Caer, J.
During the years 1938 and 1939, plaintiff corporation was engaged in lumbering operations in the counties of Houghton and Keweenaw. In connection with the carrying on of the business plaintiff entered into written contracts with various piece workers, including the individual defendants and appellees in this case. Said contracts were all in substantially the same form, some providing for the cutting of saw logs from standing timber, and others for the cutting, manufacturing and piling of merchantable pulp wood and cedar tie cuts. Exhibit 1, which is typical of the contracts in question, is set forth in the margin.
These written undertakings were for varying periods of time, ranging from 12 to 60 days. Each described the particular land on which the services
contracted for were to be performed. Before starting work on a different parcel the practice was followed of entering into a new contract.
On different dates during the first three months of 1940 said defendants and appellees, hereinafter referred to as claimants, asserting that they were during the period referred to, employees of plaintiff within the meaning of the unemployment compensation act (Act No. 1, Pub. Acts 1936 [Ex. Sess.], as amended by Act No. 347, Pub. Acts 1937, and by
Act No. 324, Pub. Acts'1939 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 8485-41
et seq.,
Stat. Ann. 1940 Cum. Supp. § 17.501
et seq.]),
filed petitions for unemployment compensation in accordance with tbe provisions of said statute. Hearings on the petitions were duly scheduled and held. The referee sustained the contentions of the claimants, holding that the evidence justified the conclusion that the actual relationship between plaintiff and claimants was that of employer and employees. The appeal board affirmed the ruling and the circuit court of Keweenaw county, reviewing the matter on certiorari, did likewise. Prom such determination of the circuit court plaintiff has appealed.
Act No. 324, Pub. Acts 1939, which amended the unemployment compensation act in material respects, became effective on the 22d day of June of that year. Each claimant based his petition for compensation in part on unemployment prior to that date and in part on such unemployment subsequent thereto. Prior to the amendment of 1939, the test to be applied in determining the nature of the relationship between the parties was fixed by section 42, subd. (6) (a) (b) and (c), of the unemployment compensation act. These provisions were construed in
Acme Messenger Service Co.
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
306 Mich. 704, and in
O ’Brian
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
309 Mich. 18. Plaintiff concedes that; under the provisions of the statute referred to, as construed in the decisions cited, the appeal board and the circuit court were correct in holding that claimants were entitled to compensation insofar as their petitions were based on unemployment prior to June 22, 1939. In consequence, further consideration of this part of the case is not necessary.
Act No. 324, Pub. Acts 1939, amended tbe unemployment compensation act in sucb manner as to change tbe test to be applied in determining tbe status of services performed in logging operations. Tbe following provisions were incorporated in section 42, subd. (7), of tbe statute:
“Tbe term ‘employment’ shall not include: * * *
“ (m) Service performed in logging or woods operations, compensated wholly on a piece-work or quantity basis unless sucb services are included as ‘employment’ under title 9 of the social security act;
“ (n) Any service not included as ‘employment’ under title 9 of tbe social security act.”
It is obvious that by tbe enactment of (7) (m), above quoted, tbe legislature made inapplicable to tbe claimants in this case tbe provisions of section 42, subd. (6) (a) (b) and (c). Clearly, it was tbe intention of the legislature to exclude from tbe benefits of tbe statute persons rendering services of tbe character referred to unless sucb persons are entitled to be classed as employees under tbe social security act. It is a general rule of statutory construction that an amendment is to be construed, unless a different intent is manifest, as changing tbe statute amended.
Lawrence Baking Co.
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
308 Mich. 198, 205 (154 A. L. R. 660). As applied to tbe status of tbe claimants in this case tbe amendment withdrew tbe previously controlling test, as laid down in section 42, subd. (6) (a) (b) and (c), and substituted therefor the test suggested by section 42, subd. (7) (m), of tbe Michigan unemployment compensation act.
It is tbe claim of plaintiff here, in substance, that following said amendment claimants must be regarded as independent contractors, that they were not engaged in “employment” as tbe term is used in
the social security act and that, in consequence, they are not entitled to unemployment compensation for any period since June 22,1939. On behalf of the appeal board of the unemployment compensation commission it is urged that the social security act should be construed as applicable to and including these claimants and, therefore, that they should be held entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Michigan statute.
This brings us to a consideration of the question as to the proper tests to be applied in construing the term “employment,” as used in the Federal act referred to. Plaintiff insists that resort must necessarily be had to common-law principles, while counsel for appellees claim that an interpretation more inclusive than that of the common law should be accepted. Title 9, § 907 (c), of the social security act (49 Stat. at L. 642), in defining various terms used therein, declares that “The term ‘employment’ means any service, of whatever nature, performed within the United States by an employee for his employer.” Certain exceptions are set forth but none is pertinent to the issue in this case. Counsel for appellant insists that Congress, in using the terms “employee” and “employer,” without specific definition, must be presumed to have had in mind the tests ordinarily applicable under common-law principles. Such construction seems to be favored by Federal courts that have passed on the matter. Thus, in
Glenn
v.
Beard
(C. C. A.), 141 Fed. (2d) 376, it was said by Judge McAllister, speaking for the circuit court of appeals:
“According to the pertinent regulations of the commissioner of internal revenue, promulgated under title 9 of the social security act, 26 USCA, Internal Revenue Code, § 1600,
et seq,
it is provided: ‘In general, if an individual is subject to the con
trol or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and method of accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor, not an employee.’ Treasury Regulation No. 90, art. 205.
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Caer, J.
During the years 1938 and 1939, plaintiff corporation was engaged in lumbering operations in the counties of Houghton and Keweenaw. In connection with the carrying on of the business plaintiff entered into written contracts with various piece workers, including the individual defendants and appellees in this case. Said contracts were all in substantially the same form, some providing for the cutting of saw logs from standing timber, and others for the cutting, manufacturing and piling of merchantable pulp wood and cedar tie cuts. Exhibit 1, which is typical of the contracts in question, is set forth in the margin.
These written undertakings were for varying periods of time, ranging from 12 to 60 days. Each described the particular land on which the services
contracted for were to be performed. Before starting work on a different parcel the practice was followed of entering into a new contract.
On different dates during the first three months of 1940 said defendants and appellees, hereinafter referred to as claimants, asserting that they were during the period referred to, employees of plaintiff within the meaning of the unemployment compensation act (Act No. 1, Pub. Acts 1936 [Ex. Sess.], as amended by Act No. 347, Pub. Acts 1937, and by
Act No. 324, Pub. Acts'1939 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 8485-41
et seq.,
Stat. Ann. 1940 Cum. Supp. § 17.501
et seq.]),
filed petitions for unemployment compensation in accordance with tbe provisions of said statute. Hearings on the petitions were duly scheduled and held. The referee sustained the contentions of the claimants, holding that the evidence justified the conclusion that the actual relationship between plaintiff and claimants was that of employer and employees. The appeal board affirmed the ruling and the circuit court of Keweenaw county, reviewing the matter on certiorari, did likewise. Prom such determination of the circuit court plaintiff has appealed.
Act No. 324, Pub. Acts 1939, which amended the unemployment compensation act in material respects, became effective on the 22d day of June of that year. Each claimant based his petition for compensation in part on unemployment prior to that date and in part on such unemployment subsequent thereto. Prior to the amendment of 1939, the test to be applied in determining the nature of the relationship between the parties was fixed by section 42, subd. (6) (a) (b) and (c), of the unemployment compensation act. These provisions were construed in
Acme Messenger Service Co.
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
306 Mich. 704, and in
O ’Brian
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
309 Mich. 18. Plaintiff concedes that; under the provisions of the statute referred to, as construed in the decisions cited, the appeal board and the circuit court were correct in holding that claimants were entitled to compensation insofar as their petitions were based on unemployment prior to June 22, 1939. In consequence, further consideration of this part of the case is not necessary.
Act No. 324, Pub. Acts 1939, amended tbe unemployment compensation act in sucb manner as to change tbe test to be applied in determining tbe status of services performed in logging operations. Tbe following provisions were incorporated in section 42, subd. (7), of tbe statute:
“Tbe term ‘employment’ shall not include: * * *
“ (m) Service performed in logging or woods operations, compensated wholly on a piece-work or quantity basis unless sucb services are included as ‘employment’ under title 9 of the social security act;
“ (n) Any service not included as ‘employment’ under title 9 of tbe social security act.”
It is obvious that by tbe enactment of (7) (m), above quoted, tbe legislature made inapplicable to tbe claimants in this case tbe provisions of section 42, subd. (6) (a) (b) and (c). Clearly, it was tbe intention of the legislature to exclude from tbe benefits of tbe statute persons rendering services of tbe character referred to unless sucb persons are entitled to be classed as employees under tbe social security act. It is a general rule of statutory construction that an amendment is to be construed, unless a different intent is manifest, as changing tbe statute amended.
Lawrence Baking Co.
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
308 Mich. 198, 205 (154 A. L. R. 660). As applied to tbe status of tbe claimants in this case tbe amendment withdrew tbe previously controlling test, as laid down in section 42, subd. (6) (a) (b) and (c), and substituted therefor the test suggested by section 42, subd. (7) (m), of tbe Michigan unemployment compensation act.
It is tbe claim of plaintiff here, in substance, that following said amendment claimants must be regarded as independent contractors, that they were not engaged in “employment” as tbe term is used in
the social security act and that, in consequence, they are not entitled to unemployment compensation for any period since June 22,1939. On behalf of the appeal board of the unemployment compensation commission it is urged that the social security act should be construed as applicable to and including these claimants and, therefore, that they should be held entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Michigan statute.
This brings us to a consideration of the question as to the proper tests to be applied in construing the term “employment,” as used in the Federal act referred to. Plaintiff insists that resort must necessarily be had to common-law principles, while counsel for appellees claim that an interpretation more inclusive than that of the common law should be accepted. Title 9, § 907 (c), of the social security act (49 Stat. at L. 642), in defining various terms used therein, declares that “The term ‘employment’ means any service, of whatever nature, performed within the United States by an employee for his employer.” Certain exceptions are set forth but none is pertinent to the issue in this case. Counsel for appellant insists that Congress, in using the terms “employee” and “employer,” without specific definition, must be presumed to have had in mind the tests ordinarily applicable under common-law principles. Such construction seems to be favored by Federal courts that have passed on the matter. Thus, in
Glenn
v.
Beard
(C. C. A.), 141 Fed. (2d) 376, it was said by Judge McAllister, speaking for the circuit court of appeals:
“According to the pertinent regulations of the commissioner of internal revenue, promulgated under title 9 of the social security act, 26 USCA, Internal Revenue Code, § 1600,
et seq,
it is provided: ‘In general, if an individual is subject to the con
trol or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and method of accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor, not an employee.’ Treasury Regulation No. 90, art. 205. The regulation is in harmony with the assumption that the act took over the term ‘employee,’ as the common law knew it, ‘for it enumerates the generally accredited determinants in such cases, of which the most important is the putative employer’s control over the employee’s business.’ * * *
“Employment under this statute is to be understood in its ordinary sense, as meaning the legal relationship of employer and employee; and this conclusion is fortified by the applicable regulations of the commissioner of internal revenue, which sets forth that ‘the relationship between the individual who performs such services and the person for whom such services are rendered must, as to those services, be the legal relationship of employer and employee. * * * The words “employ,” “employer,” and “employee,” as used in this article, are to be taken in their ordinary meaning. * * * Individuals performing services as independent contractors are not employees.’ ”
In
United States
v.
Mutual Trucking Co.
(C. C. A.), 141 Fed. (2d) 655, it was further, stated by Judge Allen, after referring to the provisions of the statute:
‘ ‘ The statute thus recognizes the common-law definition of independent contract and excludes such relationship from the burden of the tax. (citing cases)” ’
After discussing the facts involved in the controversy before it, the following significant comment was made:
“Congress might have provided that such a relationship should be considered an employment, but
it has not done so. In fact the senate rejected a house amendment which would have extended the coverage in the statute beyond the employment relationship. ’ ’
Similar views were expressed by the 'same court in
Glenn
v.
Standard Oil Co.
(C. C. A.), 148 Fed. (2d) 51, decided March 12, 1945.
In
Jones
v.
Goodson
(C. C. A.), 121 Fed. (2d) 176, in holding that the common-law tests must be deemed applicable in determining whether the employer and employee relationship exists under the social security act, it was said:
“It must be presumed that Congress was cognizant of these well-established principles at the time of the enactment of the statute, and that if different guides were intended for ascertaining whether the relationship of employer and employee existed between the parties in the application of the statute, appropriate language would have been used to indicate such purpose. There is nothing in the' act or its legislative history which indicates such an intent. Furthermore, the regulation adverted to blue prints with meticulous care the elements of the relationship in strict harmony with uniform judicial pronouncements. Congress has convened several times since the regulation was promulgated and has not evidenced its disapproval in any manner. That acquiescence must he construed as approval.
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co.
v.
United States,
288 U. S. 294 (53 Sup. Ct. 350, 77 L. Ed. 796);
Shelton
v.
United States
(C. C. A.), 88 Fed. (2d) 599.”
Other Federal cases of like import are
Texas Co.
v.
Higgins
(C. C. A.), 118 Fed. (2d) 636;
United States
v.
Griswold
(C. C. A.), 124 Fed. (2d) 599;
Williams
v.
United States
(C. C. A.), 126 Fed. (2d) 129;
Anglim
v.
Empire Star Mines Co.
(C. C. A.), 129 Fed. (2d) 914;
Los Angeles Athletic Club
v.
United States,
54 Fed. Supp. 702;
Kirsch
v.
Rothensies,
56 Fed. Supp. 92;
Emard
v.
Squire,
58 Fed. Supp. 281;
Cannon Valley Milling Co.
v.
United States,
59 Fed. Supp. 785;
American Oil Co.
v.
Fly
(C. C. A.), 135 Fed. (2d) 491 (147 A. L. R. 824);
Burruss
v.
Early,
44 Fed. Supp. 21;
W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co.
v.
United States,
55 Fed. Supp. 103.
Counsel for the appeal board has called attention to the case of
United States
v.
Vogue, Inc.
(C. C. A.), 145 Fed. (2d) 609, in which the view was expressed that a more liberal test than that furnished by common-law rules should be used for the purpose of determining whether a questioned relationship constitutes “employment” under title 9 of the social security act. However, the great weight of authority, insofar as the Federal decisions are concerned, supports the holding of the circuit court of appeals of the sixth circuit in
Glenn
v.
Beard, supra,
and
United States
v.
Mutual Trucking Co., supra.
There is much force in the pertinent suggestion in several of those decisions that if Congress had intended that a test more liberal than that of the common law should be applied, it would have specifically indicated such test. The practical situation is that, unless resort is had to principles commonly recognized as controlling at common law, there is no certain and definite basis on which reliance can be placed in determining whether the “employer-employee” relationship exists for the purposes of title 9 of the social security act. It is our conclusion that Congress intended that these terms should be used in their common-law significance.
This brings us to consideration of the question of whether the claimants were, under common-law principles, independent contractors or employees in the rendition of the services- in question. In
Macario
v.
Bonifas-Gorman Lumber Co.,
291 Mich. 292, which
arose under the workmen’s compensation law, the written agreement between the parties was very similar to the contracts executed by plaintiff and claimants. It was there held that the relationship existing was not that of employer and employee, but rather that Macario was an independent contractor. In the case at bar it is apparently not questioned that the contracts as written made each of the claimants an independent contractor. The trial court stated that such was his opinion and his conclusion in this regard is not challenged. Counsel for the appeal board, however, rely on the claim that in actual practice the specific provisions of the contracts were not followed. A careful reading of the testimony leads us to the conclusion that in certain instances representatives of the plaintiff, for the purpose of expediting operations, overstepped their authority as defined by the written agreements. In the main, however, the contracts were followed and the record requires the conclusion that such violations as actually occurred were merely occasional. There is nothing in the record on which to base a finding that plaintiff and claimants, or any of them, agreed to modifications of said contracts. Under such circumstances this court has held that the written 'contract is controlling.
In
Tuttle
v.
Embury-Martin Lumber Co.,
192 Mich. 385, 399 (Ann. Cas. 1918C, 664), it was said:
“We are of the opinion that the test of the relationship is the right to control. It is not the fact of actual interference with the control, but. the right to interfere, that makes the difference between an independent contractor and a servant or agent. 26 Cyc. p. 1547.”
Likewise, in
McCormick
v.
Sears Roebuck & co.,
254 Mich. 221, after determining that ’the specific
contract involved made plaintiff an independent contractor, it was said:
“The department of labor and industry reached a different conclusion, evidently on the theory that the defendant departed from the contract by assuming to hire and discharge workmen and to control the plaintiff in the manner of doing the work. If the contract rested in parol, the defendant’s conduct would be strong evidence of the relationship of employer and employee; but it was in writing and the relationship of the parties must be measured by its terms and provisions. Moreover, actual interference or actual control is not the test of the relationship.”
These decisions were followed in
Macario
v.
Bonifas-Gorman Lumber Co., supra,
where the court in holding that the provisions of the contract were controlling, said:
“The relationship of the parties here must be measured by the terms and provisions of that contract. The fact that the defendant may have actually interfered with the rights of plaintiff’s decedent under the contract did not change the relationship established thereby.”
See, also,
Bert Baker, Inc.,
v.
Ryce,
301 Mich. 84;
O’Brian
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
309 Mich. 18;
Palmer
v.
Unemployment Compensation Commission,
310 Mich. 702 (158 A. L. R. 909). These decisions are controlling in the case at bar.
It is our conclusion that the claimants, under the contracts as written and under which they rendered services to the plaintiff, were, for the reasons above stated, independent contractors and not employees during the period here involved subsequent to June 22, 1939. The determination of the trial court
that claimants are entitled to compensation during the periods in question prior to that date is affirmed. Insofar as the judgment in the circuit court held them to be entitled to compensation thereafter, said judgment is reversed. In view of the nature of the questions involved, no costs are allowed. The case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Btjtzel, C. J., and Bitshnell, Sharpe, Boyles, Reid, North, and Starr, JJ., concurred.