Bosley, M. v. York Hospital

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 25, 2024
• Docket: 443 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A27015-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MARILYN L. BOSLEY, INDIVIDUALLY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE : PENNSYLVANIA ESTATE OF JOHN ELMER BOSLEY : : Appellant : : v. : : YORK HOSPITAL AND WELLSPAN : HEALTH : No. 443 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 21, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 2015-SU-003881-82

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 25, 2024

Marilyn Bosley appeals an order granting partial summary judgment to

the Defendants, York Hospital and WellSpan Health (“the Hospital”). Because

that order is not final, we quash.

In 2013, Mrs. Bosley’s husband, John Bosley, underwent surgery at the

Hospital. In 2015, Mr. and Mrs. Bosley sued the Hospital on counts of (1)

corporate negligence and (2) loss of consortium. They sought various types

of consequential damages, as well as punitive damages. When Mr. Bosley

died, Mrs. Bosley substituted as the Administratrix of his estate.

After discovery closed, the Hospital moved for summary judgment. The

trial court granted partial relief. It barred damage theories of pain, suffering,

inconvenience, mental distress, and punitive damages. However, the order

did not dismiss either count. See T.C.O., 1/23/24, at 1-2. Mrs. Bosley asked

the court to certify its grant of partial summary judgment as a “final order.” J-A27015-24

The trial court complied but observed, “there is a jurisdictional issue to be

resolved [i.e.,] whether the January 23, 2024 Order is a ‘final’ order subject

to interlocutory appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).” Trial Court Opinion,

5/13/24, at 2. As we explain, it is not.

“This Court may raise the issue of appellate jurisdiction sua sponte.”

Commonwealth v. Cross, 317 A.3d 655, 657 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some

punctuation omitted). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate

standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review plenary.” Id.

Typically, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court extends to “final orders

of the courts of common pleas.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742. The summary-judgment

order disposed of no claims and no parties. Thus, it is not a “final order” under

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Even so, an interlocutory order may be “entered as a

final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of this rule.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(3).

Under that subdivision, the trial court “may enter a final order as to one

or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only [when] an immediate appeal

would facilitate resolution of the entire case.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) (emphasis

added). A finality certification “should be made only in the most extraordinary

circumstances, because such action would frustrate the purpose of the

amendments to the Rule” and lead to piecemeal appeals. Bailey v. RAS Auto

Body, Inc., 85 A.3d 1064, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Courts must weigh four factors before certifying an order as final: “(1)

whether there is a significant relationship between adjudicated and

unadjudicated claims; (2) whether there is a possibility that an appeal would

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be mooted by further developments; (3) whether there is a possibility that the

court . . . will consider issues a second time; and (4) whether an immediate

appeal will enhance prospects of settlement.” Pa.R.A.P. 341 Comment. Here,

those factors do not indicate finality in the partial summary-judgment order.

First, the relationship between the dismissed damages theories and the

remaining negligence counts is not substantial. The dismissed damages are

the outer limits of Mrs. Bosley’s potential remedy, but they have no implication

on whether the Hospital acted negligently. As such, no decision by this Court

on the scope of Mrs. Bosley’s damages will determine if the Hospital was

negligent. Hence, this appeal will not resolve the entire case, regardless of

what we decide. There is no finality under the first factor.

Second, the trial court correctly held that the mootness factor “does not

favor a finding of finality.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/24, at 7. A “jury’s finding

of no negligence would, indeed, moot any issue” regarding damages. Id. The

jury’s ability to moot this appeal entirely strongly favors quashal, because this

Court may never need to decide the issues raised here.

Third, although the trial court weighed this factor in favor of finality, we

disagree. The court stated there “are at least two other cases arising from

the same factual background as this case” on its docket. Id. at 8. However,

those cases are outside the certified record and, therefore, beyond this Court’s

scope of review. See, e.g., In re J.F., 27 A.3d 1017, 1024 n.10 (Pa. Super.

2011). Moreover, a trial court’s ability to dispose of future cases will not

resolve this case in its entirety. Thus, the third factor does not favor finality.

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Fourth, the trial court believes that this appeal will lead to settlement,

because “the parties will know prior to heading into a trial where they stand.”

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/24, at 10. In its view, Mrs. Bosley’s remaining

damages “are nominal at best” and “probably not worth taking to trial in the

face of a reasonable settlement offer.” Id. at 9.

The trial court is better positioned to predict a settlement than we are.

We therefore accept its conclusion regarding the fourth factor that deciding

Mrs. Bosley’s appeal now would increase the chances of settlement. Even so,

no court can guarantee settlement, because the parties unilaterally decide,

for reasons known only to themselves, whether to settle a case. Thus, we

hold that the likelihood-of-settlement factor does not outweigh the other three

factors, which strongly disfavor a finding of finality.

Because three Rule 341(c) factors disfavor finality, we quash.

Appeal quashed. Case stricken from the argument list.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/25/2024

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