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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 24-CV-0728
VICTOR M. BOOTH, et al., APPELLANTS, V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2021-CA-001651-B)
(Maurice A. Ross, Judge)
(Argued April 27, 2026 Decided August 4, 2026 *)
Renée L. Bowser was on the briefs for appellant.
Holly M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L.
Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Thais- Lyn Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before EASTERLY, DEAHL, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
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The decision in this case was originally issued as an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. It is now being published upon the court’s grant of appellee’s motion to publish.
DEAHL, Associate Judge: This case involves a challenge to the District of Columbia’s Comprehensive Plan, a guidance document that informs land use decisions in the District. After the D.C. Council amended the Plan in 2021, a group of residents sued the District in Superior Court, raising two challenges to the processes undertaken by the Mayor’s Office of Planning before it recommended certain land use amendments to the Council. The residents claimed the amended Plan would, among other things, lead to higher density development in their neighborhoods and increase their risk of displacement. The trial court held that none of the residents had standing to challenge the amended Plan and dismissed their complaint. The residents now appeal.
Because we agree that none of the appellants has suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing upon them, we agree with the trial court that their suit had to be dismissed. The trial court erred in one respect, however, which is that it dismissed this suit with prejudice, when dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. We therefore direct entry of a revised judgment on remand, reflecting that the dismissal here is without prejudice.
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I. Background
The Comprehensive Plan
The District’s Comprehensive Plan is a “legislative enactment establishing a ‘broad framework intended to guide the future land use planning decisions for the District.’” Youngblood v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 262 A.3d 228, 241 (D.C. 2021) (quoting Cummins v. D.C. Zoning Comm’n, 229 A.3d 768, 771 (D.C. 2020)). The Plan consists of a series of “elements” that inform policy areas ranging from environmental protection to transportation to housing. See D.C. Code § 1-306.01(a). The D.C. Code sets forth specific purposes for these elements, such as to “influence social, economic and physical development,” to “[p]romote economic growth and jobs for District residents,” and to “[g]uide private and public development in order to achieve District and community goals.” Id. § 1-306.01(b). The Code further provides that “[t]he Mayor shall submit periodically to the Council . . . proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Plan.” Id. § 1-306.04(d). Those amendments “shall be submitted not less frequently than once every 4 years” and “shall be accompanied by an environmental assessment.” Id.
In addition, the Mayor’s Office of Planning typically creates a “Future Land Use Map” that summarizes the Plan’s amendments to land use designations across the District. See id. § 1-306.02(e)-(f). The map designates four density levels for
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residential and commercial areas, as well as a series of mixed-use areas. See 10A D.C.M.R. § 227.4-.13; Cummins, 229 A.3d at 772 (noting that the Future Land Use Map “generally designates residential and commercial areas as being low-density, moderate-density, medium-density, or high-density”).
This case concerns a host of land use amendments proposed by the Office of Planning and enacted by the Council as part of the Comprehensive Plan Amendment Act of 2021. See D.C. Act 24-110, 68 D.C. Reg. 6918 (Jul. 16, 2021). 1 Many of these amendments changed land use designations—from “Moderate Density Residential” to “Medium Density Residential,” for example—in a manner designed to encourage higher-density development in certain parts of the District. These amendments followed a multi-year planning process that started with a public kickoff campaign in 2016. See 10-A D.C.M.R. § 107.12-18. The Office of Planning published a draft version of the amended Plan for public comment in October 2019 and compiled an environmental assessment that rated each element of the amended Plan according to its expected environmental effects. The Office then transmitted its final draft of the amended Plan to the Council in April 2020. The Council ultimately
1 The proposed amendments were reflected in a 2021 map compiled by the Office of Planning. See Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map Proposed Amendments, https://planning.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/op/publication/atta chments/LU_62821.pdf; https://perma.cc/9X64-FX9J (last visited Aug. 27, 2026).
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held a lengthy, multi-day public hearing and made its own revisions before enacting the amended Plan on May 18, 2021.
Procedural History
Hours after the Council approved the 2021 Plan amendments, a group of D.C.
residents filed the instant lawsuit. 2 Their complaint alleged that the Office of Planning (1) failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment evaluating the adverse impacts of the amendments it proposed, in violation of D.C. Code § 1-306.04(d); and (2) failed to give “great weight” to the concerns of their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions. The plaintiffs claimed the amended Plan would cause various injuries related to expected higher-density development in their neighborhoods, which will be discussed in detail below. They requested as relief an injunction blocking the “implementation of the Comprehensive Plan Amendment Act of 2021” and a declaration that the Act was “illegal and unenforceable.”
2 The initial complaint in this case was filed pro se by twelve plaintiffs just before midnight on May 18, 2021. Several months later, after the amendments took effect in August 2021, counsel filed an amended complaint on behalf of eighteen plaintiffs, including most of those in the initial complaint. Thirteen residents remained plaintiffs when the trial court dismissed the suit, and all are now appellants. Their names are Victor M. Booth, Linda Brown, Minnie Elliott, William Jordan, Mary Alice Levine, Richard Nash, Chris Otten, Marc Poe, Graylin W. Presbury, Laura Richards, Mary E. Rowse, Shirley Shannon, and Christopher Williams.
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The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court first found that none of the plaintiffs had “suffered a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact” because they cited only the risk of “hypothetical” future injuries that amounted to mere “fear” of the Plan’s “potential ramifications.” This left the plaintiffs, in the trial court’s view, with “nothing more than generalized grievances of concern” about the impacts of the Plan. The court also found that neither of the other two elements of standing was satisfied: the plaintiffs failed to establish a “causal nexus” between their alleged injuries and the Office of Planning’s actions, and they likewise failed to show those injuries were redressable because the court could only require the Mayor to comply with extra procedures and could not prevent the Plan enacted by the Council from being implemented. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
We need not discuss the merits of the various claims raised by the appellants because none of them has standing to challenge the District’s Comprehensive Plan. “[S]tanding is a ‘threshold jurisdictional question’ which every court must address ‘prior to and independent of the merits.’” Kalorama Citizens Ass’n v. SunTrust Bank Co., 286 A.3d 525, 531 (D.C. 2022) (quoting Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d
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219, 229 (D.C. 2011) (en banc)). To establish standing, 3 a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Vining v. Exec. Bd. of D.C. Health Benefit Exch. Auth., 174 A.3d 272, 278 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). Each element of standing “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Fraternal Ord. of Police Metro. Police Dep’t Labor Comm. v. District of Columbia, 290 A.3d 29, 37 (D.C. 2023) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
Appellants fail on the first element—none of them alleged an adequate injury-
in-fact for standing purposes. An injury-in-fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Padou v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 70 A.3d 208, 211 (D.C. 2013). “A particularized injury is one that ‘affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’” Vining, 174 A.3d at 278 n.26 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). A “generalized grievance,” by contrast, is an injury “shared in
3 While the D.C. courts were established under Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article III, we generally follow “the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III” as a prudential matter. Youngblood, 262 A.3d at 234 (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 224).
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substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens” that “do[es] not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.” Padou, 70 A.3d at 212 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). And while an injury can be merely “imminent”—i.e., it does not need to have already happened—there must be a “substantial risk” that it will come to pass, and that risk must not rest on “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 414 n.5 (2013); see also Padou, 70 A.3d at 212 (“The concept of imminence is ‘stretched beyond its breaking point’ when . . . the plaintiff only alleges some injury at an indefinite future time.” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2)).
Appellants claim that the 2021 amendments to the Comprehensive Plan will cause various injuries related to the expected increase in density they attribute to the changes in land use designations reflected in the Future Land Use Map. For example, several appellants assert that the public transportation system will become “increasingly burdened” by higher ridership, which will “increase unreliability” and place “pressure on aging infrastructure.” Appellant Booth claims higher density will cause “noise, air quality degradation, public service impacts, utility, transportation, and parking capacity impacts.” Appellant Poe laments the “increased strain on and likely more rapid deterioration of service in public utilities” caused by higher density, and appellant Rowse cites the potential impact of new development on “sewer, gas, electric, and other infrastructure needs.” Appellant Shannon claims new
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development will “greatly increase cars” on the road and impact “pedestrian safety.” Appellants Nash and Rowse worry that the “character” of their “historic” neighborhoods will be affected by new development. And several appellants cite the “increased risk” of displacement from their homes, either because they believe future development will lead to higher rents in their neighborhoods or because their apartment buildings may be subject to redevelopment.
These alleged harms do not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing for two reasons. First, many of them are merely “generalized grievances” shared by a large subset of District residents. For example, the general claim that public transit services will become “increasingly burdened” by higher ridership is not an injury that affects any appellant in a “personal and individual way.” Vining, 174 A.3d at 278 n.26. The same goes for any alleged society-wide harm that affects an undefined geographic area. See York Apartments Tenants Ass’n v. D.C. Zoning Comm’n, 856 A.2d 1079, 1084 (D.C. 2004) (the “loss of new property tax revenue” and “new jobs” were not personal to plaintiffs, but “generalized grievances affecting the Downtown area at large”). Second and more importantly, to the extent that some of appellants’ statements gesture at individual injuries to legally protected interests—for instance, we have recognized increased traffic and noise as injuries-in-fact in reference to a
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specific proposed development, see Youngblood, 262 A.3d at 235—appellants did not establish that those injuries were imminent when the Plan was enacted in 2021. 4
Appellants rely on Youngblood, 262 A.3d 228, where we held that petitioners had an imminent injury-in-fact based on allegations of “increased noise, congestion, traffic, as well as a loss of parking” tied to a development proposed across the street from where they lived. Id. at 235. But the petitioners in Youngblood challenged a specific proposed development before the Board of Zoning Adjustment, and their alleged injuries were imminent because they seemingly would have come to fruition if the Board approved the proposal. Here, appellants challenged only the amended Plan itself, not any specific proposals that their alleged harms stemmed from. And when the Plan was enacted in 2021, any injuries tethered to those specific proposals were only set to arise if: (1) the Zoning Commission rezoned the areas subject to the land use designation changes in the Plan; (2) the relevant bodies approved all the individual development and zoning applications; and (3) those approved developments failed to mitigate the harms appellants alleged. See Tenley &
4 Appellants argue that the trial court “improperly eliminated the imminence prong of the injury-in-fact element,” and indeed the court seemed to discount the probabilistic nature of future harm by noting that increased density was “simply possible, not guaranteed to occur” when the Plan was enacted. But that is of no moment given our de novo conclusion that none of the plaintiffs alleged a concrete, imminent injury-in-fact. See Padou, 70 A.3d at 211.
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Cleveland Park Emergency Comm. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 550 A.2d 331, 334 (D.C. 1988) (the Plan is “not self-executing and does not directly regulate the development of private property in the District of Columbia”). Given this attenuated “chain of possibilities,” there were no imminent harms tethered to any specific development proposals that were likely to come to pass when the amended Plan was enacted. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410, 414 n.5; Christian Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Nessel, 117 F.4th 826, 849 (6th Cir. 2024) (standing is ordinarily “determined as of the time the complaint is filed”).
Appellants note that the Office of Planning plays a formal role in the Zoning Commission’s rezoning process and, in some cases, invoked the amended Plan when recommending that the Commission “upzone” certain areas to accommodate higher- density development. For example, the Office recommended a rezoning proposal “intended to implement changes to the recently updated Comprehensive Plan” that would have authorized a proposed development that appellant Richards challenged before the Commission. But even if it was foreseeable that the Office of Planning would recommend upzoning certain areas, the Commission was not bound to rubber stamp those recommendations or approve specific proposals. And once again, none of those proposals are before us today. Appellants challenge only the Plan itself, which did not dictate the outcome of any zoning proceedings or have any predictable bearing on how they would come out. And while the Commission’s decisions must
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not be “inconsistent with” the Plan, D.C. Code § 6-641.02, appellants can—and many of them did—challenge specific proposals before that body so long as they have a concrete, imminent injury-in-fact tethered to that proposal. See Youngblood, 262 A.3d at 235.
Finally, appellants invoke the “procedural injury” doctrine, arguing that the imminence element is “relaxed” for procedural harms. They cite to a footnote in Lujan, where the Supreme Court opined that a plaintiff “living adjacent” to the site of a proposed dam had standing to challenge a federal agency’s failure to follow license approval procedures “even though he cannot establish with any certainty” that compliance will “cause the license to be withheld or altered,” and “even though the dam will not be completed for many years.” 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. But plaintiffs seeking recompense for procedural injuries still must have “some other concrete interest at stake” besides the “loss of an entitlement to participate” in agency action. Friends of Tilden Park, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201, 1212 (D.C. 2002); see id. at 1211 (rejecting the proposition that a “procedural injury alone is sufficient to establish standing”). 5 Even if the redressability element of standing is
5 Moreover, as counsel admitted at oral argument, the Office of Planning is not required to consult with the public during the environmental assessment process, so it is unclear whether appellants had a “procedural right” at all. We need not unpack that issue, however, since the same standard for injury-in-fact applies regardless.
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relaxed for plaintiffs alleging a deprivation of a procedural right, those plaintiffs still must have alleged an adequate injury-in-fact at the time of their complaint, see Christian Healthcare, 117 F.4th at 849, which none of the appellants here did. 6
At bottom, none of the appellants’ alleged injuries were sufficiently concrete or imminent to confer standing when the Council approved the land use amendments recommended by the Office of Planning in the 2021 Comprehensive Plan. Most of the injuries were either too generalized or highly speculative, and any future injuries tethered to specific proposed development projects were not imminent when the Plan was enacted given the attenuated chain of possibilities that would need to happen before the risk of the harms materializing became substantial. As such, the trial court correctly ruled that the appellants lacked standing to maintain their suit. 7
6 Appellants seem to believe they had standing to challenge the amended Plan because of their “geographical nexus to the areas” affected by the proposed land use amendments. But no nexus can bridge the speculative leap from the Plan itself to the development projects appellants claim will cause their injuries.
7 Because we conclude that the appellants failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing, we do not address the trial court’s holdings on causation or redressability or the District’s argument that the plaintiffs “forfeited any challenge” to the trial court’s ruling that their claims were not redressable. We also do not address the District’s argument that the “residents’ claims are moot” because the court could not order relief that would affect the implementation of the Plan.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the trial court’s ruling dismissing appellants’ suit for lack of standing. While the trial court dismissed appellants’ suit “with prejudice,” that was error. A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the prerequisites for standing must result in dismissal without prejudice, because such a dismissal is not on the merits of the action. See UMC Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 120 A.3d 37, 48 (D.C. 2015) (explaining that a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction may only properly serve as the foundation for a dismissal without prejudice,” and “direct[ing] the Superior Court to amend the order accordingly”). We thus remand for the trial court to revise its judgment to reflect that appellants’ suit was dismissed without prejudice.
So ordered.