Bond v. State

50 S.W.2d 813, 121 Tex. Crim. 269, 1932 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 490
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 11, 1932
DocketNo. 15045.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 50 S.W.2d 813 (Bond v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bond v. State, 50 S.W.2d 813, 121 Tex. Crim. 269, 1932 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 490 (Tex. 1932).

Opinions

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is murder; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for fifty years.

It was charged in the indictment, in substance, that appellant, with malice aforethought, killed J. C. White by shooting him with a gun.

Appellant was employed by the State Highway .Department and was engaged in working on the highways in Terry county. He and his family lived in the town of Brownfield, they having moved to Terry county something over two years prior to the homicide. Deceased ran a grocery store in Brownfield, where he had lived for several years. Appellant and deceased had been good friends, appellant’s boy having been employed by deceased in his grocery store. Deceased had a young daughter, who went with appellant’s son. The daughter became pregnant and named appellant’s son as being responsible for her condition. Deceased became enraged and threatened to kill appellant’s son. According to appellant’s testimony, he came to his house with a pistol, threatening his boy’s life. Other witnesses gave testimony touching this threat. After appellant and deceased had talked the matter over, they decided to take the boy and girl to New Mexico and let them marry. Going to New Mexico, they secured a marriage license. After the wedding the boy and girl came back to Brownfield to live in deceased’s home. In a few days a baby was born. A little later appellant’s son left his wife. Deceased again became ¡enraged, according to the testimony of appellant’s witnesses, and threat•ened to kill appellant’s son. One witness testified that deceased told him that he ought to have killed both appellant and his son before the mar *271 riage took place. Deceased said, further, that appellant’s son could not stay in the town of Brownfield. Some time thereafter the son returned to Brownfield and deceased made him leave. According to appellant’s testimony, he tried to get transferred to a highway in another county, in order that he could be away from deceased, and avoid trouble. His testimony was to the further effect that deceased threatened both him and his son. Further, appellant said that it was his desire that his son live with his wife. It was the state’s theory that after the boy left Brownfield the second time the trouble between deceased and appellant .died out, and that there was no animosity on the part of deceased toward appellant. It was appellant’s theory that deceased continued to bear animosity toward him and succeeded in having him discharged from the highway force.

Some time after the trouble between appellant and deceased relative to their children, deceasd advised Mr. McBride, who had charge of the highway forces, that appellant was seeking to have him (McBride) transferred out of Terry county. Mr. McBride went to appellant and told him what deceased had stated to him. Appellant denied that he had made any effort to have McBride transferred. McBride took deceased’s word in the matter and discharged appellant. However, he recommended appellant for a position on the highway in some other county. The state’s testimony was to the effect that appellant had engaged with others in framing a letter to the highway department which would have been calculated to cause McBride to lose his job. Appellant denied that he participated in the matter. The morning after appellant was discharged by McBride, deceased was in a restaurant, sitting on a stool near the counter. According to the witnesses for the state, appellant entered the restaurant, called “Jay” (speaking to deceased), and began shooting at deceased. After firing the first shot appellant advanced some three or four steps. At the time he fired the last shot he was about three feet from deceased. Deceased had fallen from the stool at the time the last shot was fired. Four or five shots were fired in all by appellant. After firing the last shot, appellant said to deceased: “You double-crossed me.” Witnesses for the state testified that deceased was making no demonstration toward appellant at the time he shot him. Further, they testified that deceased was unarmed.

Appellant testified, in substance, as follows: On the morning he met deceased in the restaurant he had made arrangements for a party to take, him to Lubbock in order that he might apply for a position in the highway department there. He had gone to the restaurant for the purpose: of meeting this party. When he entered the restaurant he did not know,that deceased was in there and would not have gone in if he had known; it. When he saw deceased he said: “Hello Jay.” At this point we quote appellant’s testimony as follows: “He (deceased) then turned around right quick, facing me. When he turned around he never did. *272 say a word but just reached for his hip pocket. He just turned and faced me right quick and reached for a gun or I thought that it was what he reached for. I thought then that he was getting a gun. I thought he was going to shoot me. If I had not have thought he was going to kill me I would not have fired. I did that because I thought he was going to kill me.”

Appellant testified that he had been advised that deceased had threatened to kill him. He said, in speaking of the trouble he had had with deceased about his son and deceased’s daughter: “After that I would hear of Mr. White making threats against me or trying to do me or my boy harm; I would hear of those threats all the way along and it seemed that Mr. White at times would quiet down and it seemed that spells would come over him and he would make a threat, from the time of the wedding until the trouble ended.”

Appellant testified that, from what he knew of deceased, and what he had heard people say of him, he believed he was a man who would execute any threat he had made. He said that at one time he stayed off of his work four days on account of threats that he had heard of deceased making. He testified, further, that a few days before the killing a Mr. Lane asked him if his boy was at home. He said that he believed deceased would kill him and the boy, but would kill him first. He testified, further, that a Mr. Earnest told his wife that he had better stay out of town or he would get killed. Appellant denied he said to deceased, after he shot him: “You double-crossed me.” He denied that he shot deceased because he had caused him to lose his job with the highway department. Deceased’s partner in business testified that deceased had threatened to kill appellant’s son, and, further, that deceased had said appellant’s son could not come back to Brownfield to live. Further, this witness testified, in effect, that deceased had said to him that if appellant tried to prevent him from keeping his boy away from Brownfield he would “beat him to it.” This witness testified also to the fact that appellant had endeavored to avoid trouble with deceased. ' He said appellant would call on him and ask him to see if he could not keep down trouble between him and deceased. Another witness testified that deceased had said that appellant and his family were not human and that they were worse than dogs. Again, a witness for appellant testified that deceased had said that appellant and his boy could not live in the country with him unless appellant made his boy live with his girl and do the right thing by her. He said he communicated this matter to appellant. One witness testified that a few days before the killing deceased told him that he was going to get appellant’s son, but that he was going to get the old man (appellant) first.

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Bluebook (online)
50 S.W.2d 813, 121 Tex. Crim. 269, 1932 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 490, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bond-v-state-texcrimapp-1932.