1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 Case No.: 24-cv-799-DMS-VET DWIGHT MAURICE BOND,
14 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 15 v. MOTION TO VACATE THE COMMISSIONER’S FINAL ORDER 16 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security, 17 Defendant. 18
19 20 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Dwight Bond’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint seeking 21 judicial review of an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of his application for 22 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Complaint, ECF No. 1). On December 9, 2024, 23 the parties filed a Joint Motion for Judicial Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner 24 of Social Security. (Jt. Mot., ECF No. 11). Plaintiff seeks an order vacating the 25 Commissioner’s final decision and remanding for a de novo hearing, further development 26 of the record, and a new decision. Defendant requests that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed. 27 The case was transferred from Magistrate Judge Valerie E. Torres to the undersigned on 28 June 25, 2025. For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB under Title II of the Social 3 Security Act. (ECF No. 6-2, at 17). Plaintiff alleged disability from March 16, 2022, “due 4 to degenerative atrophy of the lower back, posttraumatic stress disorder, sleep apnea, 5 bilateral degenerative arthritis of the knees, tinnitus, and hypertension.” (Motion, at 2). 6 Social Security Administration (“SSA”) ALJ Andrew Verne denied Plaintiff’s application 7 on October 19, 2023. (ECF No. 6-2, at 30). While the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from 8 “severe impairments of minimal scoliosis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 9 spine, degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine, and degenerative joint disease of the 10 bilateral knees (left greater than right),” he did not find any of these impairments to “meet[] 11 or medically equal[] the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 12 Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at 22–25). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual 13 functional capacity (“RFC”) to: 14 lift or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours total out of an 8-hour workday; stand or walk for 6 hours total out of an 8- 15 hour workday; frequently climb ramps and stairs; frequently climb ladders, 16 ropes or scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; frequently ambulate on uneven terrain; frequently drive vehicles. 17 18 (Id. at 23). Based on this RFC and review of the administrative record, the ALJ determined 19 Plaintiff was “capable of performing past relevant work as a safety inspector[,]” and thus 20 was not “under a disability as defined in [20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)], from March 16, 2022 21 through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision [on October 19, 2023].” (Id. at 28–30). 22 Plaintiff timely filed for judicial review of the SSA’s denial of disability benefits. 23 (Complaint ¶ 2). On February 28, 2024, the SSA Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 24 request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 6-2, at 1–3). Plaintiff thereafter filed 25 this Complaint on May 3, 2024. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Upon timely petition for review of any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 28 Security, a federal district court “shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and 1 transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 2 Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 3 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner’s decision “should be upheld unless it contains 4 legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 5 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a scintilla but less than a 6 preponderance,” Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997), and “means 7 such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 8 conclusion.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 9 “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking 10 the agency’s determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) 11 (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)), superseded on other grounds by 12 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). 13 “The ALJ has a duty to conduct a full and fair hearing.” McLeod v. Astrue, 940 F.3d 14 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). Although the district court may not substitute its discretion for 15 the Commissioner’s, the court nonetheless must review “the entire record as a whole, 16 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 17 Commissioner’s conclusion.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 “Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to allow for 19 proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty to conduct an appropriate 20 inquiry.” Id. (quoting Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A 21 specific finding of ambiguity or inadequacy of the record is not necessary to trigger this 22 duty to inquire, where the record establishes ambiguity or inadequacy.” Id. 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 The parties disagree whether the ALJ properly developed the record. (Jt. Mot., at 25 9). A claimant’s RFC “is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations” and is 26 determined by the ALJ after assessing all the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 27 404.1545(a)(1). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity 28 to perform a range of medium work. (ECF No. 6-2, at 23.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC 1 is “unsupported by substantial evidence . . . because . . . he failed to discharge his duty to 2 fully develop the record.” (Jt. Mot., at 10). Defendant contends the ALJ considered “all 3 the relevant evidence in the record” and “included all supported limitations in the residual 4 functional capacity finding.” (Id. at14, 16.) The Court agrees with Defendant. 5 On July 29, 2022, Juliane Tran, M.D., conducted a physical consultative 6 examination on Plaintiff. Following examination, Plaintiff was assessed with: lumbar 7 degenerative disc disease, back pain with possible radiculopathy, mild right carpal tunnel 8 syndrome, and bilateral knee pain (right mainly) due to early degenerative joint disease.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 Case No.: 24-cv-799-DMS-VET DWIGHT MAURICE BOND,
14 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 15 v. MOTION TO VACATE THE COMMISSIONER’S FINAL ORDER 16 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security, 17 Defendant. 18
19 20 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Dwight Bond’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint seeking 21 judicial review of an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of his application for 22 Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Complaint, ECF No. 1). On December 9, 2024, 23 the parties filed a Joint Motion for Judicial Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner 24 of Social Security. (Jt. Mot., ECF No. 11). Plaintiff seeks an order vacating the 25 Commissioner’s final decision and remanding for a de novo hearing, further development 26 of the record, and a new decision. Defendant requests that the ALJ’s decision be affirmed. 27 The case was transferred from Magistrate Judge Valerie E. Torres to the undersigned on 28 June 25, 2025. For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB under Title II of the Social 3 Security Act. (ECF No. 6-2, at 17). Plaintiff alleged disability from March 16, 2022, “due 4 to degenerative atrophy of the lower back, posttraumatic stress disorder, sleep apnea, 5 bilateral degenerative arthritis of the knees, tinnitus, and hypertension.” (Motion, at 2). 6 Social Security Administration (“SSA”) ALJ Andrew Verne denied Plaintiff’s application 7 on October 19, 2023. (ECF No. 6-2, at 30). While the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from 8 “severe impairments of minimal scoliosis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 9 spine, degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine, and degenerative joint disease of the 10 bilateral knees (left greater than right),” he did not find any of these impairments to “meet[] 11 or medically equal[] the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 12 Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Id. at 22–25). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual 13 functional capacity (“RFC”) to: 14 lift or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours total out of an 8-hour workday; stand or walk for 6 hours total out of an 8- 15 hour workday; frequently climb ramps and stairs; frequently climb ladders, 16 ropes or scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; frequently ambulate on uneven terrain; frequently drive vehicles. 17 18 (Id. at 23). Based on this RFC and review of the administrative record, the ALJ determined 19 Plaintiff was “capable of performing past relevant work as a safety inspector[,]” and thus 20 was not “under a disability as defined in [20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)], from March 16, 2022 21 through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision [on October 19, 2023].” (Id. at 28–30). 22 Plaintiff timely filed for judicial review of the SSA’s denial of disability benefits. 23 (Complaint ¶ 2). On February 28, 2024, the SSA Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 24 request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 6-2, at 1–3). Plaintiff thereafter filed 25 this Complaint on May 3, 2024. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 Upon timely petition for review of any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 28 Security, a federal district court “shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and 1 transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 2 Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 3 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner’s decision “should be upheld unless it contains 4 legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 5 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a scintilla but less than a 6 preponderance,” Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997), and “means 7 such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 8 conclusion.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 9 “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking 10 the agency’s determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) 11 (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)), superseded on other grounds by 12 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). 13 “The ALJ has a duty to conduct a full and fair hearing.” McLeod v. Astrue, 940 F.3d 14 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). Although the district court may not substitute its discretion for 15 the Commissioner’s, the court nonetheless must review “the entire record as a whole, 16 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 17 Commissioner’s conclusion.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 “Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to allow for 19 proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty to conduct an appropriate 20 inquiry.” Id. (quoting Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A 21 specific finding of ambiguity or inadequacy of the record is not necessary to trigger this 22 duty to inquire, where the record establishes ambiguity or inadequacy.” Id. 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 The parties disagree whether the ALJ properly developed the record. (Jt. Mot., at 25 9). A claimant’s RFC “is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations” and is 26 determined by the ALJ after assessing all the relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 27 404.1545(a)(1). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity 28 to perform a range of medium work. (ECF No. 6-2, at 23.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC 1 is “unsupported by substantial evidence . . . because . . . he failed to discharge his duty to 2 fully develop the record.” (Jt. Mot., at 10). Defendant contends the ALJ considered “all 3 the relevant evidence in the record” and “included all supported limitations in the residual 4 functional capacity finding.” (Id. at14, 16.) The Court agrees with Defendant. 5 On July 29, 2022, Juliane Tran, M.D., conducted a physical consultative 6 examination on Plaintiff. Following examination, Plaintiff was assessed with: lumbar 7 degenerative disc disease, back pain with possible radiculopathy, mild right carpal tunnel 8 syndrome, and bilateral knee pain (right mainly) due to early degenerative joint disease. 9 (Id.) Plaintiff also was assessed with the following functional limitations: lifting and 10 carrying fifty pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; standing and walking six 11 hours in an eight-hour workday; limited to walking uneven terrain or ramps and stairs on a 12 frequent basis; limited to scaffolding and climbing activities on a frequent bases; frequent 13 postural activities; frequent driving activities; and frequent right wrist movement. (Id.) 14 The ALJ assessed Dr. Tran’s opinion as “largely persuasive” and reasoned that the 15 Doctor’s “exertional, postural and environmental limits are supported by the objective 16 findings on her exam and those by treating sources.” (Id., citing AR 26.) 17 However, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s analysis failed to consider that Plaintiff’s 18 “course of treatment and physical condition changed significantly shortly after” Dr. Tran’s 19 examination on July 29, 2022, thus rendering the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Tran’s opinion 20 improper as it was “stale.” (Id. at 10-11.) Specifically, Plaintiff points out that on 21 September 20, 2022, approximately two months after Dr. Tran’s examination, Plaintiff 22 presented for medical treatment and was assessed with lower back pain, “chronic with 23 flares,” by Tuan Dang, M.D. (Id., citing AR 567-569 (noting “not taking any medications. 24 Interested in seeing PT.”)) Following that examination, Plaintiff was referred to physical 25 therapy and prescribed a walking cane. (Id., citing AR 568.) 26 On November 16, 2022, Plaintiff presented to Marie H. Crouse, PT, DPT, for 27 physical therapy consultation. There, Plaintiff was noted to display right lateral trunk lean 28 with heavy reliance on his cane. (Id., citing AR 462.) Following the examination, Plaintiff 1 was prescribed a TENS unit and physical therapy treatment, including four to eight visits. 2 (Id.) 3 Plaintiff argues that the “escalation in care following Dr. Tran’s assessment— 4 namely, the prescription of a cane, TENS unit, and physical therapy—as well as his 5 worsened physical condition created an ambiguity in the record and required further 6 development” of the record with an “updated consultative examination or other medical 7 opinion.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues the “mere assertion that an ALJ’s RFC aligns with a 8 doctor’s [dated] notation is not enough to satisfy the ALJ’s duty to support his analysis 9 with substantial evidence.” (Id. at 12.) Here, according to Plaintiff, the ALJ committed 10 legal error by substituting his own medical opinion and independent assessment of clinical 11 findings to determine the RFC. 12 “An RFC is … based upon all relevant evidence in the record, including medical 13 records, medical source statements, and symptom testimony.” Howell v. Kijakazi, No. 20- 14 cv-2517-BLM, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. 15 § 404.1545(a)(1)-(3)). While the ALJ is responsible for assessing a plaintiff’s RFC, 16 “[b]arring a few exceptions, an ALJ must have a doctor’s opinion of a claimant’s functional 17 capacity in order for there to be substantial evidence supporting the decisions.” Id. (quoting 18 Duarte v. Saul, No. 2:19-cv-01019 AC, 2020 WL 5257597, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 19 2020)). “In formulating an RFC, an ALJ cannot interpret raw medical data.” Id. (citing 20 Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting the ALJ was not qualified 21 as a medical expert)). An ALJ cannot “substitute his own interpretations of medical records 22 and data for medical opinions” when determining a claimant’s RFC. Mack v. Saul, No. 18- 23 cv-01287-DAD-BAM, 2020 WL 2731032, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020). 24 Here, the record does not reveal the ALJ committed error. In determining Plaintiff’s 25 RFC, the ALJ relied on the medical opinions and findings of Dr. Tran’s July 29, 2022 26 examination; the August 15, 2022 opinion of T. Dupont, M.D. (reaching similar 27 conclusions to Dr. Tran that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to “lift or carry 28 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours total out of an -hour work 1 day; stand or walk for 6 hours total out of an 8-hour workday; frequently climb ramps and 2 stairs; frequently climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch 3 and crawl[.]”); and, more than three months after Dr. Tran’s examination, the November 4 5, 2022 RFC opinion of Charles Lee, M.D., which mirrored Dr. Dupont’s opinion. (ECF 5 No. 6-2, at 26–27). The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Dupont and Lee to be “largely 6 persuasive.” 7 Further, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “ha[d] been treated with physical therapy since 8 November 2022” and noted he “ambulate[s] with a cane,” has “20 percent limitation of 9 flexion of the lumbar spine due to pain,” but “the other range of motion were normal,” and 10 he “was not taking any medication.” (ECF No. 6-2, at 24). The ALJ also referenced 11 January 15, 2023 treatment notes indicating Plaintiff “was not taking any medication” and 12 the “exam at that time showed no abnormalities.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ cited physical 13 therapy progress notes from April 18, 2023, indicating Plaintiff’s “gait . . . was normal” 14 and he was not being treated with “injections, or other treatment modalities[,] . . . [or] any 15 medications for back pain.” (Id.) 16 An “ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a 17 succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). 18 “ALJs are, at some level, capable of independently reviewing and forming conclusions 19 about medical evidence to discharge their statutory duty to determine whether a claimant 20 is disabled and cannot work.” Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022). The 21 ALJ fulfilled those duties here by considering the pertinent medical evidence, including 22 evaluative evidence after Dr. Tran’s examination and noting Drs. Dupont and Lee’s 23 opinions, treatment notes, and physical therapy progress notes, all of which provided 24 substantial evidence to allow the ALJ to evaluate the disability claim. The “duty to develop 25 the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record 26 is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 27 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the record was neither ambiguous nor inadequate. 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed, the Court finds the ALJ applied the correct legal standards 3 supported his decision with substantial evidence. The Commissioner’s final decision 4 affirmed. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 ||Dated: August 13, 2025 7 2 in Yn : $4) 8 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28