Booth v. City of Watertown

District Court, N.D. New York·Decided March 14, 2023·No. 5:22-cv-01011·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________

PATRICK M. BOOTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF WATERTOWN; WATERTOWN 5:22-CV-1011 POLICE DEP’T; DUSTIN C. SHAWCROSS, (BKS/ML) Police Officer; PEARCE A. PARSONS, Police Officer; DAVID PAULSON, County Attorney; CHARLES DONOGHUE, Chief of City Police,

Defendants. _____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

PATRICK M. BOOTH Plaintiff, Pro Se Elmira Correctional Facility Post Office Box 500 Elmira, New York 14902 (last known address)

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff Patrick M. Booth (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, has commenced this action against the City of Watertown, Watertown Police Department, Dustin Shawcross, Pearce A. Parsons, David Paulson, and Charles Donohue (collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Despite ample notice of the requirement that he either pay a statutory filing fee or submit a properly supported application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he has failed to do either. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 5) and a letter request to place a lien on Defendants Shawcross and Parsons (Dkt. No. 6). For the reasons set forth below, I (1) deny Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 5), and (2) recommend that (a) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed, and (b) Plaintiff’s letter request (Dkt. No. 6) for a lien on Defendants Shawcross and Parsons be denied. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action pro se on September 26, 2022, asserting

claims arising from an interaction he had with members of the Watertown Police Department on June 24, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a letter request to place a lien on Defendants Shawcross and Parsons and notifying the Court of his address upon release on or about December 29, 2022. (Dkt. No. 6.) On February 7, 2023, the undersigned issued an order denying Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application directing that, within thirty days, Plaintiff either (1) pay the $402.00 filing fee, or (2) submit a renewed IFP long form application detailing his post-release financial condition. (Dkt. No. 8.) The Court’s order of February 7, 2023, was served via regular mail at both (1) Plaintiff’s address of record: Elmira Correctional Facility, and (2) the address provided in Plaintiff’s Letter Request (Dkt. No. 6): 26464 Route 180, Dexter,

New York 13634. (Dkt. No. 8.) Despite the passage of more than thirty days since the issuance of the Court’s order dated February 7, 2023, Plaintiff has taken no further action in this case. (See generally docket sheet.) II. DISCUSSION When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to grant IFP status if it determines that the plaintiff is unable to pay the required fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, where a plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient economic need to proceed without prepaying the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In this instance, due to Plaintiff’s failure to provide any information concerning his current finances, the Court is unable to make any meaningful assessment of his financial status

and determine whether he qualifies for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees. Having failed to comply with this Court’s order dated February 7, 2023, I now recommend that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed for failure to pay the required filing fee or to obtain leave to proceed IFP. See, e.g., Walker v. Vill. Ct., 17-CV-0390, 2017 WL 4220415, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017) (Peebles, M.J.) (citing Waters v. Camacho, 288 F.R.D. 70, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint where he failed to either pay the required filing fee or demonstrate that he qualifies for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees), report and recommendation adopted by, 2017 WL 4221069 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) (Hurd, J.).

III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND THAT A LIEN BE PLACED ON DEFENDANTS As an initial matter, “[a] party has no constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel in a civil case.” Lefridge v. Connecticut State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Furthermore, there is no bright-line test determining whether

1 The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); see also Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). counsel should be appointed on behalf of an indigent party. Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-393 (2d Cir. 1997). Rather, the court must carefully consider a number of factors, including whether the indigent’s claims seem likely to be of substance. See Leftridge, 640 F.3d at 69 (stating that “[t]he court properly denies the plaintiff’s motion for counsel if it concludes that his chances of success are highly dubious.”) (citations omitted).

Because I have recommended dismissal of the instant matter, it cannot be said that Plaintiff’s claims are likely to be of substance; therefore, the motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 5) must be denied. Moreover, Plaintiff cites no authority for his request that a “lien” be placed on Defendants Shawcross and Parsons. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Letter Request (Dkt. No. 6) be denied. ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 5) is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further respectfully

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Letter Request (Dkt. No. 6) be DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this report and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.2

2 The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

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