Bonie v. Annucci

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 23, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-02409·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NASEAN BONIE, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-2409 (LLS) ANTHONY ANNUCI; ROYCE HANNS; ORDER TO AMEND C.O. OFFICER D. GERMANO; C.O. OFFICER “X” MAHON, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that he was falsely accused of misbehavior and denied his due process rights in the disciplinary hearing that followed. By order dated April 20, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Nasean Bonie alleges that on December 9, 2018, he was served with a Tier II misbehavior report for an incident that took place on December 7, 2018. (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 3). He states that the disciplinary notice charged him with six offenses: “1–[Disobeying a] direct order, 2-Threat, 3- Interference, 4-Out of place, 5-Movement violation, 6-Threat of violence.” (Id. at 8). According to Plaintiff, the disciplinary report signed by Officers Germano and Mahon had several errors or omissions. First, the report was dated “November 5,” that is, one month before the incident took place. (Id. at 8-9). Second, the name of a third officer, who Plaintiff

states was present during the incident, was omitted from the report. Plaintiff indicates that this third officer has indicated that he or she did not hear Plaintiff make any threat. Plaintiff wrote a prison grievance on December 13, 2018, stating that he has “been ILLEGALLY confined (keep locked) to [his] cell because of the false report since 12-7-18!” (Id. at 9). He argues that the disciplinary report must be untrue because “[i]f these officers felt threatened by me then why didn’t they pull the emergency pin for immediate security response? That’s because the[i]r statements of facts are absolutely false and they lied to have me receive punishment for their own gratification.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that these officers have continued to act aggressively toward him. On December 12, 2018, Officer Mahon asked Plaintiff whether he took medication. When Plaintiff

shook his head rather than verbalizing his response, Officer Mahon raised his voice to “a very aggressive pitch” and said, “Didn’t you just hear what the fuck I said?” (Id. at 10). Plaintiff fears that Defendants Germano and Mahon will target him further and seeks to have these officers immediately suspended pending a formal hearing into their conduct. Plaintiff brings this suit against Defendants Germano and Mahon, Hearing Officer Hanns, and New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) Acting Commissioner Anthony Annucci. Plaintiff seeks damages and an injunction directing defendants not to engage in further harassment. DISCUSSION A. Unprofessional Conduct Verbal abuse, threats, and intimidation, standing alone, without injury or damage, do not amount to a constitutional deprivation. See Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that name-calling without “any appreciable injury” is not a constitutional violation); Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F. Supp. 2d 318, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[V]erbal intimidation

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”); Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[V]erbal harassment or profanity alone, ‘unaccompanied by any injury no matter how inappropriate, unprofessional or reprehensible it might seem,’ does not constitute the violation of any federally protected right and therefore is not actionable under 42 U.S. C. § 1983”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations that Correction officer Mahon raised his voice to “a very aggressive pitch” and used profanity, while abhorrent, do not state a claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights absent further allegations of injury or damage. B.

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