Booth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co.

63 Md. 39, 1885 Md. LEXIS 57
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJanuary 8, 1885
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 63 Md. 39 (Booth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Booth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 63 Md. 39, 1885 Md. LEXIS 57 (Md. 1885).

Opinion

Alvey, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The primary object of the bill filed in this case was to ■obtain indemnity by the complainants for the depreciation [42]*42of, and loss in, the value of the shares of the capital stock of the Powhatan Steamboat Company, held hy them, caused, as it was alleged, by the illegal and fraudulent, conduct of certain of its directors, who acted in the interest of a rival corporation, the Baltimore Steam Packet Company. The principal relief sought hy the bill was denied, for the reasons stated by this Court when the case was. here on the former appeal (Booth, et al., vs. Robinson, et al., 55 Md., 419, 428,); but it was held, that a certain transaction, whereby it was made to appear that for the consideration of §40,000, there had been a sale and transfer of the Steamer Petersburg from the Powhatan Company to the Steam Packet Company, was in reality and effect a mortgage, and not an absolute sale, and that being so the latter Company should account for the mortgaged property, and all the profits and hire thereof; and the-cause was remanded to the end that such account might he taken. Accounts were stated, and upon the case coming on for hearing upon exceptions to such accounts, the Court below rejected the accounts as stated hy the auditor, and in its opinion and order determined and settled the principles and basis upon which the account should he taken, and referred the cause hack to the auditor. It is from this order that both parties have appealed to this Court.

To the proper statement of the account it is essential that the value of the steamer at the time she went into' the possession and control of the mortgagee should he ascertained, and also the value of her use while in such possession. It is likewise material to ascertain to what extent she suffered depreciation in value, from natural causes, or otherwise, during the time of such possession of the mortgagee, and for what allowances the mortgagee may he entitled for repairs and other expenses, if for any, under the circumstances of the case. And as the mortgagee finally sold the steamer as its own property, and without notice to the mortgagor, it also becomes necessary to de[43]*43termine for what amount the mortgagee shall he charged, as the value of the steamer, for and in respect of such sale.

Before referring to the facts of the case, hearing upon these questions, it would seem to he necessary that we should state briefly the principles of law that must he observed in taking the account between the parties. As between the mortgagor and mortgagee, where the latter is in possession in the acknowledged character of mortgagee, the principles of the account are plain and well defined, and are applied for the mutual benefit of both parties. But where the possession is held adversely to the mortgagor, with denial of the right of redemption, the principles of the account are quite different, and are applied with more or less rigor against the wrong-doer, according to the circumstances of the case.

In the ordinary case for redemption, where the mortgagee is in possession, acknowledging his true relation to the property, he is required to account for all issues and profits thereof, so that they may he applied, after deducting all reasonable expenses and allowances, towards the discharge of the debt and accrued interest. The usual decree in such cases, against the mortgagee in possession, is for an account “of what he has received, or what he might have received without his own wilful default.” Mayer vs. Murray, 8 Ch. Div., 424, 428; 2 Fisher on Mort. (3d ed.) 943. The duty of the mortgagee in possession is well stated by Lord Justice Turner,, in Kensington vs. Bouverie, 7 De G., M. & G., 134, 157, where he says, “ A mortgagee, when he enters into possession of the mortgaged estate, enters for the purpose of recovering both his principal and interest, and, the estate being, in the eye of this Court, a security only for the money, the Court requires him to be diligent in realizing the amount, which is due, in order that he may restore the estate to the mortgagor, who, in the view of this Court, is entitled to it. It is part of his contract that he should do so.”' [44]*44See, also, Mayer vs. Murray, supra. By taking possession the mortgagee assumes the duty of treating the property ■as a provident owner would do. He is hound to keep it in good ordinary repair, or, as some of the cases put it, to keep it in necessary repair. Godfrey vs. Watson, 3 Atk., 518; Sandon vs. Hooper, 6 Beav., 249. And for all such proper or necessary repairs placed upon the property by the mortgagee he is entitled to receive allowance in the ■settlement of his accounts, and the amount so allowed will be added to the principal of the mortgage debt, if not liquidated by the rents and profits charged. Godfrey vs. Watson, supra; Moore vs. Cable, 1 John. Ch., 388.

Such are the principles of accounting as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee in possession, where the character of mortgagee is acknowledged by the latter. But where the mortgagee in possession repudiates his character and true relation to the property, and claims to hold as real, absolute owner, and denies all right of redemption, he renders himself liable to be treated as a wrong-doer, and as having acted in fraud of the rights of the mortgagor. In such case, it is an attempt to pervert a transaction from its real nature and design, and to give it an effect contrary to the real intention of the parties ; and such an attempt is stigmatized by a Court of equity as fraudulent. Russell vs. Southard, et al., 12 How., 148. And the consequences attending such attempted perversion of- the transaction is most serious to the mortgagee. He thereby disentitles himself to be treated with the favor of a mortgagee in possession as such, but is treated as a wrong-doer from the time of the disclaimer or repudiation of his true character. As an authority for, and in illustration of this principle, we may refer to the case of the Incorporated Society vs. Richards, 1 Dr. & War., 334. In that case the Chancellor, Lord St. Leonards, was pressed ■to give to the defendant the advantages of a mortgagee, in an ordinary suit for redemption, to which he replied, [45]*45This is a peculiar case, and cannot he treated as the ordinary case between mortgagee and mortgagor. Here-you set up a title adverse to the owner ; and when a creditor denies his character as such, and claims as owner, I cannot allow him to fall back on his original character of creditor, as if he had never departed from it. I will never allow a party, who has put the owner at arm’s length, to turn round, when defeated, and claim all the benefits attached to the character of a fair creditor.” The same principle was adopted and applied in the decision of the case of the Bank of Australasia vs. United Hand-in-Hand Co., 4 App. Cas., 391, 408, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Many of the facts of that case are very analogous to those of the present. In that case it. was held that because the mortgagee set up title to-the mortgaged property adverse to the mortgagor and in denial of the right of redemption, he lost the immunities of an ordinary mortgagee, and was held to account as for a wrongful possession.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
63 Md. 39, 1885 Md. LEXIS 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/booth-v-baltimore-steam-packet-co-md-1885.