 cite Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), in support of their position that 22 § 1225(b)(2)(A) is applicable here. (Id. at 1.) Respondents also argue that petitioner does not 23 possess a right to freedom from immigration detention in any form other than the form provided 24 by Congress. (Id. at 2.) 25 /// 26 3 Because petitioner is proceeding pro se and pro se pleadings are liberally construed, the Court 27 construes petitioner’s claim as a Fifth Amendment due process claim challenging his re-detention, and not limited to a claim challenging his detention as prolonged. The Court also notes that 28 respondents did not focus on prolonged detention in their response. (See ECF No. 7.) 1 A. Analysis of Petitioner’s Due Process Claim 2 Petitioner argues he has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from imprisonment 3 pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and has a liberty interest in not being incarcerated after prior 4 release without a pre-custodial hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 10-19.) Respondents argue petitioner’s 5 due process claim fails because petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from immigration 6 detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) Respondents’ 7 arguments do not demonstrate the government has satisfied the requirements of the Due Process 8 Clause, “which of course constitute[s] the supreme law of the land[.]” Tot v. United States, 319 9 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (Black, J., concurring). 10 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 11 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that 12 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due 13 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause 14 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is 15 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process 16 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their 17 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 19 The Court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether 20 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines 21 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with 22 the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing 23 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The Supreme Court has 24 found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint. 25 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to 26 arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may 27 entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (finding due 28 process requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 2 (1972) (same, in parole context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the 3 level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific 4 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 5 Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 6 marks and citation omitted). 7 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 8 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 9 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 10 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 11 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring, 12 his “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied 13 on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole 14 conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” 15 Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in his “continued 16 liberty.” Id. at 481-84. 17 Here, petitioner’s initial detention and subsequent release in February 2023 are similar 18 because it allowed petitioner to live in the United States, subject to immigration supervision, but 19 free of custody for almost 3 years. Such time allowed petitioner to form “enduring attachments of 20 normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Petitioner obtained work authorization, obtained a 21 commercial driver’s license and worked as a truck driver. (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 7-1 at 4.) 22 This Court finds that petitioner’s original release and time out of custody gave rise to a 23 constitutionally protected liberty interest. 24 Petitioner’s release was premised upon a finding that, at the time of petitioner’s release, he 25 was not dangerous nor a flight risk. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to issue 26 a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in [8 U.S.C. 27 § 1226](c)(1), under the conditions at section [8 U.S.C. § 1226](a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided 28 that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a 1 danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”); 2 Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for 3 A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018); F.M.V. v. Wofford, 2025 WL 3083934, at *1 4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). In light of all of the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner’s prior 5 release created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his liberty as long as 6 he was not a flight risk and did not pose a danger to the community. See Perry v. Sindermann, 7 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations may establish a 8 legitimate claim of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest); F.M.V., 2025 WL 9 3083934 at *4. This Court concludes that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release. 10 See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing 11 that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the 12 Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) 13 (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have been released have a strong liberty interest); 14 F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *4-5. 15 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of 16 that protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has 17 “regularly applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to 18 removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also 19 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in 20 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim 21 challenging immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible 22 test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration 23 detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews, 24 the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous 25 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 26 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from 27 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at 28 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing 1 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 2 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s 3 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”). 4 For almost three years, petitioner was free from custody before his re-detention. Petitioner 5 obtained work authorization and his commercial driver’s license and worked as a truck driver. 6 (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 7-1 at 4.) The duration of his conditional release elevates and 7 underscores his interest in liberty. See Pinchi v. Noem, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 8 25, 2025) (in the past five years, petitioner developed “extensive relations of support and 9 interdependence” that “underscore the high stakes of [his] liberty.”); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. 10 Supp. 3d 963, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that petitioner had a substantial liberty interest 11 where he had been released from custody for 18 months and was living with his wife, spending 12 time with his mother and other family members, working as a bicycle mechanic, and developing 13 friendships in his community). 14 The second Mathews factor also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The risk of an erroneous 15 deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody 16 redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 17 2025). Again, civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is 18 typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight 19 or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 20 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not contend that petitioner is or was a flight risk 21 or a danger to the community. (See generally ECF No. 7.) In addition, respondents do not 22 contend that petitioner has a criminal record. (Id.) Here, petitioner has been detained since 23 January 22, 2026, without being given an individualized bond hearing to evaluate whether 24 petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. No neutral arbiter has determined 25 whether petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 26 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest 27 in enforcing immigration laws, but respondents’ interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing 28 is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts are routine, and impose a 2 “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. In addition, here, the government’s interest is 3 even lower because petitioner was previously released after immigration officials determined he 4 was not a flight risk or danger to the community, he lived in the country for almost 3 years on 5 release, and he has no criminal record. See Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2. 6 Overall, balancing these factors, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor 7 of finding petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, and petitioner should have been provided such a 8 hearing before he was detained. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of 9 life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 10 nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal 11 quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on 12 parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly 13 dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, including 14 a predeprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86. 15 “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of immigration 16 detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents point to no reasons 17 a pre-deprivation hearing could not be held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, 18 “a pre-deprivation hearing is required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. 19 Supp. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to relief on his due 20 process claim. 21 V. RESPONDENTS’ MOTON TO DISMISS 22 For the reasons discussed above, respondents’ motion to dismiss should be denied. 23 VI. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 24 Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 2.) There currently exists 25 no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 26 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any 27 stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 28 Cases. Because the Court recommends that the petition be granted, petitioner’s motion for 1 appointment of counsel is denied. 2 VII. CONCLUSION 3 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted. 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for appointment of 5 counsel (ECF No. 2) is denied. 6 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 8 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) be denied. 9 3. Respondents be ordered to IMMEDIATELY release petitioner Boss Peterson Saint 10 Louis (A-241-008-786), and be ordered to provide petitioner with a copy of the release 11 order at or near the time of release. If respondents have custody of petitioner’s 12 documents (e.g., identification, passport, work permit, Social Security card, etc.), 13 respondents shall return those to petitioner at the time of release. Respondents be 14 ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless the government 15 demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing 16 before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the 17 community such that his physical custody is legally justified. This injunction does not 18 address other circumstances where detention authority is established under different 19 authority than what is presented in this case (e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1231). 21 4. Given petitioner’s pro se status, respondents be directed to file, within seven days of 22 the adoption of these findings and recommendations, a status report addressing 23 petitioner’s status. 24 5. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close 25 this case. 26 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days of 28 the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 1 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 2 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 3 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 4 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 5 || Court’s order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 7 || Dated: April 3, 2026 4 aA Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM ? UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 | Stlouis1873.imm.rel/2 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10