Borough of Cressona v. Fraternal Order of Police Black Diamond Lodge No. 80

632 A.2d 1018, 159 Pa. Commw. 141, 144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3006, 1993 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 641
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 18, 1993
DocketNo. 733 C.D. 1993
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 632 A.2d 1018 (Borough of Cressona v. Fraternal Order of Police Black Diamond Lodge No. 80) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Borough of Cressona v. Fraternal Order of Police Black Diamond Lodge No. 80, 632 A.2d 1018, 159 Pa. Commw. 141, 144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3006, 1993 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 641 (Pa. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

The Fraternal Order of Police Black Diamond Lodge No. 80 (FOP) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) vacating that portion of an Act [144]*1441111 arbitration changing the time period to be used for calculating the pension of the-then Chief of Police.

The FOP is the designated bargaining agent for the Borough of Cressona Police Department. In March of 1991, anticipating the expiration of the 1989-1991 contract, the FOP and the Borough of Cressona (Borough) began negotiations on a new contract to commence on January 1, 1992. Ultimately, because of an inability to reach an agreement, the Borough and the FOP submitted the contract to binding “interest arbitration”2 in accordance with the provisions of Act 111.

In September of 1991, Chief of Police Wilfred Daubert submitted to Borough Council a notice of his intention to retire as of December 31,1991, which Borough Council accepted on December 2, 1991. Chief Daubert, however, on December 16, 1991, submitted a letter to Borough Council stating that he was making his retirement effective as of January 5, 1992, rather than December 31, 1991. On December 18, 1991, the Board of Arbitrators issued its award, including a provision directing that Chief Daubert’s pension benefits, and only his benefits, were to be based on his salary during the last 12 months of service rather than the last 36 months as required by the Police Pension Fund Act, Act of May 29, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1804, as amended, 53 P.S. § 771 (Act 600).3

[145]*145The Borough appealed that portion of the award modifying the formula for calculating pension benefits to the trial court, contending that the modified pension provision exceeded the scope of the Board of Arbitrators’ power. The Borough contended that the pension benefits formula in the arbitration provision was in excess of the last 36 month formula set forth in Act 600. In addition, the Borough contended that Chief Daubert’s retirement was effective December 31, 1991, during the prior contract, and, as such, the issue should not have been considered in the arbitration of the new contract.

While not addressing when Chief Daubert’s retirement became effective, the trial court held that the Borough had established an Act 600 pension fund and the Act 600 provision that pension benefits be calculated on the basis of a minimum of the last 36 months of salary controlled. Because the Board of Arbitrators’ award calculating Chief Daubert’s pension benefits based on his last 12 months of salary exceeded the statutory provisions in Act 600, the trial court vacated that portion of the award. This appeal followed.

Our standard of review in Act 111 interest-arbitration cases is in the nature of narrow certiorari and limited to questions regarding: (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess in exercise of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights. See Washington Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 174, 259 A.2d 437, 441 (1969). Under this “narrow certiorari” standard of review, the courts give even greater deference to an arbitrator’s award than is given in judicial review of Act 195 and other arbitration proceedings. City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 (Wilson), 129 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 392, 401, 565 A.2d 1232, 1237 (1989).

The FOP contends that the trial court erred in holding that Act 600 controls and precludes a calculation of pension benefits based on any time period less than the [146]*146average salary for the last 36 months of service. The basis of its contention is that because its police department has less than three members, the Borough had the option to establish the pension fund under either the provisions of Act 6004 or Section 1131 of the Borough Code (Borough Code).5 Unlike Act 600, the Borough Code does not require that pension benefits be calculated on the average monthly salary for the last 36 months of service but, rather, leaves the time period of service used to calculate pensions to the discretion of the borough council. The FOP argues that because it was within the discretion of the Borough to choose whether to establish the police pension plan under either Act 600 or the Borough Code, the Board of Arbitrators had the power to order the Borough to pay pension amounts permissible under either plan.6 Because under the Borough Code it was not illegal to calculate pensions on the average salary paid in the last 12 [147]*147months, the FOP contends that the Board of Arbitrators’ award should be upheld.7 We disagree.

While the General Assembly did give the Borough the option to establish a police pension fund under either Act 600 or the Borough Code, once the Borough chose Act 600, that Act governs all aspects of managing the fund and awarding benefits. From that point forward, the Borough Code had no application to the fund; it is as if it didn’t exist. Because the Borough is not permitted to apply any provision of the Borough Code to the governance of its police pension fund, it was also in excess of the Board of Arbitrators’ powers to do so.

As to whether an arbitration award can change a provision of Act 600, in In re Arbitration Between the Borough of Berwick and the Borough of Berwick Police Department, 152 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 242, 618 A.2d 1185 (1992), we held that it was in excess of the Board of Arbitrators’ authority to do so. In Berwick, at issue was whether the Board of Arbitrators could order the borough to provide retirement benefits after 20 years of service rather than the mandatory minimum for retirement of 25 years of service provided for in Act 600. We held such an award to be in excess of the Board of Arbitrators’ authority because it contravened Act 600 and vacated that portion of the award. Id. at 246-48, 618 A.2d at 1187-88.

Just as we vacated the award in Berwick decreasing the years of service needed to retire set forth in Act 600 as being in excess of the Board of Arbitrators’ powers, this Board of Arbitrators’ award providing that Chief Daubert’s pension benefits be based on his average salary for his last 12 months of service rather than the 36 months required by Act 600 is [148]*148also in excess of its authority. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision vacating that portion of the award.8

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 1993, the order of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas dated March 4, 1993, No. S-128-1992, is affirmed.

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632 A.2d 1018, 159 Pa. Commw. 141, 144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3006, 1993 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 641, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/borough-of-cressona-v-fraternal-order-of-police-black-diamond-lodge-no-80-pacommwct-1993.