[Cite as Bosley v. Associated Paper Stock, Inc., 2022-Ohio-2649.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY
JOHN BOSLEY, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ASSOCIATED PAPER STOCK, INC. and THOMAS YANKO,
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY and THE HARTFORD STEAM BOILER INSPECTION AND INSURANCE CO.,
Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 21 MA 0012
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case No. 2019 CV 2425
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.
JUDGMENT: Reversed. Judgment Entered in Favor of Appellants.
Atty. Caryn M. Groedel, Caryn Groedel & Associates Co., LPA, 31000 Woodall Drive, Cleveland, Ohio 44139, for John Bosley, Sr. –2–
Atty. Scott C. Essad, 5500 Market Street, Suite 99, Youngstown, Ohio 44512, for Associated Paper Stock, Inc. and Thomas P. Yanko and
Atty. Donald L. Best, Jr., DiBella, Geer, McAllister & Best, P.C., Law & Finance Building, 429 Fourth Avenue, Suite 200, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219, for Westfield Insurance Company and The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company.
Dated: June 30, 2022
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellants, Westfield Insurance Company (“Westfield”) and The Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (“Hartford”), appeal from a Mahoning
County Common Pleas Court decision to grant Appellees’, Associated Paper Stock, Inc.
(“APS”) and Thomas Yanko (“Yanko”), motions for summary judgment and to overrule
Appellants’ motion for summary judgment. Based on the following, the judgment of the
trial court is reversed and judgment is entered for Appellants.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} This appeal arises from age discrimination lawsuits filed by Plaintiff-
Appellee, John Bosley, Sr. (“Bosley”) against Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
APS and Yanko. APS and Yanko sought coverage for Bosley’s age discrimination claims
under an “Employment Practices Liability Insurance Coverage Endorsement” (“EPL
endorsement”) that was part of a commercial general liability policy issued by Third Party
Defendant-Appellant, Westfield. Hartford, a reinsurer for Westfield, was also named as
a defendant in the action. Westfield denied coverage under the policy based on the
determination that APS and Yanko failed to report Bosley’s claim by the cut-off date set
forth in the policy.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –3–
{¶3} APS, Yanko, Westfield, and Hartford filed a stipulation of facts with the trial
court in support of their motions for summary judgment. The stipulation included various
documents as exhibits pertaining to the EPL endorsement. Therefore, this record reveals
that the parties agree on all of the relevant facts in this matter.
{¶4} According to the stipulation of facts, Yanko is the owner and President of
APS. Bosley was employed as a commercial truck driver for APS from July of 1985
through May 17, 2018, when he was laid off. On October 26, 2018, Bosley filed an age
discrimination action against APS in Mahoning County Common Pleas Court, case no.
2018-CV-2653 (the “First Lawsuit”). Bosley alleged claims for age discrimination,
violation of the Ohio Equal Pay Act, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
While not a named party to this suit, the complaint listed Yanko as the statutory agent for
service of process on APS. Yanko, as agent, was served with the summons and
complaint on November 6, 2018. APS filed an answer to the complaint on December 27,
2018. Bosley voluntarily dismissed the First Lawsuit on September 13, 2019. He then
refiled his action on November 26, 2019 in case no. 2019-CV-2425 (“the Refiled
Lawsuit”). The Refiled Lawsuit was identical in every respect to the complaint filed in the
First Lawsuit, alleging age discrimination, violation of the Ohio Equal Pay Act, and
wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Service was obtained on Yanko, as
statutory agent, on January 27, 2020.
{¶5} On March 13, 2020, Bosley filed an amended complaint, now adding Yanko
as a party defendant. Other than the addition of Yanko as a party, the amended complaint
was identical to the first two complaints filed. Yanko was served with a summons and the
amended complaint by certified mail on March 20, 2020.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –4–
{¶6} The facts set forth in the First Lawsuit, as well as in the complaint and
amended complaint in the Refiled Lawsuit, all allege that Bosley reported directly to
Yanko. (3/13/2020 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 3). Bosley reported a suspected
violation of Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations directly to Yanko, which
included allegations that APS personnel were throwing away the driver’s logs Bosley
submitted as required by DOT if Bosley traveled more than 100 miles in a day. Bosley
continued to submit the logs after being told not to by Yanko, after which Yanko “yelled
at [Bosley]” for submitting these logs. (3/13/2020 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 18,
18-21). Shortly thereafter, Bosley was told by Yanko that he was being laid off for lack of
work. (3/13/2020 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 22).
{¶7} Westfield had issued a commercial general liability insurance policy
containing the EPL endorsement with the effective dates of April 16, 2018 to April 16,
2019. The policy renewed with the same limits, deductible, terms, and conditions as the
previous policy with the effective dates of April 16, 2019 to April 16, 2020. The parties
agree that the claims raised by Bosley would not ordinarily trigger coverage under the
commercial general liability policy. However, the EPL is an endorsement that modifies
the commercial general liability policy to provide coverage for “wrongful employment
acts.” (9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 30.) The EPL endorsement is a “claims-made and
reported” coverage endorsement and is not occurrence based. This means that for
coverage to apply, a “claim” or “suit” for a “wrongful employment act” made against the
insured during the “EPL coverage period” must be reported to Westfield during the “EPL
coverage period” or within thirty (30) days after the end of the “EPL coverage period.”
(9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 32.) Again, the initial EPL coverage period was April 16,
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –5–
2018 to April 16, 2019 and was subsequently renewed for the coverage period of April
16, 2019 to April 16, 2020. The EPL endorsement also included a definition of the word
“claim,” and broadly defines a “claim”:
“Claim” means a written demand for monetary and non-monetary relief
(including any request to toll or waive any statute of limitations). The term
“claim” shall also mean an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), Department of Labor (DOL) or Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Program (OFCCP) (or similar federal, state or local agency)
proceeding or investigation commenced by the filing of a notice of charges,
service of a complaint or similar document of which notice has been given
to “you”.
(9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 34.) The parties agree that Bosley’s allegations regarding
age discrimination are included under the definition of “Wrongful Employment Acts” under
the EPL endorsement.
{¶8} The EPL endorsement also provides: “[a]ll ‘claims’ and ‘suits’ arising from
the same or ‘related wrongful employment acts’ shall be treated as arising out of a single
‘wrongful employment act’ ” and that “[a]ll ‘claims’ and ‘suits’ arising out of one ‘wrongful
employment act’ shall be deemed to be made on the date that the first such ‘claim’ is
made or ‘suit’ is brought[.]” (9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 35, 36.) Finally, the EPL
defines “related wrongful employment acts” as:
“Related Wrongful Employment Act(s)” means “wrongful employment acts”
which are the same, related or continuous…or which arise from a common
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –6–
nucleus of facts. “Claims” or “suits” can allege “related wrongful
employment acts,” regardless of whether such “claims” or “suits” involve the
same or different claimants, “insureds” or legal causes of action.
(9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 37.)
{¶9} According to the parties’ stipulations, Bosley’s allegations were first
presented to APS and Yanko on November 6, 2018, with the service of Bosley’s complaint
in the First Lawsuit being made on Yanko, as statutory agent for APS. (9/30/20 Stipulation
of Facts, ¶ 38.) The parties also stipulate that the allegations Bosley set forth in the First
Lawsuit were not reported to Westfield until August 21, 2019. This was nine months after
initially being served with the First Lawsuit and four months after the end of the EPL
endorsement coverage period for the policy running from April 16, 2018 to April 16, 2019.
{¶10} Bosley voluntarily dismissed the First Lawsuit pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A) and
filed his Refiled Lawsuit on November 26, 2019. APS was served with the Refiled Lawsuit
on January 27, 2020 and reported the claim to Westfield the following day, January 28,
2020. (9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 44.) Bosley filed his amended complaint including
Yanko as a named defendant on March 13, 2020 and Yanko was served by certified mail
on March 20, 2020. (9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 45-46.) The parties stipulate that
Yanko, as an executive officer, is an insured under the EPL endorsement. Yanko and
APS reported Bosley’s filing of an amended complaint in the Refiled Lawsuit on April 6,
2020. Westfield denied coverage for defense or indemnification on April 21, 2020.
(9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 50.)
{¶11} APS filed a third-party action against Westfield and Hartford, disputing the
denial of coverage. The third-party complaint raised causes of action for breach of
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –7–
contract, declaratory judgment, and bad faith. In response, Westfield and Hartford filed
an answer denying liability and a counterclaim requesting a declaratory judgment that
Westfield does not owe coverage to APS or Yanko for Bosley’s lawsuit. APS and Yanko
filed separate answers to the counterclaim. Yanko also filed a cross-claim asserting
breach of contract and bad faith and seeking a declaratory judgment. Westfield and
Hartford filed an answer to the cross-claim denying liability. Westfield, Hartford, APS, and
Yanko filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the coverage issue. In addition,
Westfield and Hartford sought summary judgment on the bad faith claims of APS and
Yanko and Hartford requested summary judgment on all claims.
{¶12} On December 9, 2020, the trial court filed a judgment entry. It granted
summary judgment for APS on the coverage issue and overruled the motion for summary
judgment filed by Westfield on that issue. In addition, the trial court overruled the motions
for summary judgment of Westfield and Hartford on the bad faith claims of APS and
Yanko, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained for trial.
{¶13} On December 23, 2020, Westfield and Hartford filed a motion to amend or
correct the judgment nunc pro tunc, asking the trial court to enter an order declaring the
rights and obligations of the parties, and to amend its judgment entry by making the
express finding under Civ.R. 54(B) that its judgment entry was final and appealable. On
January 26, 2021, the trial court granted the motion in part, amending the December 9,
2020 judgment entry to include the finding that Westfield “is required to provide a defense
and indemnification to [APS] and Yanko. Both [APS’s] Third Party Complaint and Yanko’s
Crossclaim seeking a defense and indemnification are sustained.” (1/26/21 J.E.) The
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –8–
trial court also found that its judgment was final and appealable and there was no just
reason for delay.
{¶14} Appellants filed this timely appeal.
Standard of Review
{¶15} This appeal is from a trial court judgment resolving opposing motions for
summary judgment. An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s
decision to grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court set forth
in Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241
(1996). Before summary judgment can be granted, the trial court must determine that:
(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence in favor of the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, the conclusion is adverse to
that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
Whether a fact is “material” depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated.
Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (8th
Dist.1995).
{¶16} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court
of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s
claim.” (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296, 662 N.E.2d 264
(1996). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal
burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at
Case No. 21 MA 0012 –9–
293. In other words, when presented with a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some evidence to suggest that a
reasonable factfinder could rule in that party’s favor. Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn.,
122 Ohio App.3d 378, 386, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997).
{¶17} The evidentiary materials to support a motion for summary judgment are
listed in Civ.R. 56(C) and include the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact that
have been filed in the case. In resolving the motion, the court views the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Temple, 50 Ohio St.2d at 327, 364 N.E.2d
267.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING THAT THE
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY ENDORSEMENT OF THE
INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED BY WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY
WAS A CLAIMS MADE AND REPORTED POLICY FOR WHICH A
SHOWING OF PREJUDICE WAS NOT REQUIRED.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT WESTFIELD
INSURANCE COMPANY WAS REQUIRED TO SHOW IT WAS
PREJUDICED BY THE LATE CLAIM NOTICE BY ASSOCIATED PAPER
STOCK, INC. AND THOMAS YANKO.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 10 –
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
INSURANCE COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A DEFENSE AND
INDEMNIFICATION TO ASSOCIATED PAPER STOCK, INC. AND
THOMAS YANKO FOR THE CLAIM OF JOHN BOSLEY, SR.
{¶18} In Appellants’ first three assignments of error, they challenge the trial court’s
decision to grant APS and Yanko’s motions for summary judgment and concluding they
were entitled to coverage under the policy. Although not in accordance with the appellate
rules, Appellants set forth one argument for all three assignments. For the sake of clarity
and because the assignments are so similar in nature, the first three assignments will be
addressed together.
{¶19} First, it is important to note that there are two underlying lawsuits and two
EPL endorsement policies. The allegations in both lawsuits are identical and the notice
provisions in both EPL policies are identical. The key factors are, first, that in the First
Lawsuit Yanko was not named as a defendant. Yanko was not added as a party
defendant and was not served as such in the underlying matter until the Refiled Lawsuit
was amended on March 13, 2020. Second, the First Lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). Despite the dismissal of the First Lawsuit, Appellants’ timeline
incorporates both lawsuits and both EPL policies. Appellants allege that the language of
the EPL is unambiguous and that APS and Yanko were required to provide notice to
Westfield immediately upon being served with the First Lawsuit. Third, APS and Yanko
contend that although notice was not given by APS until nine months after APS was
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 11 –
served with the First Lawsuit, the dismissal of that lawsuit requires that the parties
operate, by law, as though those claims never existed and that both parties gave timely
notice of the Refiled Lawsuit, first APS, and then Yanko once he was named in the
amended complaint.
{¶20} “[I]n general, when a trial court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case
has been voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial court patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed[.]” State ex rel. Hummer v. Sadler, 96 Ohio
St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 22. “A dismissal without prejudice leaves
the parties as if no action had been brought at all.” DeVille Photography, Inc. v. Bowers,
169 Ohio St. 267, 272, 159 N.E.2d 443 (1959).
{¶21} In its judgment entry granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded:
Prompt notice provisions of insurance policies are enforceable in order to
permit the insurer to determine whether the allegations state a claim and
whether there is coverage. Giving proper notice allows the insurer to protect
its own interests and properly and timely investigate the claims alleged.
Associated maintains that it failed to notify Westfield of a prior case not the
case at bar. It further argues that coverage is owed to the insured even
under the scenario of late notice because the insurer has failed to show it
was prejudiced as a result of the delay. See: Quail Energy Corp. v. Green
Westfield Ins. Co., 2015 Ohio Misc. Lexis 13447.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 12 –
The Court finds that under the facts of this case as stipulated, Westfield’s
notice of the claim in case No. 2019 CV 2425 has not deprived it of a
meaningful opportunity to investigate and protect its own interests.
(12/9/20 J.E.)
{¶22} Thus, the trial court determined that Appellants were not prejudiced by the
late notice given by Appellees. Appellants assert in their first assignment of error that the
trial court erred in failing to recognize and consider that the EPL endorsement was
contained in a “claims made and reported policy.” According to Appellants, there is a
distinction under Ohio law between a “claims made and reported” policy and an
“occurrence” policy. They argue that, under Ohio law, contrary to the law and customs
regarding an occurrence policy, there is no requirement that an insurer demonstrate that
they were prejudiced by late notice of a claim from an insured under a claims made and
reported policy (the notice-prejudice rule), particularly if the policy sets forth a date certain
by which notice must be given.
{¶23} Appellees respond that in Ohio there is no distinction between a claims
made and reported policy and an occurrence based policy. Late notice will only amount
to a breach of the insurance contract when it is prejudicial to the insurer. Ferrando v.
Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St.3d 186, 2002-Ohio-7217, 781 N.E.2d 927.
{¶24} The parties do not dispute that the EPL endorsement is contained in a
claims made and reported policy. In fact, according to the parties’ stipulations, the title
heading on the first page of the EPL endorsement states in all capital letters, “THIS IS A
CLAIMS-MADE AND REPORTED COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT.” (9/30/20 Stipulation
of Facts, ¶ 27.) Therefore, the language of the policy unambiguously states that it is a
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 13 –
claims made and reported policy and not an occurrence based policy. Appellants’
contention that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that the EPL endorsement was
contained in a claims made and reported policy is not borne out by the record, as the trial
court noted in its judgment entry that, “[t]he parties have submitted a stipulation of facts
that the Court has adopted as true.” (12/9/20 J.E.) As the parties stipulated that the
endorsement was contained in a claims made and reported policy and the trial court
adopted that stipulation, the trial court did not need to make a specific finding regarding
this issue, as it was not a fact in dispute between the parties. However, although it was
not required to specifically state the EPL endorsement was contained in a claims-made
policy, the trial court was required to conduct the appropriate analysis to determine what
coverage was provided under a claims-made policy pursuant to Ohio law. Such an
analysis is specifically lacking and is determinative in this case, as discussed below.
{¶25} In its second assignment of error, Appellants contend the trial court erred in
determining that Appellants were required to show they were prejudiced by a late notice
of claim when the parties stipulated that the EPL was part of a claims-made policy. Citing
United States v. A.C. Strip, 868 F.2d 181 (6th Cir.1989), Appellants argue that there is an
important distinction between a claims-made policy and an occurrence based policy in
determining whether the notice-prejudice rule applies. Appellants argue that, under Ohio
law, claims-made policies do not require the insurer to demonstrate it was prejudiced by
the late notice given.
{¶26} The trial court concluded in its judgment entry that, “Westfield’s notice of the
claim in case No. 2019 CV 2425 has not deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to
investigate and protect its own interests.” (12/9/20 J.E.) Hence, the court clearly applied
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 14 –
the notice-prejudice rule. In so doing, however, the trial court ignored the effect of the
language in the parties’ policy and EPL endorsement.
{¶27} A claims-made policy is intended to cover losses that are asserted during
the policy period, regardless of when the events underlying the “claim” may have
occurred. Id. “A claims made policy provides coverage for claims brought against the
insured only during the life of the policy. An occurrence policy provides coverage for acts
done during the policy period regardless of when the claim is brought.” Id. at 185. A
claims-made policy limits liability to a fixed duration of time only. A.C. Strip, at 187. To
allow for coverage beyond that fixed time period would operate to provide an insured
more coverage than specifically allowed for and agreed to in the policy that the insured
obtained. Id. A cut-off date is integral to a claims-made policy, as it is directly related to
the premium rate of a policy. Garrison Southfield Park, L.L.C. v. Aspen Specialty Ins.
Co., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-21, 2022-Ohio-709, ¶ 29. Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that an
insurance company is under no obligation to its insured, or to others harmed by the
actions of the insured, unless the conduct alleged of the insured falls within the coverage
of the policy.” Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 665 N.E.2d 1115
(1996).
{¶28} In Ferrando, on which Appellees rely, the Ohio Supreme Court implemented
the notice-prejudice rule with regard to an insured giving notice to an insurer of a pending
claim. The Ferrando Court determined that prompt notice provisions in an insurance
policy can be valid, but “the failure of notice will serve as a material breach of the
insurance contract only when the unreasonable notice is prejudicial to the insurer.” Id. at
¶ 30. Thus, if notice is unreasonable but the insurer suffers no prejudice, the breach is
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 15 –
not material and coverage remains in effect. Id. However, it is abundantly clear that the
language in the policy in Ferrando merely stated that the insured was to provide “prompt
notice” of any “accident,” “claim,” “suit,” or “loss.” This language is significantly less
specific than in the endorsement at bar, which required that notice of any “claim,” as
broadly defined, must be made within the policy period or no later than 30 days thereafter.
Additionally, the policy language at issue requires that any “claims” raised from a single
allegedly wrongful action are “deemed to be made on the date that the first ‘claim’ is
made.” Hence, this policy tells an insured that the insurer requires notice within a specific
period of any and all acts alleged against it where a third party has made any kind of
“written demand for monetary and non-monetary relief,” and when it first becomes aware
of the demand, no matter how many subsequent “claims” are made. Ferrando is clearly
distinguishable on the basis of the language of the policies and the specificity with which
an insured is notified of its obligations. This specificity is only one hallmark in
distinguishing a claims-made versus occurrence based policy.
{¶29} Appellees contend that the notice-prejudice rule applies regardless of
whether the policy is a claims-made policy or an occurrence policy. However, federal
courts applying Ohio law have held that the notice-prejudice rule in Ferrando is
inapplicable in cases where the policy provides that notice of a “claim” must be given to
the insurer by a certain date. See McCarty v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA.,
699 Fed.Appx. 464 (6th Cir.2017); Wendy’s Intern., Inc. v. Illinois Union Insur. Co.,
S.D.Ohio No. 2:05-cv-803, 2007 WL 710242, at *9; Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of
London v. Jeff Wyler Dealer Group, Inc., S.D.Ohio No. C-1-05-572, 2007 WL 1989836,
*8 (July 9, 2007).
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 16 –
{¶30} In McCarty, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying
Ohio law, rejected an argument that the notice-prejudice rule applied to malpractice
insurance which was contained in a claims-made policy. This policy required any “claim”
to be “promptly reported” to the insurer, but no later than 60 days after the end of the
policy period. McCarty at 468. The plaintiffs in McCarty did argue that the insurer would
not be prejudiced by the late notice. The Sixth Circuit noted, “[b]ecause coverage in a
claims-made policy is generally restricted to only claims made and reported during the
policy period, an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice to deny a claim that is made
outside the policy period.” Id. citing A.C. Strip at 187.
{¶31} In Wendy’s, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
determined that the notice-prejudice rule did not apply to a policy where notice was
required to be given “immediately, but in no event later than 60 days after the end of the
Policy Period of any Claim made against the Insured.” Wendy’s at *3. The court
distinguished Ferrando, concluding that the policy in Ferrando did not require the insured
to notify the insurer of any claim by a specific date, but merely stated that notice should
be given “promptly.” Wendy’s at *8.
{¶32} In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, another United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio case applying Ohio law, the Court determined that
“[a]bsent any contrary caselaw supporting the proposition that the notice-prejudice
standard enunciated in Ferrando applies when a specific notice deadline is imposed
under a policy or indicating that the Ohio Supreme Court would extend the notice-
prejudice standard in this manner, the Court declines to extend Ferrando to the facts of
this case.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London at *7.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 17 –
{¶33} The notice provision in the instant matter is unambiguous and clear. Notice
of any “claim” made against the insured is required to be given to the insurer during the
defined policy period or within thirty days after the expiration of the policy period. Thus,
there is a date certain when the insured is to provide notice. This is the provision agreed
to by the parties when Appellees obtained this claims-made policy and, in accordance
with the Tenth District and the federal courts applying Ohio law, Appellants were not
required to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by Appellees’ late notice.
{¶34} In their third assignment of error, Appellants contend the trial court erred in
determining that Westfield was required to provide a defense and indemnification under
the terms of the EPL endorsement for Bosley’s claims.
{¶35} The parties stipulated the notice provision contained in the EPL
endorsement requires Appellees to “give written or oral notice to [Westfield] as soon as
practicable and either: * * * anytime during the ‘EPL coverage period’ * * * or within thirty
(30) days after the end of the ‘EPL coverage period.’ ” (9/30/20 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 32.)
The coverage period for the first EPL is April 1, 2018 to April 1, 2019. The second EPL
coverage period was from April 16, 2019 to April 16, 2020. The First Lawsuit was filed
on October 26, 2018. Therefore, Appellees were required to given notice of any “claim”
to Westfield as soon as practicable anytime during the EPL coverage period or within 30
days after the EPL expired. Again, the definition of “claim” is broadly written, and certainly
includes any lawsuit that may be filed. Additionally, the policy requires that notice be
given at the first instance the insured becomes aware a “claim” is being made no matter
how many other “claims” may arise from the same facts at some later date. Here, the
notice provision was triggered and the clock began ticking when Bosley’s complaint was
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 18 –
filed in the First Lawsuit on October 26, 2018 and ended on a date certain, May 1, 2019
(thirty days after the EPL endorsement coverage period). Appellee APS gave Westfield
notice of Bosley’s claims on August 21, 2019, nearly four months after the time period
mandated by the policy ended.
{¶36} Appellees concede the notice provided by APS of the First Lawsuit was not
timely, but argue: (1) the subsequent dismissal of the First Lawsuit operated to void the
allegations asserted in this complaint as though they did not exist, and (2) even if the
allegations did not extinguish pursuant to Quail, Appellants were required to show they
were prejudiced by the late notice and failed to make this showing.
{¶37} In addition, Appellee Yanko asserts that since he was not named as a party
defendant in the action until the Refiled Lawsuit was amended on March 13, 2020, the
notice provision applicable to him as an individual officer of APS did not expire until May
16, 2020 (thirty days after the expiration of the second EPL endorsement coverage
period.) Thus, Yanko contends that his notice of the claim against him that was given to
Westfield on April 6, 2020, was timely under the EPL notice provision.
{¶38} It is apparent from the record and the stipulation of facts that Appellee APS
did not give timely notice under the notice provision of the EPL endorsement. It is equally
apparent that under this claims-made policy which contains a date certain for when notice
is to be given to the insurer, the notice-prejudice standard does not apply under Ohio law.
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellees on the basis
that Appellants had “not deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to investigate and protect
its own interests.” (12/9/20 J.E.) The trial court improperly applied the notice-prejudice
rule which is inapplicable to claims-made policies with a date certain notice requirement.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 19 –
{¶39} Regarding Appellee Yanko, the record contains three nearly identical
complaints: the complaint filed in the First Lawsuit, and the complaint and amended
complaint filed in the Refiled Lawsuit. Yanko, as statutory agent, was served with the
initial “claims” made by Bosley in 2018. Although not named as a party defendant until
the complaint in the Refiled Lawsuit was amended, the initial complaint is replete with
references to Yanko, individually, as the alleged bad actor in Bosley’s age discrimination
action. The complaints all state that Yanko was Bosley’s direct supervisor during the
entire tenure of his employment at APS. (3/13/20 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 3.)
Further, Bosley alleges he directly informed Yanko as to APS’s violations of DOT
regulations and that “Yanko yelled at [Bosley]” for continuing to submit driver’s logs.
(3/13/20 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ¶ 21.) Finally, Bosley alleged that Yanko
personally notified Bosley that he was being laid off. (3/13/20 Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, ¶ 22.) Under the unambiguous terms of the EPL endorsement, Appellees
were required to notify Appellants of Bosley’s “claims” when they were first raised to
Appellees, as they agree the insurance contract provides that notice must be given: “If,
during the ‘EPL coverage period’, incidents or events occur which ‘you’ reasonably
believe may give rise to a ‘claim’ or ‘suit’ for which coverage may be provided
hereunder[.]” (EPL Endorsement at p. 5.) Even the most casual reading of the original
complaint filed in October of 2018 would have given Yanko a reasonable belief that Bosley
was raising a “claim” against him, individually. No other individual employee or officer of
APS is mentioned, other than Yanko, in any of the three complaints. All of the allegations
in the amended complaint are identical to those raised in the First Lawsuit that was served
on Yanko as the statutory agent of the business. Because the First Lawsuit clearly
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 20 –
contained “claims” raised against Yanko as defined in the EPL endorsement, Appellee
Yanko was required to provide notice to Appellants within the same time requirement
imposed by contract on APS. The record shows the Appellees were notified, in writing,
of Bosley’s claims against them at the time they were served with the First Lawsuit. While
dismissal of that lawsuit operated procedurally to make the suit a nullity pursuant to Ohio’s
rules, it in no way affected the language of the EPL endorsement. That language clearly
required Appellees to notify Appellants of the First Lawsuit at the time it was filed because
it contained the first written notice to Appellees of claims made against them by Bosley.
Because neither Appellee gave timely notice of these claims under the EPL endorsement,
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and in determining
that Appellants were required to provide a defense and indemnification to Appellees.
{¶40} Appellants’ first, second and third assignments of error have merit and are
sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE CLAIMS OF
BAD FAITH AS A MATTER OF LAW.
{¶41} In the fourth assignment of error, Appellants argue the trial court failed to
dismiss Appellees’ bad faith claims. APS asserted a claim of bad faith in a third party
complaint. Yanko raised these claims in his cross-claim against Appellants. The trial
court concluded that “Westfield’s and Hartford’s Motions for Summary Judgment
regarding bad faith claims are overruled as genuine issues of material fact remain.”
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 21 –
{¶42} Appellants argue that they were not obligated to provide coverage to
Appellees because of their failure to timely provide notice. Hence, there can be no liability
for bad faith. Appellants argue in the alternative that, even if we determine that Appellees
are entitled to coverage under the EPL endorsement, Appellees’ bad faith claims should
be dismissed because their decision was reasonable under the language of the contract.
Appellees did not respond to Appellants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue.
{¶43} Summary judgment can be granted only where there remains no genuine
issue of material fact for trial and where, after construing the evidence most strongly in
favor of the nonmovant, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-
3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 10, citing Civ.R. 56(C). The burden of showing there is no
genuine issue of material fact initially lies with the party who files the summary judgment
motion. Id., citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 294, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).
{¶44} Thereafter, the nonmovant may not rest on mere allegations or denials of
the party’s pleadings but must respond by setting forth specific facts that show that there
is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id., citing Civ.R. 56(E). “If the party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.” Civ.R.
56(E). Although courts are cautioned to construe the evidence presented in favor of the
nonmoving party, summary judgment is not to be discouraged where a nonmovant fails
to respond with evidence supporting the essentials of his claim. Leibreich v. A.J.
Refrigeration, Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 266, 269, 617 N.E.2d 1068 (1993).
{¶45} Appellees did not provide arguments in opposition to Appellants’ summary
judgment motion on the claims of bad faith in this matter and cannot simply rest on the
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 22 –
allegations presented in their pleadings. The nonmovant must respond and present
evidentiary materials or cite to the evidence already in the record. While Appellees in this
case each filed summary judgment motions and opposed some of Appellants’ claims,
they addressed only the issue of coverage under the EPL endorsement.
{¶46} “[A]n insurer has the duty to act in good faith in the handling and payment
of the claims of its insured.” Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 272, 452 N.E.2d
1315 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. Where an insurer refuses to pay a claim
without providing reasonable justification, the insurer fails to act in good faith. Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994), paragraph one of the
syllabus. A failure to act in good faith gives rise to a claim against the insurer. Hoskins,
at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶47} In their pleadings, APS and Yanko alleged that despite numerous attempts,
Appellants failed to negotiate coverage in good faith. Without any additional evidentiary
support or without citing to evidence in the record, which does not appear to exist, there
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Appellants acted in bad faith. The
mere allegations in Appellees’ pleadings do not amount to evidence of bad faith. In any
event, as we have concluded that Appellees failed to provide timely notice as required
under the terms of the EPL endorsement, there is no viable basis for their related bad
faith claims against Appellants.
{¶48} Appellants’ fourth assignment of error has merit and is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR THE HARTFORD STEAM BOILER INSPECTION AND INSURANCE
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 23 –
COMPANY BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN IT AND
ASSOCIATED PAPER STOCK, INC. AND THOMAS YANKO.
{¶49} In its fifth assignment of error, Appellants argue the trial court erred in failing
to grant summary judgment in favor of Hartford, as it had no contractual relationship with
Appellees. The third-party complaint filed by APS alleges that Hartford “is an insurance
company that either insures, underwrites, or acts as some sort of agent or partner” with
Westfield. (Third-Party Complaint, ¶ 3.)
{¶50} In their motion for summary judgment, Appellants argued that Hartford
served as a reinsurer to Westfield for the coverage afforded under the EPL endorsement.
Appellants argue that a reinsurance contract is separate from the contract between the
insured. As such, the reinsurer cannot be held directly liable to the insureds. Int’l Surplus
Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd’s of London,
868 F.Supp. 923, 928 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Since there is no direct contractual relationship
between Hartford and Appellees, the claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment,
and bad faith against Hartford should have been dismissed.
{¶51} Again, after Hartford filed its motion for summary judgment seeking to be
dismissed from the action for failing to have a contractual relationship with Appellees, the
burden was on APS and Yanko to introduce additional evidence or cite evidence already
in the record demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding their
alleged contractual relationship with Hartford. Appellees did not address this issue in
their motion in opposition to summary judgment in any fashion.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 – 24 –
{¶52} In its judgment entry, the trial court did not address this issue directly. It
merely concluded that genuine issues of fact remained regarding the bad faith claim
against both Westfield and Hartford.
{¶53} A review of this record reflects that, beyond the mere allegations in the
pleadings, there is no evidence in support of any contractual relationship which may exist
between Appellees and Hartford. In fact, it is clear even from the pleadings that Appellees
did not have a contractual relationship with Hartford.
{¶54} This record shows that no genuine issues of fact remain regarding the
absence of a contractual relationship between Hartford and Appellees. Therefore,
Appellants’ fifth assignment of error has merit and is sustained.
{¶55} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and
judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Appellants.
Donofrio, P.J., concurs.
Robb, J., concurs.
Case No. 21 MA 0012 [Cite as Bosley v. Associated Paper Stock, Inc., 2022-Ohio-2649.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are sustained and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is reversed. Judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Appellants. Costs to be taxed against the Appellees.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.