Bond v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 192, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JAMAULL BOND, § § No. 192, 2025 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 1902014233 (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. § §

Submitted: October 2, 2025 Decided: December 12, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the

Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On April 29, 2024, the appellant, Jamaull Bond, pleaded guilty to one

count of continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of dealing in child

pornography. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State dismissed the remaining

twenty-eight counts in the grand jury’s indictment and agreed to cap its sentencing

recommendation at eight years (the minimum-mandatory sentence) of unsuspended Level V time. As agreed by the parties, the court ordered a presentence investigation

report.

(2) Before sentencing, Bond, with the assistance of trial counsel, moved to

withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary

because trial counsel put “tremendous pressure” on him to take the plea and because

the medication he was taking affected his ability to comprehend the plea

proceedings.1 Because Bond’s motion called into question trial counsel’s

performance, trial counsel moved to withdraw. The Superior Court granted trial

counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed conflict counsel to represent Bond.

After reviewing the plea colloquy transcript, conflict counsel also moved to

withdraw, advising the court that he could not ethically advocate for Bond’s motion

to withdraw his guilty plea. Following a hearing, at which Bond appeared pro se

and addressed the court, the Superior Court denied Bond’s motion, finding that he

had “fail[ed] to meet his burden of providing a fair and just reason for withdrawing

his guilty plea.”2 On April 4, 2025, the Superior Court sentenced Bond to a total of

eight years of unsuspended incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of

supervision. This is Bond’s direct appeal.

1 App. to Opening Br. at A212-A217. 2 State v. Bond, 2025 WL 428569, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2025). 2 (3) Bond’s counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw

under Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts that, after a conscientious review of the record

and the law, he has concluded that this appeal is wholly without merit. In his

statement filed under Rule 26(c), counsel states that he informed Bond of the

provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw

and the accompanying brief. Counsel also informed Bond of his right to supplement

his attorney’s presentation. Bond has raised issues for the Court’s consideration,

which counsel attached to his Rule 26(c) brief. The State has responded to the Rule

26(c) brief and argues that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

(4) The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a

motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold. First,

the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious

examination of the record and the law for arguable claims. 3 Second, the Court must

conduct its own review of the record and determine whether “the appeal is indeed so

frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary presentation.”4

(5) Bond essentially makes two arguments on appeal: (i) the Superior Court

failed to determine whether there was a factual basis for his guilty plea; and (ii) he

did not voluntarily plead guilty. Both arguments are unavailing.

3 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 4 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82.

3 (6) Before it enters a judgment on a guilty plea, Superior Court Criminal

Rule 11 requires the court to make an inquiry as to whether there is a factual basis

for the plea.5 “[T]he factual basis for [a guilty] plea is most clearly established by a

defendant’s specific admission in open court that he did what he is charged with

doing….”6 That is precisely what happened here: the Superior Court read each

charge and its elements to Bond and asked him (i) if he understood the charge and

(ii) if he was guilty of that offense. As to all four offenses, Bond responded in the

affirmative to both questions. Nothing more is required; a defendant need not

“confess” to specific factual findings as he alleges. Moreover, the circumstances

under which Bond pleaded guilty—just before jury selection on the morning of trial

under an agreement proposed by Bond’s defense team, the terms of which Bond

acknowledged in open court—bolster the Superior Court’s finding that there was a

factual basis for the plea.7

(7) Turning to Bond’s second argument, a review of the plea paperwork

and the transcript of the plea colloquy belies Bond’s claim that his plea was not

voluntarily made. On the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Bond: (i) denied

5 Del. Super. Crim. R. 11(f) (“Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the judgment.”). 6 Raison v. State, 469 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. 1983). 7 See id. (“[W]hen a guilty plea is entered pursuant to an agreement and the agreement is confirmed in open court, the factual basis for the plea may be established by the plea itself and by the circumstances under which it is taken.”). 4 that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, (ii) admitted that he had freely

and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the listed charges, (iii) acknowledged that

no one had promised him anything not stated in the written plea agreement, (iv)

agreed that no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty, and (v) averred that

he was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation. Bond reaffirmed those

representations during the plea colloquy. Absent clear and convincing evidence to

the contrary, Bond is bound by the answers he provided to the court during the plea

colloquy and on the plea paperwork.8 Finally, we note that Bond received a

substantial benefit from pleading guilty—had Bond gone to trial and been found

guilty as charged, he faced a sentence between twenty-two and three hundred years

in prison. Instead, Bond received the eight-year minimum-mandatory sentence

contemplated by the plea agreement.

(8) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that

Bond’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issues.

We also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record

and the law and properly determined that Bond could not raise a meritorious claim

on appeal.

8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.3d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 5 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice