Borough of Grove City v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

928 A.2d 371, 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 261
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 6, 2007
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 928 A.2d 371 (Borough of Grove City v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Borough of Grove City v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 928 A.2d 371, 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 261 (Pa. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Judge FRIEDMAN.

The Borough of Grove City (Borough) petitions for review of the August 16, 2006, order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR), which reversed the decision of a referee and granted benefits to Michael E. Cooney (Claimant). We reverse.

Claimant was elected tax collector for the Borough, beginning in January 2002, and he served in that position until December 31, 2005. Under section 1086 of The Borough Code (Code), 1 Claimant was responsible for the collection of various taxes levied within the Borough, but, as the elected tax collector, Claimant could “not collect any tax levied and imposed under [The Local Tax Enabling Act 2 (LTEA) ] unless the ordinance imposing such tax ... provide[d] that he shall be the collector of the said tax.” 53 P.S. § 46086. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 1-3, 5.)

The only tax levied within the Borough under the LTEA is the local earned income tax. After Claimant was elected tax collector, although the ordinance did not require it, the Borough appointed Claimant to be Borough Receiver of Taxes (Receiver), whose duty it is to collect the local earned income tax. The Borough gave Claimant some training and paid Claimant a 5% commission on all earned income taxes that he collected. The Borough also paid for the office supplies, forms and postage necessary for Claimant to perform his Receiver duties. 3 (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 4, 8-10,14-15, 23, 25.)

The Borough had entered into an agreement with the Grove City Area School District and the County of Mercer under section 10 of the LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6910, to use a single Receiver to collect the local earned income tax. Section 10(b) of the LTEA allows school districts and political subdivisions that levy, assess and collect earned income taxes to select “the same person or agency to collect such tax upon earned income.... ” 53 P.S. § 6910(b). Thus, once the Borough appointed Claimant as the Borough’s Receiver, the Grove City Area School District and the County of Mercer also appointed Claimant to be their collector of earned income taxes. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 14-16.)

Claimant did not have a job description for the Receiver position and, as Receiver, did not participate in the Borough’s health or pension plans and did not accrue leave time. Claimant had his own office, which he rented from a private landlord, and paid his own rent and utilities. However, it is not clear if Claimant paid these expenses as the elected tax collector or as Receiver. Claimant hired two of his children to work part-time in his office. However, it is not clear if Claimant was acting as the elected tax collector or as Receiver when he hired them. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 11-13,17-20.)

*374 One of Claimant’s duties as Receiver was to distribute earned income tax monies received from non-residents who worked in the Borough to the proper home taxing authorities. An issue arose as to when unclaimed monies should be sent to home taxing authorities, and the Borough ordered Claimant to retain the monies until the taxing authorities specifically requested it. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 27-29.) In addition, Claimant once asked the Borough’s solicitor for permission to perform outside employment involving income tax returns, and the solicitor refused to grant him permission. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 7, 12, 26.)

When Claimant was not re-elected for the term beginning in January of 2006, Claimant applied for unemployment benefits in connection with his position as the Borough Receiver. Claimant’s application was granted, and the Borough filed an appeal. After a hearing, a referee reversed that determination. Claimant then appealed to the UCBR, which reversed the referee and granted Claimant benefits, concluding that the Borough failed to prove that Claimant, as the appointed Receiver, was self-employed where the Borough restricted his outside work and controlled his handling of non-resident taxes. The Borough now petitions this court for review. 4

I. Hearsay

The Borough first argues that the UCBR erred in relying solely on inadmissible hearsay evidence to find that the Borough refused to permit Claimant to do outside work. We agree.

Claimant testified as follows:

CL While you were acting as the Receiver of Taxes, could you perform any outside work?
C I asked the Solicitor several times about various subjects and I was always turned down....
EL I’m going to object. This is hearsay.
R I’ll honor that objection.
C I attempted to do earned income tax returns for people by request. I was informed I could not.
EL I’m going to object. I don’t — by whom and ...
C By whom? The Solicitor.
EL I’m going to object on the basis of hearsay.

(R.R. at 52a-53a.)

A finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand. Kilpatrick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 201, 429 A.2d 133 (1981). However, the admission of a party is an exception to the hearsay rule and is competent to sustain a finding of fact. Id. Statements made by an agent, employee or other representative of a party are admissible as evidence if the representative had express or implied authority to make them. Estate of Fells by Boulding v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 493, 635 A.2d 666 (1993), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 651, 647 A.2d 905 (1994).

The party offering a statement has the burden of proving agency and the authority to make the statement. Volunteer Fire Company of New Buffalo v. Hilltop Oil Company, 412 Pa.Super. 140, 602 A.2d 1348 (1992). Express authority is authority that is directly granted by the *375 principal to bind the principal as to certain matters; implied authority binds the principal to those acts of the agent that are necessary, proper and usual in the exercise of the agent’s express authority. Id.

In this case, Claimant presented no evidence to meet his burden of proving that the solicitor acted as the agent of the Borough in refusing to allow Claimant to perform outside work. A borough solicitor has a statutory duty to furnish legal opinions in writing upon questions of law submitted by a borough council, its committees, the mayor or the head of a department in their official capacities. Section 1117 of the Code, 53 P.S. § 46117.

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Bluebook (online)
928 A.2d 371, 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/borough-of-grove-city-v-unemployment-compensation-board-of-review-pacommwct-2007.