Bonime v. United States

22 C.C.P.A. 603, 1935 CCPA LEXIS 61
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 4, 1935
DocketNo. 3848
StatusPublished

This text of 22 C.C.P.A. 603 (Bonime v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bonime v. United States, 22 C.C.P.A. 603, 1935 CCPA LEXIS 61 (ccpa 1935).

Opinions

Graham, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Five entries of cotton cloth were made by the appellant at the port of New York under the Tariff Act of 1922. They were classified by the collector in each instance under paragraph 903 of said act, with an additional 10 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 906 of said act.

These entries were covered by three protests filed by the importer, in which protests it was claimed that the said goods were not chargeable with said additional duty of 10 per centum under said paragraph 906. An alternative claim was made to the effect that if said goods are dutiable under said paragraph 906, such duty was in addition to the appropriate primary rate as provided in the first or second sub-paragraphs of paragraph 903 of said act. However, as the issue is presented hero, no contention is made under said alternative claim, and the single question is presented as to whether the additional duty of 10 per centum under said paragraph 906 is properly chargeable on these goods. There is no contention as to the correctness of the ascertainment of basic duty under said paragraph 903, and it will not, therefore, be necessary to quote the language of said paragraph here. Said paragraph 906 and paragraph 904 of said act are as follows:

Par. 906. In addition to the duty or duties imposed upon cotton cloth in paragraph 903, there shall be paid the following duties, namely: On all cotton cloths woven with eight or more harnesses, or with Jacquard, lappet, or swivel attachments, 10 per centum ad valorem; on all cotton cloths, other than the foregoing, woven with drop boxes, 6 per centum ad valorem. In no case shall the duty or duties imposed upon cotton cloth in paragraphs 903, or 903 and 906 exceed 45 per centum ad valorem.
[605]*605Par. 904. The term cotton cloth, or cloth, wherever used in this schedule, unless otherwise specially provided for, shall be held to include all woven fabrics of cotton, in the piece, whether figured, fancy, or plain, arid shall not include any article, finished or unfinished, made from cotton cloth. In the ascertainment of the condition of the cloth or yarn upon which the duties imposed upon cotton •cloth are made to depend, the entire fabric and all parts thereof shall be included.
The average number of the yarn in cotton cloth herein provided for shall be obtained by taking the length of the thread or yarn to be equal to the distance covered by it in the cloth in the condition as imported, except that all clipped threads shall be measured as if continuous; in counting the threads all ply yarns shall be separated into singles and the count taken of the total singles; the weight shall be taken after any excessive sizing is removed by boiling or other suitable process.

The various protests were consolidated for the purposes of trial.

Two witnesses were called and examined on behalf of the importer in the trial court, one of whom was an examiner and the other an analyst, at the port of New York.

It appears from the testimony of these witnesses that samples of the imported goods were analyzed by the witness Gassmann, and it was found on analysis that the goods were of a twill weave, with a selvage on each edge made with a taffeta weave. It further appears that in weaving the body of the cloth seven harnesses were used, and that in weaving the selvages two harnesses were used; that both selvage and the body of the cloth are woven at the same time, on the same loom; that the cloth is always woven with a selvage, and that it cannot be made without the same.

The trial court was of opinion that the protests of the appellant were without merit, and that the cloth in issue should be considered for dutiable purposes as woven with nine harnesses. It, therefore, entered judgment against the importer.

On the hearing in this court, and in the brief of counsel, it is admitted by the importer that protest No. 117908-G/32215, so far as it relates to the merchandise in entry No. 861131, should be overruled, it being conceded that the merchandise in question was fabricated with fourteen harnesses.

Counsel for importer contend here that the judgment of the court below ought to be reversed, principally on the authority of United States v. Mandel, 1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 223, T. D. 31259, and United States v. Auffmordt & Co., 3 Ct. Cust. Appls. 236, T. D. 32561. The Government, on its part, insists that these cases are not decisive, and cites United States v. Erlanger et al., 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 437, T. D. 43189, which is claimed to be decisive.

United States v. Mandel, supra, was decided under the tariff act of July 24, 1897, and came to this court on transfer from the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The imported merchandise in that case was a cotton fabric having silk selvages. The question was whether it was properly dutiable as [606]*606classified under paragraph 311 of said act as “cloth, composed of cotton or other vegetable fiber and silk,” or as cotton cloth by count of threads under paragraph 306 of said act. This court there went into a considerable discussion of the nature and character of a selvage upon textile goods. We concluded that “its primary distinctive purpose is to prevent the distortion of the cloth and the raveling out or fraying of the weft.” We further stated that when goods containing a selvage were thrown into consumption, ordinarily the selvage has no use. Again we stated:

In no case cited by the Government was it held by the Board of General Appraisers or by the courts that the ordinary selvage was a factor to be considered in determining the true nature of the fabric — that is to say, the materials of which it is made. * * *

And, finally, we said this:

* * * Evidently there is nothing in this case or in the other cases cited from which it can be deduced, either directly or on principle, that an ordinary selvage, having no use beyond that of a mere selvage and not designed or intended to be a feature of the goods, or to form a material, substantial, or essential part of them in actual consumption, should determine the classification of the whole fabric.

Judgment was rendered sustaining the protest of the importer.

United States v. Auffmordt & Co., supra, was decided under the tariff act of August 5, 1909. In that case, paragraph 323 of said act. provided that an additional duty upon countable cotton cloth should be made on all cotton cloth mercerized or subjected to any similar process. Cloth was imported which contained a mercerized selvage,, and the goods were classified as mercerized, under said paragraph 323. Paragraph 320 of said act provided that the term “mercerized”' should be taken to mean all cotton cloth which “either wholly or in part” has any mercerized “threads in or upon any part of the fabric.”' The issue was whether the cloth had been mercerized, under said! paragraph 320. This court, again speaking through Smith, J., who-had written the opinion of the court in the Mandel case, supra,. discussed, extensively, the relationship of a selvage to the cloth to-which it was attached, and said:

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Related

United States v. Mandel
1 Ct. Cust. 223 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1911)
United States v. Auffmordt
3 Ct. Cust. 236 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1912)
United States v. N. Erlanger, Blumgart & Co.
16 Ct. Cust. 437 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1929)

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