Bonsu v. Holder

646 F. Supp. 2d 273, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80464, 2009 WL 2575661
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedAugust 19, 2009
DocketCivil Action 3:09-cv-0429 (JCH)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 646 F. Supp. 2d 273 (Bonsu v. Holder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bonsu v. Holder, 646 F. Supp. 2d 273, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80464, 2009 WL 2575661 (D. Conn. 2009).

Opinion

RULING RE: PETITIONER’S DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP

JANET C. HALL, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Nana Bonsu is a native of Ghana. He is before this court as a result of a transfer from the Second Circuit of an appeal of a removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). The sole issue is whether Bonsu has established that he has derivative citizenship of the United States. In order to do so, Bonsu must prove that his paternity has not been established by legitimation.

Both parties filed briefs with the court, as well as a lengthy joint appendix. Fur *275 ther, the court heard testimony on July 15, 2009. For the reasons stated below, this court finds that Bonsu’s paternity was not legitimated under Ghanaian law. He is, therefore, a U.S. citizen and not removable.

II. BACKGROUND

In February 2007, removal proceedings were begun against Bonsu. He had been convicted in Connecticut Superior Court on May 30, 1997, of the offenses of sexual assault in the first degree and unlawful restraint. He was sentenced to ten years incarceration.

Throughout his immigration proceedings, Bonsu has claimed derivative citizenship through his mother. In March 2007, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ruled that Bonsu failed to meet his burden of proof in demonstrating that his paternity was not legitimated. Bonsu filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which appeal was dismissed on August 24, 2007.

On September 20, 2007, Bonsu filed a motion for reconsideration, bringing to the attention of the BIA a July 2007 decision of this court, Ankrah v. Gonzales, No. 3:06CV0554(PCD), 2007 WL 2388743, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63970 (D.Conn. July 21, 2007). That case, which was also transferred to the district court pursuant to section 1252(b)(5)(B), addressed the same issue that is before this court: what is the standard for legitimation of paternity in Ghana. In Ankrah, the district court had ruled that the petitioner’s interpretation of Ghanaian legitimation law was correct. Id. at *7-*8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63970 at *23-*24. In light of that ruling, the BIA granted the motion to reconsider and remanded the case to the IJ for further proceedings.

On January 9, 2008, the IJ issued a decision again finding that Bonsu did not have derivative citizenship. The IJ stated that he was not precedentially bound by the decision of a district court and that he disagreed with the reasoning of the Ankrah court. Bonsu appealed this decision, but his appeal was dismissed by the BIA on July 15, 2008. Bonsu then filed a petition for review with the Second Circuit. On March 11, 2009, the Second Circuit issued' a Stipulation and Order transferring Bonsu’s case to this court, for it to address the issue of whether Bonsu was legitimated under Ghanaian law. See Stipulation and Order of Transfer (Doc. No. 1).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to section 1252(b)(5)(B) of title 8 of the U.S.Code, which states that the case shall be transferred to the district court “for a new hearing on the nationality claim and a decision on that claim as if an action had been brought in the district court....” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). The parties agree that this court’s review of Bonsu’s claim of derivative citizenship is de novo. See Pet’s Br. at 13 (Doc. No. 8); Resp.’s Br. at 4 (Doc. No. 16).

B. Burden of Proof

In general, the government bears the burden of establishing the removability of an alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(3)(A). However, when the disputed issue is derivative citizenship, if the government provides evidence of a foreign birth, a rebuttable presumption of alienage is created, and the burden shifts to the petitioner to prove his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence. See Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2000); 1 see also In re *276 Tijerina-Villarreal, 13 I. & N. Dec. 327, 330 (B.I.A.1969). The parties agree that respondent has provided evidence of Bonsu’s foreign birth and that the burden therefore lies with the petitioner. See Pet.’s Br. at 14; Resp.’s Br. at 4-5.

C. Proof of Foreign Law

The court must consider whether paternity has been established based on the law of the child’s native country. See Gorsira v. Loy, 357 F.Supp.2d 453, 459 (D.Conn.2005) (Underhill, J.). Because Bonsu’s claim for derivative citizenship rests on whether he was legitimated under Ghanaian law, he must prove the Ghanaian standard for legitimation by a preponderance in order to prevail. In determining the law of Ghana, a district court may consider “any relevant material or source,” regardless of whether it was introduced by a party or whether it is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R.Civ.P. 44.1. When a party’s claim rests on the existence or application of foreign law, the Second Circuit has dismissed those claims if that party failed to provide evidence of the contents of the foreign law. See, e.g., Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.1956) (holding complaint properly dismissed when plaintiff failed to provide evidence of Saudi Arabian law essential to claim); Esso Standard Oil S.A. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul, 387 F.2d 573, 581 (2d Cir.1967) (dismissing claims after finding plaintiff failed to prove strict liability existed under Guatemalan law and therefore failed its burden of proof); Eli Lilly do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir.2007) (refusing to apply Brazilian law, which would dismiss case, when defendant failed to prove foreign law).

IY. FINDINGS OF FACT

Nana Osei Bonsu was born in Kumasi, Ghana on July 20, 1975, to Mercy Mensah. His biological father is Osei Tutu Bonsu, but petitioner argues that he has never had any relationship or contact with his father. 2 Ms.

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646 F. Supp. 2d 273, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80464, 2009 WL 2575661, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bonsu-v-holder-ctd-2009.