Borgens v. Hematology Oncology Associates of New Jersey LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 25, 2022
• Docket: 3:21-cv-08153
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Amber Borgens, No. CV-21-08153-PCT-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Hematology Oncology Associates of New Jersey LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the parties’ stipulation for a protective order. (Doc. 30). 16 In this stipulation, the parties seek to mark as confidential, “Ms. Borgens’ relevant tax, 17 medical, and other employment records, that contain sensitive, private information.” (Doc. 18 30 at 1). The stipulation implies that other information will be marked confidential, but 19 does not specify what that information would include. 20 Global protective orders are not appropriate. See AGA Shareholders, LLC v. CSK 21 Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007). Rule 26(c) requires a party 22 seeking a protective order to show good cause for issuance of such an order. Fed. R. Civ. 23 P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule 26(c), ‘the party seeking protection bears 24 the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is 25 granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (emphasis added) (quoting 26 Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002)). The party seeking 27 protection “must make a ‘particularized showing of good cause with respect to [each] 28 individual document.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. 1 U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). 2 Thus, “[t]he burden is on the party to requesting a protective order to demonstrate 3 that (1) the material in question is a trade secret or other confidential information within 4 the scope of Rule 26(c), and (2) disclosure would cause an identifiable, significant harm.” 5 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 6 Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 653 (D. Md. 1987)). 7 In this case, in short summary, Plaintiff claims that she experienced a COVID-19 8 exposure while working for Defendants and that Defendants’ response to Plaintiff advising 9 Defendants of that exposure violated the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Public 10 Law 116-127, as well as the Arizona Fair Wages & Healthy Families Act, A.R.S. § 23-371 11 et seq., both of which, Plaintiff alleges, required paid leave. (Doc. 1). Against this 12 complaint, it is not immediately clear to the Court why all of Plaintiff’s employment 13 records, medical records and tax returns are relevant to this case. Nonetheless, to the extent 14 these documents contain information subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, 15 Plaintiff may redact these records to remove this information prior to disclosure. In other 16 words, while the Court acknowledges that during discovery this information will not 17 automatically be filed in the record as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 requires for 18 redaction (see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(1)(A) and Local Rule Civil 5.2), by 19 this Order the Court is expanding when the redactions under Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 5.2 can be made by the disclosing party. 21 To the extent these records are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this case, the parties 22 have not shown a specific prejudice or harm will occur if these documents (once redacted) 23 are not subject to a protective order. For example, to the extent the medical records sought 24 relate to Plaintiff’s claimed exposure detailed in the complaint, that information is already 25 in the public record via the complaint. Further, that information is central to the issues in 26 this case and, thus, will be part of the public record. See e.g., Krieger v. Nationwide Mut. 27 Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1623158, *1 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“Plaintiff put his medical condition at 28 issue when he filed for benefits. The mere assertion that Plaintiff considers medical and 1 || personal information sensitive does not amount to a compelling reason to seal.”); Young v. 2|| Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 2014 WL 6886018, *2 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“[G]iven the centrality || of Plaintiff’s medical condition to the case, Plaintiff’s privacy interests are not a compelling reason to seal the records from public access. Accordingly, the Court will not seal materials 5 || containing Plaintiff’s medical information.”). 6 As stated above, it is not immediately clear to the Court why Plaintiff’s employment records are relevant to this case. Further, the parties have not alleged that Plaintiff has kept 8 || her employment history confidential such that it is not already “public” in some forum. 9 Based on the foregoing, the parties have failed to justify the issuance of a protective 10 || order in this case. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1131. Accordingly, 11 IT IS ORDERED that the stipulation for a protective order (Doc. 30) is denied 12 || without prejudice. 13 Dated this 25th day of January, 2022. 14 15 A 16 James A. Teilborg 17 Senior United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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