Borden v. Armstrong

403 S.W.2d 731, 240 Ark. 1050, 1966 Ark. LEXIS 1451
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJune 6, 1966
Docket5-3829
StatusPublished

This text of 403 S.W.2d 731 (Borden v. Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Borden v. Armstrong, 403 S.W.2d 731, 240 Ark. 1050, 1966 Ark. LEXIS 1451 (Ark. 1966).

Opinion

Osro Cobb, Justice.

The New Castle-Barrow Hill Boad Improvement District was formed in 1961 under the lengthy provisions of Chapter 12 of Title 20 of Arkansas Statutes Annotated. On September 25, 1961, the county court of St. Francis County entered an order officially creating said district. The purpose of said district was to improve and pave some twenty-five miles of county dirt road, which was frequently impassable in adverse weather, at a cost then estimated at approximately $850,000. It was contemplated that said improvements would be made with one half of the cost being matched by funds from the federal government.

In March of 1964 the commissioners of the district, noting that the costs of materials, labor and equipment had substantially increased, advised all of the parties at interest by letter that said increase in cost would be anywhere from 20 to 30 per cent above that originally estimated. The landowners involved were requested to indicate their approval or disapproval of continuing the project in view of the added cost, and the landowners were further advised that if a majority disapproved the increased costs the project would be abandoned. The added costs involved no changes in plans or specifications for the improvements originally contemplated.

The commissioners appointed Jason L. Light as assessor for the district. On March 23, 1964, Mr. Light filed with the county clerk his detailed assessment of benefits against the parties at interest in the total sum of $1,280,530.33. The assessor made no report as to assessment of damages to the landowners. He testified that the project was devoted to the improvement of an existing county road without substantial changes in its location, and that the project involved benefits and no damages to the landowners except those incident to taking lands. Issues as to damages are discussed under that heading in this opinion.

On May 19, 1964, some ninety landowners joined together in instituting a suit in chancery as a class action against the commissioners of the district, alleging that the assessments of benefits as made by the assessor were grossly contrary to the representations made to the landowners at the time of the formation of the district; that said assessments of benefits were excessive to such an extent as to be confiscatory in nature; and that said assessments of benefits were inequitable as between the various landowners. Appellants’ complaint prayed the following' general relief:

(a) That the commissioners and the assessor for the district be enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the levy and collection of said inequitable and excessive assessments.

(b) That the commissioners be ordered and directed to file with the clerk of the county court the plans and specifications, together with engineering surveys and cost estimates, on any further construction plans.

(c) That the commissioners be ordered and directed to divulge to the landowners the results of the so-called election which was held pursuant to the terms of the letter of the commissioners to the landowners on March 10, 1964.

(d) That the commissioners and the assessor be ordered and directed to make any further assessments in accordance with assessed benefits which are fair, reasonable and equitable to the landowners.

Appellees’ answer denied any modifications in the plans and specifications of the original project but did admit the increase in cost therefor over the original estimate ; and also denied any excessive or inequitable or unfair assessments of benefits as to any landowner in the district, and prayed for dismissal of the complaint.

The chancellor invoked the assistance of a special master, Fred MacDonald of Brinkley, to conduct hearings as to the issues joined in the pleadings and to report to the court. Extensive hearings were held and much testimony taken. The transcript of proceedings has required five separate volumes. The findings and conelusions of the special master in chancery covered some fifty-six pages. The master resolved all of the issues joined between the parties in favor of appellees. Formal exceptions to the report of the master were timely filed by appellants. The chancellor, after reviewing the report of the master, after hearing thereon with respect to the exceptions taken thereto, and after hearing arguments of counsel and receiving written briefs on behalf of the parties, on the 8th day of July, 1965, entered a decree approving and confirming the report of the master and finding that all of the exceptions of appellants to the report of the master should be denied and overruled, and upon said findings dismissed appellants ’ complaint. From this adverse decree appellants are now here on appeal.

Appellants urge thirteen separate points, all of same being related to and connected with their ten stated exceptions to the report of the master.

We note that appellants’ points 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 all relate to the work of the district assessor; his method in making the assessment of benefits ; alleged inequity and invalidity of such assessment; his failure to assess damages in certain cases; and that his assessments were arbitrary and confiscatory. We combine all contentions of appellants as to assessments into a single discussion.

The Assessment of Benefits

The record before us reflects that in 1957 and 1958 the A. P. Capers Company, a company specializing in assessment work, appraised all the property located in St. Francis County for county and city tax purposes. Procedures set forth under Act 153 of the Acts of 1955, State of Arkansas, were followed. Bare farm lands in the territory were broken down into six different types of cultivatable land, and each type was in turn broken down into four categories, depending on accessibility as to roads, soil type, crop production, etc. All of the land on Crowley’s Ridge, including the land in the instant road improvement district, was designated as an “F” type, or the lowest value land. In this classification, cultivatable land located on a hard-surface road was valued at $70 an acre; on a gravel road $60' an acre; on a dirt road $50 an acre; and on no road $40 an acre. Woods land and waste land on a hard-surface road was valued at $25 an acre; $20 on a gravel road; $15 on a dirt road; and $10 without a road. Following these appraisals, county taxes were assessed based upon 20 per cent of said appraised values.

There was considerable new construction in the improvement district subsequent to the Capers report. As to such new improvements, Mr. Light, who had worked with the Capers Company in St. Francis County in compiling its appraisal report, made trips about the district personally inspecting such new improvements, and thereafter employed the recognized factors for appraisals of same as used by the Capers Company and as set forth in the Assessor’s Manual (1956) introduced into evidence as an exhibit to the testimony of witness Cleo C. Perry. Said manual is an implementation of the provisions of Act 153 of 1955.

When all appraisals of properties in the district had been completed, Mr. Light then applied the same yardstick as to each parcel of property in assessing benefits and in extending the annual district tax that would be due. The district included approximately 500 separate appraisals of property.

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Bluebook (online)
403 S.W.2d 731, 240 Ark. 1050, 1966 Ark. LEXIS 1451, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/borden-v-armstrong-ark-1966.