Bonilla v. Woods (INMATE 2) (LEAD)

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedAugust 30, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-00071
StatusUnknown

This text of Bonilla v. Woods (INMATE 2) (LEAD) (Bonilla v. Woods (INMATE 2) (LEAD)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bonilla v. Woods (INMATE 2) (LEAD), (M.D. Ala. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

LUIS BONILLA, Reg. No. 41724-083, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:19-CV-71-WHA-KFP ) [WO] WALTER WOODS, ) ) Respondent. )

LUIS BONILLA, Reg. No. 41724-083, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:19-CV-903-WHA-KFP ) [WO] WALTER WOODS, ) ) Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This consolidated case is before the Court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Louis Bonilla. At the time he filed his habeas petitions, Bonilla was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama, serving a 360- month prison sentence for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 5 Kilograms or more of Cocaine. Doc. 15-1 at 3. Bonilla argues in this consolidated action that he meets the eligibility requirements found in 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g) for early release to home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018.1 Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 2 at 3. Bonilla further challenges the BOP’s determination that he is a “violent” offender, which disqualifies him as an eligible elderly offender under the First Step Act.

See Bonilla v. Woods, Case No. 2:19-cv-903-WHA-KFP (M.D. Ala.) (Doc. 1 at 1–4). Bonilla seeks an order directing the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to transfer him to home confinement to serve the remainder of his sentence, less any earned good time. Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 2 at 4; see also Case No. 2:19-cv-903-WHA-KFP (Doc. 1 at 3–4). Respondent Woods filed a response with supporting evidentiary materials arguing

both petitions are due to be dismissed because Bonilla failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies through the BOP before filing. Docs. 15, 23. Woods also argues that Bonilla is entitled to no relief on his claims. Id. The Court granted Bonilla an opportunity to respond, but he failed to do so. Further, a review of the BOP’s website shows Bonilla was released during the pendency of this action.2

II. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction & Venue The law is settled that a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the manner, location, or execution of his sentence. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 236 (2001); Williams v. Pearson, 197 F. App’x 872, 877

(11th Cir. 2006). Jurisdiction is determined at the time the action is filed. United States v. Edwards, 27 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 1994). Bonilla claims he is entitled to serve the remainder

1 Pub. L. No. 115–391, §§ 504, 603, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). 2 See www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited August 30, 2021), reflecting release date of July 23, 2021. of his sentence on home confinement under the First Step Act because he meets the eligibility requirements under 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g). Because Bonilla’s challenges the execution of his sentence, this Court has jurisdiction over his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claims.

Further, because Bonilla was incarcerated in this district when he filed these actions, venue is proper. Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 28 U.S.C. § 2241petition for habeas corpus relief generally may be brought only in the district court where inmate is incarcerated). B. Mootness

To obtain relief on his petitions, Bonilla must demonstrate that he “is [currently] in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Under Section Two, Article III, of the United States Constitution, federal courts are barred from hearing matters, including habeas petitions, in the absence of a live case or controversy. See e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Deakins v.

Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988). For a live case or controversy to exist, at all times during litigation the petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental Bank, 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam ) (observing that “federal courts are without power to decide

questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them”). “[A] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Soliman v. U.S. ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When effective relief cannot be granted because of later events, the [case] must be dismissed as moot.” Westmoreland v. National Transportation Safety Board, 833 F.2d 1461, 1462 (11th Cir. 1987); American Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Service, 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that, “[i]f an event occurs that prevents the court from granting effective relief, the claim is moot and must be dismissed”). “It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (explaining that a federal court no longer has jurisdiction over a case that has become moot). In the specific context of habeas petitions, the case or controversy requirement warrants a finding of mootness if (1) the petitioner receives the relief requested or (2) the court is unable to provide the relief sought. See Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d

1096, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1997). Bonilla’s objective in filing these actions was to be transferred to home confinement to serve his remaining sentence, but Bonilla has since been released from custody. The Court cannot give him meaningful habeas relief on his claims, and there are no allegations that he will be suffer future adverse consequences related to his claims. See Bailey v.

Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir.

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Rodney H. Williams v. Bruce Pearson
197 F. App'x 872 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
North Carolina v. Rice
404 U.S. 244 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Preiser v. Newkirk
422 U.S. 395 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Deakins v. Monaghan
484 U.S. 193 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.
494 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Spencer v. Kemna
523 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Lopez v. Davis
531 U.S. 230 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Larry Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama
661 F.2d 1206 (Eleventh Circuit, 1981)
Murray Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.
667 F.2d 33 (Eleventh Circuit, 1982)
Fernando Fernandez v. United States
941 F.2d 1488 (Eleventh Circuit, 1991)
Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS
296 F.3d 1237 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)

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