1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 James Bonham, No. CV-21-00406-PHX-MTL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v. NOT FOR PUBLICATION
12 Bank of America NA,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court are five motions. (Docs. 10, 20, 22, 29, 30.) Plaintiff James 16 Bonham has filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 10), a Motion for Joinder of 17 Additional Parties (Doc. 20), a Motion for Hearing (Doc. 29), and Motion for Discovery 18 Conference (Doc. 30). Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) has filed a Motion to 19 Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). (Doc. 22.) For the reasons 20 expressed herein, the Court will grant BANA’s Motion to Dismiss. (Id.) Mr. Bonham’s 21 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 10), Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties 22 (Doc. 20), Motion for Hearing (Doc. 29), and Motion for Discovery Conference (Doc. 30) 23 will be denied as moot.1 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 In 2005, Mr. Bonham obtained a loan from Countrywide Bank. (Doc. 19 ¶ 1.) This 26 action is the latest in a series of cases filed by Mr. Bonham related to the loan. Because the 27 parties are familiar with this history, the Court will only recount the pertinent facts.
28 1 The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 1 In 2013, Mr. Bonham filed a lawsuit against BANA, asserting his debt was either 2 unenforceable under a “bifurcation” theory or “satisfied by the sale of [the] loan.” See 3 Bonham v. Bank of Am. NA, No. CV-13-02220-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 12204173, at *1 (D. 4 Ariz. Dec. 19, 2013) (hereinafter “Bonham I”). Finding Mr. Bonham failed to state a 5 plausible cause of action, the district court dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 6 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision. 7 Bonham v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. App’x 179 (9th Cir. 2016). 8 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bonham filed another lawsuit against BANA, repeating the 9 claims alleged in Bonham I and alleging related claims under the Fair Debt Collections 10 Practices Act and Uniform Commercial Code. See Bonham v. Bank of Am. NA, No. CV- 11 16-03822-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL 2841220, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2017) (hereinafter 12 “Bonham II”). The district court dismissed Mr. Bonham’s repetitive claims on res judicata 13 grounds and the others as meritless. Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the decision. 14 Bonham v. Bank of Am., N.A., 715 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 In March 2021, Mr. Bonham initiated the instant action, demanding that BANA 16 “prove up” the debt by presenting a “wet-signed debt instrument.” (Doc. 1; Doc. 19 ¶¶ 4, 17 5.) BANA now moves to dismiss Mr. Bonham’s claims. (Doc. 22.) The Motion to Dismiss 18 is ripe for ruling. (Docs. 22, 26, 27.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include a 21 “short and plain statement” showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 22 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain 23 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 24 face.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). A claim is plausible when there is enough factual 25 content for a court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 26 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). Dismissal is proper if “there is no cognizable 27 legal theory,” or “an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal 28 theory.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2018). 1 Generally, when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), 2 courts may not consider material outside the pleadings. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 3 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Judicial notice is an exception 4 to that general rule. Id. Judicial notice is appropriate if an adjudicative fact is “not subject 5 to reasonable dispute,” meaning it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources 6 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). “[Courts] may 7 take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in 8 federal or state courts.” Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 9 2012) (citation omitted). For purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss, the Court will 10 take judicial notice of the substance and disposition of Bonham I and Bonham II. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 The doctrine of res judicata protects “litigants from the burden of relitigating an 13 identical issue” and promotes “judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” 14 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Res judicata applies when three 15 elements are satisfied: (1) identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and 16 (3) privity between the parties. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 17 987 (9th Cir. 2005). BANA argues Mr. Bonham’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res 18 judicata. (Doc. 22.) For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees. 19 Mr. Bonham’s current claims are premised on a “wet-signed” theory, which the 20 district court and the Ninth Circuit has already considered and rejected. Bonham, 667 F. 21 App’x at 179 (“[D]efendant was not required to show Bonham the note or otherwise prove 22 its authority to foreclose.”). Thus, because Bonham I, Bonham II, and the instant action 23 “arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts,” the identity-of-claims element is 24 satisfied. See Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767, 25 770 (9th Cir. 2003). The second element is also met because the courts in Bonham I and 26 Bonham II entered final judgments on the merits. See Bonham II, 2017 WL 2841220, at 27 *2; see also Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 502, 506 (1987) (“A 28 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . disposes of the merits and takes res judicata effect.”). And privity is 1 satisfied because each lawsuit involves Mr. Bonham and BANA. Accordingly, the Court 2 concludes that Mr. Bonham’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they 3 were raised, or could have been raised, in his prior actions against BANA.2 4 Mr. Bonham’s history of litigation warrants a reminder that federal courts have a 5 responsibility to ensure that their limited resources “are allocated in a way that promotes 6 the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). “Flagrant abuse of the 7 judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to preempt the use of 8 judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other 9 litigants.” DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 James Bonham, No. CV-21-00406-PHX-MTL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v. NOT FOR PUBLICATION
12 Bank of America NA,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court are five motions. (Docs. 10, 20, 22, 29, 30.) Plaintiff James 16 Bonham has filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 10), a Motion for Joinder of 17 Additional Parties (Doc. 20), a Motion for Hearing (Doc. 29), and Motion for Discovery 18 Conference (Doc. 30). Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) has filed a Motion to 19 Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). (Doc. 22.) For the reasons 20 expressed herein, the Court will grant BANA’s Motion to Dismiss. (Id.) Mr. Bonham’s 21 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 10), Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties 22 (Doc. 20), Motion for Hearing (Doc. 29), and Motion for Discovery Conference (Doc. 30) 23 will be denied as moot.1 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 In 2005, Mr. Bonham obtained a loan from Countrywide Bank. (Doc. 19 ¶ 1.) This 26 action is the latest in a series of cases filed by Mr. Bonham related to the loan. Because the 27 parties are familiar with this history, the Court will only recount the pertinent facts.
28 1 The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 1 In 2013, Mr. Bonham filed a lawsuit against BANA, asserting his debt was either 2 unenforceable under a “bifurcation” theory or “satisfied by the sale of [the] loan.” See 3 Bonham v. Bank of Am. NA, No. CV-13-02220-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 12204173, at *1 (D. 4 Ariz. Dec. 19, 2013) (hereinafter “Bonham I”). Finding Mr. Bonham failed to state a 5 plausible cause of action, the district court dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 6 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision. 7 Bonham v. Bank of Am., N.A., 667 F. App’x 179 (9th Cir. 2016). 8 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bonham filed another lawsuit against BANA, repeating the 9 claims alleged in Bonham I and alleging related claims under the Fair Debt Collections 10 Practices Act and Uniform Commercial Code. See Bonham v. Bank of Am. NA, No. CV- 11 16-03822-PHX-JJT, 2017 WL 2841220, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2017) (hereinafter 12 “Bonham II”). The district court dismissed Mr. Bonham’s repetitive claims on res judicata 13 grounds and the others as meritless. Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the decision. 14 Bonham v. Bank of Am., N.A., 715 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 In March 2021, Mr. Bonham initiated the instant action, demanding that BANA 16 “prove up” the debt by presenting a “wet-signed debt instrument.” (Doc. 1; Doc. 19 ¶¶ 4, 17 5.) BANA now moves to dismiss Mr. Bonham’s claims. (Doc. 22.) The Motion to Dismiss 18 is ripe for ruling. (Docs. 22, 26, 27.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include a 21 “short and plain statement” showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 22 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain 23 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 24 face.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). A claim is plausible when there is enough factual 25 content for a court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 26 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). Dismissal is proper if “there is no cognizable 27 legal theory,” or “an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal 28 theory.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2018). 1 Generally, when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), 2 courts may not consider material outside the pleadings. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 3 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Judicial notice is an exception 4 to that general rule. Id. Judicial notice is appropriate if an adjudicative fact is “not subject 5 to reasonable dispute,” meaning it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources 6 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). “[Courts] may 7 take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in 8 federal or state courts.” Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 9 2012) (citation omitted). For purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss, the Court will 10 take judicial notice of the substance and disposition of Bonham I and Bonham II. 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 The doctrine of res judicata protects “litigants from the burden of relitigating an 13 identical issue” and promotes “judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” 14 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Res judicata applies when three 15 elements are satisfied: (1) identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and 16 (3) privity between the parties. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 17 987 (9th Cir. 2005). BANA argues Mr. Bonham’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res 18 judicata. (Doc. 22.) For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees. 19 Mr. Bonham’s current claims are premised on a “wet-signed” theory, which the 20 district court and the Ninth Circuit has already considered and rejected. Bonham, 667 F. 21 App’x at 179 (“[D]efendant was not required to show Bonham the note or otherwise prove 22 its authority to foreclose.”). Thus, because Bonham I, Bonham II, and the instant action 23 “arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts,” the identity-of-claims element is 24 satisfied. See Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767, 25 770 (9th Cir. 2003). The second element is also met because the courts in Bonham I and 26 Bonham II entered final judgments on the merits. See Bonham II, 2017 WL 2841220, at 27 *2; see also Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 502, 506 (1987) (“A 28 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . disposes of the merits and takes res judicata effect.”). And privity is 1 satisfied because each lawsuit involves Mr. Bonham and BANA. Accordingly, the Court 2 concludes that Mr. Bonham’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they 3 were raised, or could have been raised, in his prior actions against BANA.2 4 Mr. Bonham’s history of litigation warrants a reminder that federal courts have a 5 responsibility to ensure that their limited resources “are allocated in a way that promotes 6 the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). “Flagrant abuse of the 7 judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to preempt the use of 8 judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other 9 litigants.” DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). District courts have 10 inherent power to ensure that the business of the court is conducted in an orderly and 11 reasonable fashion. See, e.g., Visser v. Supreme Court of Cal., 919 F.2d 113, 114 (9th Cir. 12 1990). This inherent authority includes the power to “regulate the activities of abusive 13 litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” 14 Delong, 912 F.2d at 1147. Although the Court will not issue a vexatious litigant order at 15 this time, continued attempts by Mr. Bonham to relitigate meritless claims may result in 16 sanctions or a vexatious litigant order. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22). 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 21 Injunction (Doc. 10), Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties (Doc. 20), Motion for 22 Hearing on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29), and Motion for Discovery 23 Conference (Doc. 30) as moot. 24 25
26 2 Because the Court will dismiss Mr. Bonham’s claims, there is no longer a case or controversy pending before the Court, and thus the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction 27 to resolve Mr. Bonham’s pending motions. See Outlaw Lab’y, LP v. Trepco Imp. & Distrib., Ltd., No. 3:19-cv-01229-GPC-BGS, 2019 WL 5422929, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 28 2019) (dismissing a complaint on a motion to dismiss and then denying a motion for preliminary injunction as moot). 1 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment || accordingly and close this case. 3 Dated this 2nd day of August, 2021. 4 WM clacl T. Hburde Michael T. Liburdi 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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