Borg 936010 v. Taylor

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: August 26, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00947
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

TIMOTHY LOWELL BORG,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-947

v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou

J. TAYLOR et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Johnson-Southwest, Snay, and Bassett. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim for damages against Defendant Taylor. Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Taylor remains in the case. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following ECF personnel in their official and personal capacities: Sergeant Unknown Johnson-Southwest, Correctional Officers J.

Taylor and B. Snay, and Grievance Coordinator T. Bassett. (Compl., ECF No 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that on March 16, 2025, Defendant Taylor was conducting rounds between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.. (Id., PageID.3.) When Defendant Taylor got to Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff told Defendant Taylor that he was feeling suicidal. (Id.) Defendant Taylor looked at Plaintiff and said, “I don’t give a f***[;] go for it.” (Id. (asterisks added).) Two hours later, Defendants Taylor and Johnson-Southwest came to Plaintiff’s cell and found Plaintiff hanging from the window. (Id.) Plaintiff was placed on observation, and he asked non-party Officer Casto to file a form requesting Defendant Taylor’s body camera footage from the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff “got off observation” on March 20, 2025, and filed a grievance about the incident. (Id.) Plaintiff gave the grievance to Defendant Snay, but was told “it allegedly got lost.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed another copy

of the grievance and never got a response. (Id.) He wrote to Defendant Bassett about the state of the grievance, and Defendant Bassett wrote back, telling Plaintiff “he had nothing on file and that [Plaintiff’s] grievances weren’t being submitted or were allegedly lost.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he has a history of self-harm and suicide attempts, and that Defendant Taylor had knowledge of this history “and still neglected to do anything about it.” (Id.) Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment claims premised upon a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s risk of suicide against Defendants Taylor and Johnson-Southwest, as well as constitutional claims regarding the handling of Plaintiff’s grievances against Defendants Snay and Bassett. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $150,000.00 in compensatory damages and $150,000.00 in punitive damages. (Id., PageID.4.) II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment claims premised upon a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s risk of suicide against Defendants Taylor and Johnson-Southwest, as well as constitutional claims regarding the handling of Plaintiff’s

grievances against Defendants Snay and Bassett. A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments, such as the MDOC, are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823,

826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). And, regardless, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims in their entirety. B. Personal Capacity Claims 1. Eighth Amendment Claims The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment claims against

Defendants Taylor and Johnson-Southwest premised upon a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s risk of suicide. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations

of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying

deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial

risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Under the Eighth Amendment, the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s “serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a]n inmate’s psychological needs may constitute serious medical needs, especially when they result in suicidal tendencies.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro

Dep’t of Corrs., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994)). With respect to suicidal tendencies, the Sixth Circuit has stated: “A plaintiff meets the objective prong of the [deliberate indifference] analysis by showing that the inmate showed suicidal tendencies during the period of detention or that he ‘posed a strong likelihood of another suicide attempt.’” Troutman, 979 F.3d at 483 (emphasis added) (quoting Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006); Linden v. Washtenaw Cnty., 167 F. App’x 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2006)). This is because “[s]uicide is a difficult event to predict and prevent and often occurs without warning.” Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005).

The Sixth Circuit has concluded that steps to prevent suicide are constitutionally required only in cases where “it [i]s ‘obvious that there [i]s a ‘strong likelihood that [the] inmate w[ill] attempt suicide[.]’” Troutman, 979 F.3d at 483 (quoting Downard for Estate of Downard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 2020)). “This is a high bar[.]” Downard, 968 F.3d at 601. Thus, the subjective component “typically requires evidence that the inmate was already on suicide watch, previously attempted suicide under similar conditions, or recently expressed a desire to self-harm.” Id. (citing Grabow v. Cnty. of Macomb, 580 F. App’x 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2014)). Moreover, “a prison official’s duty to recognize an inmate’s risk of committing suicide has a temporal component.” Andrews v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 957 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2020). To be held liable, “a prison official must be cognizant of the significant likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his own life.” Linden, 167 F. App’x at 421 (quoting Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, Plaintiff avers that he told Defendant Taylor that he felt suicidal, and that Defendant Taylor looked at Plaintiff and said, “I don’t give a f***[;] go for it.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3

(asterisks added).) Two hours later, Defendants Taylor and Johnson-Southwest came to Plaintiff’s cell and found Plaintiff hanging from the window. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he has a history of self-harm and suicide attempts, and that Defendant Taylor had knowledge of this history “and still neglected to do anything about it.” (Id.) Although Plaintiff has by no means proven his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Taylor, taking Plaintiff’s facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must do at this stage, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment personal capacity claim against Defendant Taylor cannot be dismissed on initial review. Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, Defendant Taylor was aware of the significant risk that Plaintiff might attempt suicide

because Plaintiff directly informed Defendant Taylor that he was suicidal. Moreover, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Taylor was aware of Plaintiff’s history of self-harm and suicide attempts. Despite that, Defendant Taylor disregarded that risk by telling Plaintiff, “I don’t give a f***[;] go for it.” (Id. (asterisks added).) Plaintiff, however, has not plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim with respect to Defendant Johnson-Southwest. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint does he set forth any facts suggesting that Defendant Johnson-Southwest was aware that Plaintiff was suicidal, that Plaintiff had told Defendant Johnson-Southwest that he was feeling suicidal, and that Defendant Johnson- Southwest ignored that risk. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Johnson-Southwest was with Defendant Taylor when they found Plaintiff hanging from his window. Plaintiff was then placed on observation. (Id.) Quite simply, Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest that Defendant Johnson- Southwest deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s suicide risk. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Johnson-Southwest. 2. Claims Regarding Handling of Grievances

The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert constitutional claims against Defendants Snay and Bassett premised upon the handling and failure to process Plaintiff’s grievances. These allegations, however, do not give rise to any constitutional claim. Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The courts have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does not create a

liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, the alleged conduct by Defendants Snay and Bassett could not have deprived Plaintiff of due process. Additionally, Plaintiff’s right to petition government is not violated by any failure to process or act on his grievances. The First Amendment “right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond). Moreover, any actions by Defendants Snay and Bassett related to Plaintiff’s grievances have not barred Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his grievances. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). “A prisoner’s constitutional right to assert grievances typically is not violated when

prison officials prohibit only ‘one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials’ while leaving a formal grievance procedure intact.” Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977)). Indeed, Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial process. See Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances, and he therefore cannot demonstrate the actual injury required for an access-to-the-courts claim. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 355 (1996) (requiring actual injury); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–24 (1977), overruled in other part by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). The exhaustion requirement only mandates exhaustion of available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were improperly denied access to the grievance process, the process would be rendered unavailable, and exhaustion would not be a prerequisite for initiation of a civil rights action. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required); Kennedy v. Tallio, 20 F. App’x 469, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for each of the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims regarding his use of the grievance process. Conclusion The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Moreover, having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants

Johnson-Southwest, Snay, and Bassett will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim for damages against Defendant Taylor. Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Taylor remains in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: August 26, 2025 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE