Borough of St. Clair v. St. Clair Police Department

24 A.3d 1107, 2011 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 324, 2011 WL 2695787
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 13, 2011
Docket1393 C.D. 2010
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 24 A.3d 1107 (Borough of St. Clair v. St. Clair Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Borough of St. Clair v. St. Clair Police Department, 24 A.3d 1107, 2011 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 324, 2011 WL 2695787 (Pa. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Judge McGINLEY.

St. Clair Police Department (Depai'tment) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial *1109 court) which reversed and vacated the disputed portion of an Interest Arbitration Award (Award) entered pursuant to 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10 1 commonly referred to as “Act 111.”

The Borough of St. Clair (Borough) is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Department is the exclusive representative of the police employees of the Borough.

On August 24, 2009, an arbitration board modified various provisions of the parties’ existing Award, including overtime during unscheduled absences and emergencies. The term of the Award was from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2011.

Article VIII, Section 3 of the Interest Award provided that overtime would be offered to full-time officers first using a rotating system based on seniority, to fill vacancies during unscheduled absences and emergencies:

Overtime would be defined to be hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day for scheduled eight (8) hour shifts or in excess of ten (10).hours in a day for scheduled ten (10) hours shifts or in excess of forty (40) hours in a work week.
OveHime shall be offered to full-time officers first, using a rotating seniority system. If no full-time officer accepts the shift, the vacancy may be offered to part-time officers. For purposes of this section, overtime shall mean unscheduled absences that arise after the schedule for full-time and part-time officers has been posted and in emergency situations.
Absent any emergency situation, no officer shall work in a police capacity for more than sixteen (16) hours in a twenty-four (24) hour period.

Interest Arbitration Award, June 30, 2009, Article VIII, Section 3 at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 9a (Emphasis added).

On September 17, 2009, the Borough filed a Petition for Review. It alleged that the Award “improperly limits the power of the Mayor of the Borough to control the Chief of Police and the police force and direct a time during which, the place where, and the manner in which the Chief of Police and the police force shall perform their duties as provided by Section 1121 of the Borough Code, 53 P.S. § 46121.[ 2 ]” Petition for Review, ¶ 6 at 2.

Specifically, the Borough argued that Section 1121 of the Borough Code, 53 P.S. § 46121, gives the Mayor the statutory right to “have full charge and control of the chief of police and the police force, and he shall direct the time during which, the place where and the manner in which, the chief of police and the police force shall perform their duties.... ”

The Borough did not dispute that “regularly scheduled overtime” may be a subject of collective bargaining. However, the Borough contended that the arbitration board exceeded its jurisdiction and powers because the Award unduly restricted the Mayor’s ability to schedule police officers under the unusual circumstances of last minute absences and emergencies.

The Department countered that the overtime provision, which incorporated a rotating system of overtime based on seniority, did not infringe on the Borough’s managerial prerogative to determine “if’ overtime will be offered. According to the Department the Award merely determined, in advance, the order in which the officers must be called to fill the vacancies, based on full-time/part-time status and ro *1110 tating seniority; thereby eliminating the chance that overtime would be awarded based on partiality or some other unfair practice.

The Department further argued that an arbitration board had jurisdiction over matters that constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining under Act 111. Those subjects include “the terms and conditions of ... employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits.” Section 1 of Act 111, 43 P.S. § 217.1. According to the Department, nothing in the Award contravened these subjects. The Department further noted that the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board determined on many occasions that overtime and seniority are mandatory subjects of bargaining.

On July 6, 2010, the trial court reversed and vacated the disputed portion of the Award. The trial coui’t agreed that the disputed language infringed on the Borough’s “managerial prerogatives” and undermined the Mayor’s exclusive scheduling authority granted by the Borough Code because it “interferes with the statutory right of the Mayor to adjust schedules for Borough police officers.” Trial Court Decision, July 6, 2010, at 6. The trial court found that the Award went beyond the parameters of the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining so far as it required that certain officers be given overtime before other officers, specifically full-time officers over part-time officers. The trial court also found that the arbitration board “exceeded its jurisdiction” because it “improperly affected the Mayor’s statutory right to have free charge and control of the police department concerning the manner in which and the time the police perform their duties with regard to scheduling of overtime for emergency situations and unscheduled absences.” Trial Court Order and Opinion, July 6, 2010, at 4-5.

On appeal, the Department contends that the trial court erred when it vacated the overtime provision. The Department argues that overtime and seniority issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded that the arbitration board exceeded its jurisdiction. The Department also contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the arbitration board exceeded its powers because the Award neither usurped any authority deposited with the Mayor nor the Borough’s managerial prerogative to determine if and when overtime was necessary. The Mayor still retained all rights essential for the proper and efficient function of a police force, including the right to determine when overtime was necessary, whether there were enough officers on shift to cover the emergency, whether it was necessary to call off-duty officers, and the number of officers required. The Award simply established a system, in advance, which determined the priority in which the off-duty officers would be offered overtime, and eliminated any potential for favoritism.

Review of an Act 111 Interest Arbitration Award is limited to narrow certiorari wherein the award may only be reviewed for: (1) jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) excess in the exercise of powers; and (4) deprivations of constitutional rights. City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, 595 Pa. 47, 938 A.2d 225 (2007). This Court’s standard of review of an order of the trial court is plenary. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania Troopers Association (Styers), 840 A.2d 1059 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).

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24 A.3d 1107, 2011 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 324, 2011 WL 2695787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/borough-of-st-clair-v-st-clair-police-department-pacommwct-2011.