Borden v. State

60 So. 3d 935, 2004 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 48, 2004 WL 362256
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
DecidedFebruary 27, 2004
DocketCR-02-1314
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 60 So. 3d 935 (Borden v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Borden v. State, 60 So. 3d 935, 2004 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 48, 2004 WL 362256 (Ala. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

McMILLAN, Presiding Judge.

On December 1, 1994, the appellant, James Henry Borden, Jr., was found guilty of the capital offense of murder, for intentionally causing the death of Nellie Ledbetter after he had been convicted of another murder within the 20 years preceding this offense. See § 13A-5-40(a)(13), Ala.Code 1975. The jury, by a vote of 10 to 2, recommended a sentence of death. The trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Borden to death by electrocution. After the case was remanded for specific findings regarding the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, see Borden v. State, 769 So.2d 935 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), this court [936]*936affirmed Borden’s conviction. See Borden v. State, 769 So.2d 935 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed our judgment, see Ex parte Borden, 769 So.2d 950 (Ala.2000), and the United States Supreme Court denied Borden’s petition for certiorari review. See Borden v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 961, 121 S.Ct. 389, 148 L.Ed.2d 299 (2000). The relevant facts are set out in this court’s opinion on direct appeal.

On October 18, 2001, Borden timely filed a Rule 32 petition, challenging his conviction and sentence of death. The State filed its initial response and supporting affidavits on December 27, 2001. The State then filed additional affidavits and a motion to dismiss the petition on January 22, 2002. On July 31, 2002, the trial court permitted the State to amend its response and motion to reflect two changes in the law. In the amendment, the State withdrew its reliance on procedural bars regarding Borden’s claim that he was mentally retarded and that, in light of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), he should not be executed, provided that Borden amended the claim to comply with Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. The State also argued that Borden’s challenge to the constitutionality of electrocution as a method of carrying out the death penalty had been rendered moot on July 1, 2002, when the primary method of execution in Alabama was changed to lethal injection. On August 22, 2002, Borden filed a response to the State’s motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate his death sentence, in which he set out specific facts supporting his mental-retardation claim. He also filed an amended petition and a motion to amend three claims, including the Atkins claim, and add a new claim under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). On September 30, 2002, the State filed a motion stating its opposition to any changes other than the amendment of the Atkins claim. On March 14, 2003, the circuit court dismissed Borden’s petition. In its order of dismissal, the court instructed Borden to amend his Atkins claim within 21 days to comply with Rule 32.6(b) and to file his notice of appeal within 42 days of the date of the order. On April 4, 2003, Borden filed a motion for reconsideration, in which he argued that his August 22, 2002, filings contained sufficient facts to support the Atkins claim. He filed his notice of appeal on April 17, 2003, before the circuit court had ruled on his motion.

The State has asked this court to remand this case for a hearing on the merits of Borden’s claim of mental retardation under Atkins. In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court held:

“We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”

536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). This court has held that Atkins applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review. Clemons v. State, 55 So.3d 314 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).

In his original petition, Borden failed to state a factual basis for his claim that carrying out the death-penalty sentence in his case constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, in his August 22, 2002, response and in his amended petition, Borden set out approximately nine pages of facts underlying the Atkins claim. Because this claim was sufficiently [937]*937pleaded, the circuit court erred in finding that Borden failed to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 32.1 Therefore, we remand this cause to the circuit court with instructions for that court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific, written findings of fact as to Borden’s claim that he is mentally retarded and that his sentence of death is unauthorized as a matter of law.2 In determining whether Borden is mentally retarded, the court should consider the standards set forth in Ex parte Smith, [Ms. 1010267, March 14, 2003] — So.3d - (Ala.2003); Ex parte Perkins, 851 So.2d 453 (Ala.2002); McGowan v. State, 990 So.2d 931 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); and Stallworth v. State, 868 So.2d 1128, 1178 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (opinion on return to second remand).3 The circuit court shall file its return, including its specific, written findings of fact and a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, with this court within 98 days after the release of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

COBB, BASCHAB, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.

On Return to Remand

On February 27, 2004, we remanded this cause, following the appellant’s Rule 32 petition, for the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to make specific, written findings of fact as to whether Borden is mentally retarded and whether, therefore, in light of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), his sentence of death is unauthorized as a matter of law. The circuit court has now filed its return, which states, in pertinent part:

“On August 12, 2004, this Court held a status conference at which the State of Alabama stipulated that Mr. Borden is mentally retarded and that his death sentence is prohibited as a matter of law pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304[, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335] (2002). Both parties agreed during the status conference that this Court should find that Mr. Borden is a person with mental retardation and in accordance with Atkins his sentence should be reduced to life imprisonment without parole.
“Pursuant to the opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, this Court has reviewed the evidence in light of the standards for determining mental retardation articulated in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304[, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335] (2002); Ex parte Smith, [(No. 1010267, Mar.

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Related

Smith v. State
112 So. 3d 1108 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 2012)
Ex Parte Borden
60 So. 3d 940 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 2007)

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60 So. 3d 935, 2004 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 48, 2004 WL 362256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/borden-v-state-alacrimapp-2004.