Bonazza v. MUFG Bank, Ltd.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 6, 2025
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01161
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 MICHAEL ALAN BONAZZA, 7 Case No. 23-cv-01161-JCS Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 MOTIONS MUFG BANK, LTD., 10 Re: Dkt. Nos. 121, 122 Defendant. 11

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 The parties in this employment discrimination case have filed cross-motions for summary 15 judgment. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion is DENIED. 16 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.1 This case is dismissed, in its entirety, 17 with prejudice. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff Michael Bonazza initiated this employment discrimination case against Defendant 20 MUFG Bank, Ltd. (“MUFG”) in the District of Hawaii on February 23, 2023. That court 21 transferred the case to this District and the undersigned screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court found that Bonazza asserted viable claims for employment 23 discrimination based on race and sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and ordered 24 the complaint served. Id. 25 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, who is a white male, alleges that MUFG 26 discriminated against him by offering him only a temporary position at MUFG based on his race 27 1 and sex whereas many of MUFG’s permanent employees were women and non-white. Dkt. no. 2 37. Plaintiff’s theory of the case has been a moving target throughout this case; it has often been 3 unclear whether he is asserting his discrimination claims based on a theory of disparate treatment 4 or disparate impact, and sometimes he seems to be asserting claims based on an alleged breach of 5 contract. See, e.g., Declaration of Nathaniel H. Jenkins in Support of Defendant MUFG Bank, 6 Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Jenkins Decl.”), Ex. A (Bonazza Dep.) at 46 (“I was 7 trying to prove it as hard as I could, disparate impact[.]”); id. at 48 (testifying that disparate 8 treatment claim was based on “giving [Bonazza] a termed contract . . . it was restrictive when 9 comparing [himself] to peers.”); id. at 71 (“what I’m asking is that the bank reevaluate my 10 contract” because “I don’t believe that contract was priced correctly” in light of “the incremental 11 skills that I brought to the job.”).2 Further, Bonazza’s deposition testimony suggests he filed this 12 case simply to extract a settlement from MUFG without a good faith belief that his allegations of 13 race and sex discrimination were valid. Id. at 44 (“I initially filed the lawsuit because I felt there 14 was value in the work, and if I couldn't get it through a job, I -- I wanted to somehow get it 15 through the court system. You know, like that was literally my thought.”). 16 The basic facts relating to Bonazza’s employment history with Defendant appear to be 17 undisputed.3 Between 2013 and 2017, Bonazza was employed as a Technical Accountant by 18 MUFG Union Bank, N.A. (“Union Bank”), the predecessor of Defendant MUFG Bank, Ltd. Id. 19 at 101-105. Although he initially accepted a temporary position, his position with Union Bank 20 became permanent in August 2013, carrying an annual salary of $72,000 a year. Id. Bonazza 21

22 2 Bonazza conceded at his deposition, however, that “there was nothing wrong with the contract.” Id. at 47. As Bonazza did not assert a breach of contract claim in the operative complaint, the 23 Court finds that there is no pending breach of contract claim in this case. In any event, Bonazza has not pointed to any evidence of a breach of contract or articulated any legal theory that might 24 support such a claim. Nor has the Court found any authority to suggest that it could (or should) retroactively modify the terms of Bonazza’s contract to increase his compensation for the work he 25 performed at Union Bank in 2022. 3 Much of the evidence establishing these facts was offered by MUFG in support of its summary 26 judgment motion, dkt. no. 122 (“MUFG Motion”). Although Bonazza did not oppose the MUFG Motion, he submitted some evidence to support his own summary judgment motion, dkt. no. 121 27 (“Bonazza Motion”). The Court treats facts as undisputed only where the evidence Bonazza 1 received positive performance reviews but voluntarily resigned from his position with Union Bank 2 in October 2017 due to the work there. Id. at 120-129. Bonazza testified that he did not leave his 3 position with Union Bank because he was treated unfairly. Id. at 125. 4 Between October 2017 and May 2022, Bonazza worked sporadically. Id. at 87-88, 129- 5 159. He took a position as an accounts payable clerk at a company in British Columbia, Canda in 6 January 2021 and resigned from that position in July 2021. Id. at 148-152. That job paid an 7 annual salary of between $40,000 and $45,000. Id. at 148-149. He then moved to Hawaii and got 8 a job as an accounting manager with Helber, Haster & Fee (“HHF”) & Dep. Ex. 4 (resume). Id. at 9 153. His salary in this position was between $60,000 and $65,000. Id. at 155. 10 In the meantime, in September 2021, Bonazza got in touch with Chris Escher, of Union 11 Bank, to inquire about opportunities to return to Union Bank. Id. at 169 & Dep. Ex. 14. Initially 12 Escher told Bonazza that he could not offer him anything because the acquisition of Union Bank 13 by U.S. Bank was underway, but he told Bonazza to check back. Id. at 170. Bonazza emailed 14 Escher again on March 7, 2022, while still employed by HHF, to send him his updated resume. 15 Id. at 172. Escher told Bonazza about a temporary position at Union Bank and Bonazza 16 subsequently received an email from a Union Bank recruiter inviting him to apply for a “term 17 employment” opening at Union Bank as a Financial Reporting Project Specialist. Id. at 173-175 18 & Dep. Exs. 15-16. The recruiter sent the job description for the position, which explained that 19 “[t]erm employment is an employment status in which the Bank hires an individual for a 20 designated period of time, not exceeding 2 years.” Id. 21 Bonazza applied for the temporary position and received an offer. Id. at 174-175 & Dep. 22 Ex. 17. The offer letter, dated May 6, 2022, stated that the term of the position was from June 13, 23 2022 to October 13, 2023. Id. at 179-180 & Dep. Ex. 17. It further stated that “[u]pon mutual 24 agreement, your Term Employment period may be extended for an additional term (not to exceed 25 a combined total of two years) under the same terms and conditions set forth in this offer letter.” 26 Id. The salary for the temporary position was $106,00 a year, which Bonazza described as a 27 “fantastic salary.” Id. at 181-182. He testified that although he understood the position was 1 Bonazza accepted the position, even though it was temporary, because he “had no 2 leverage.” Id. at 183. He did not apply for any permanent position with Union Bank at that time 3 or subsequently, however; nor was he aware of any such position. Id. at 201-204. He also is not 4 aware of any white males who have applied for a permanent position with Union Bank and not 5 been hired. Id. at 204. 6 Bonazza relocated from Hawaii to Oakland to take the temporary position, working out of 7 the same office he had worked from between 2013 and 2017. Id. at 180-181, 184. He testified 8 that there was no one else at Union Bank performing similar work and that this position was 9 “unique.” Id. at 190. In September 2022, just three months into the 16-month term, Bonazza 10 resigned in order to move back to Hawaii with his girlfriend. Id. at 196-198. His email notifying 11 Union Bank of his resignation states as follows: 12 Hi Erin, Happy Weekend.

13 I just want to take the time in this note to thank you and Chris so much for bringing me back to the bank after so many years. 14 My memories at the bank, though short-lived, are good ones both then 15 and now.

16 As you might imagine, I have been thinking about where I want my life to be over the next 5 years. The answer for me is definitely with 17 my girlfriend in Hawaii. It is with that in mind that I would like my last day to be Monday (tomorrow). 18 In regard to the work, I’ve given Sam what I have for the piece of 66.2 19 that I worked on. They should be able to have a successful call on Tuesday with Vidia because they put in all the work. 20 Thank you again so much for allowing me the opportunity to be part 21 of the team and prove myself.

22 Talk to you tomorrow.

23 Mike 24 Id. at 196-197 & Dep. Ex. 19. 25 On January 24, 2023, Bonazza submitted an informal Inquiry form to the Equal 26 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received a Right to Sue on or about 27 February 22, 2023, after filing an administrative Charge of Discrimination. Id. at 74-79 & Dep. 1 III. THE MOTIONS 2 A. MUFG Motion 3 In its summary judgment motion, MUFG argues that Bonazza’s Title VII claims fail as a 4 matter of law based on the undisputed facts. MUFG addresses both Bonazza’s disparate treatment 5 theory and his disparate impact theory under Title VII. MUFG argues as to both theories that 6 Bonazza’s discrimination claims fail because he cannot make a prima facie case of 7 discrimination.4 MUFG further asserts that there is no legal theory that supports a breach of 8 contract claim to recover what Bonazza now claims was the value of his work in excess of the 9 salary he was paid, arguing that the undisputed evidence establishes that MUFG paid Bonazza the 10 salary promised under the contract, to which Bonazza agreed. 11 Bonazza did not file an opposition to the MUFG Motion. 12 B. Bonazza Motion 13 Bonazza argues in his summary judgment motion that he is entitled to judgment as a matter 14 of law on his discrimination claim based on disparate treatment, alleging that his “class was 10 to 15 1 non-white European male to white European male.” Bonazza Motion at 1. Bonazza attached 16 various documents to his motion, including: 17 • screen shots of the LinkedIn pages of eight individuals who appear to be women 18 and/or non-white and list MUFG as their current place of employment; 19 • emails Bonazza exchanged with Chris Escher and Erin Dickey; 20 • the May 6, 2022 offer letter for the temporary position; 21 • employment records from Bonazza’s previous tenure at Union Bank, between 22 2013 and 2017; 23 • Bonazza’s September 25, 2022 email resigning from the temporary position; 24 • An article entitled, “The 5 Year Statute of Limitations for Government 25 Enforcement Actions for Civil Penalties: Recently Settled and Still Unsettled 26

27 4 MUFG also argued in the motion that the Title VII claims fail because Bonazza’s EEOC charge 1 Issues Regarding 28 U.S.C. Section 2462;”5 2 • Articles about gender inequality, including one entitled, “The Crisis of Men and 3 Boys;” 4 • A list “showing employee demographics at MUFG” listing ten individuals who are 5 purportedly MUFG employees, along with their gender and ethnicity, 6 accompanied by a group photograph of those individuals wearing MUFG T-shirts. 7 MUFG filed an opposition objecting to all of Bonazza’s evidence on the basis that it is not 8 properly authenticated.6 It further asserted that Bonazza’s motion is frivolous and is supported by 9 neither admissible evidence nor legal authority. Bonazza did not file a reply brief. 10 IV. ANALYSIS 11 A. Legal Standards 12 1. Rule 56 13 Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is 14 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 15 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show 16 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the non- 17 moving party’s claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of 18 persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 19 Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing 20 summary judgment to designate “‘specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. 21 (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely 22 disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record 23 . . . .”). “[T]he inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . implicates the 24 substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.” Anderson v. 25 5 Bonazza does not explain the relevance of this statute to his claims and the Court finds that it has 26 no bearing on this case. Section 2462 sets a five year limitations period on “proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2462. However, Title VII 27 does not provide for civil fines, penalties or forfeitures. 1 Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The non-moving party has the burden of 2 identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Keenan 3 v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, it is not the task of the court to scour the 4 record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Id.; see Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 5 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 6 On summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the 7 non-movant, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), but where a rational trier of fact could not 8 find for the non-moving party based on the record as a whole, there is no “genuine issue for trial” 9 and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 10 587 (1986). 11 2. Employment Discrimination Under Title VII 12 Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice “to fail or refuse to hire or to 13 discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 14 compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race 15 [or] sex,” among other protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. At summary judgment, Title VII 16 discrimination claims are analyzed under the three-step burden-shifting framework in McDonnell 17 Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th 18 Cir. 2008). At the first step, the employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. 19 If the employee meets that burden, the analysis proceeds to the second step, at which the employer 20 must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. At the third 21 step, the employee “must show that the ‘reason is pretextual “either directly by persuading the 22 court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 23 that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Chuang v. 24 Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs 25 v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981))). 26 Generally, to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination under Title 27 VII, a plaintiff must establish that (1) they are a member of a protected class under Title VII 1 employment action; (3) at the time of the adverse action, they were performing their job in a 2 satisfactory manner; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances suggesting a 3 discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802-05; 42 USC § 2000e- 4 2(a)(1)-(2). Where a disparate treatment discrimination claim is based on failure to hire, a plaintiff 5 must establish the following specific elements: (1) they are a member of a protected class; (2) they 6 applied for and were qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) they 7 were rejected despite being qualified for the job; and (4) after the plaintiff’s rejection, the position 8 remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of comparable 9 qualifications. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985)). Alternatively, a 10 prima facie case of discrimination can be made if a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) they are a 11 member of a protected class; (2) they applied for a position for which they were qualified; and (3) 12 a person who was not within a protected class with similar qualifications received the position. 13 Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 To make a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff 15 must “identify a specific, seemingly neutral practice or policy that has a significantly adverse 16 impact on persons of a protected class.” Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 17 1993). “[T]he requirements of a prima facie disparate impact case . . . are in some respects more 18 exacting than those of a disparate treatment case.” Id. (quoting Spaulding v. University of 19 Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 705 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)). 20 The court in Garcia explained that “[i]n the disparate treatment context, a plaintiff can make out a 21 prima facie case merely by presenting evidence sufficient to give rise to an inference of 22 discrimination.” Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–06 (1973)). In 23 contrast, in a disparate impact case, “plaintiffs must do more than merely raise an inference of 24 discrimination before the burden shifts; they ‘must actually prove the discriminatory impact at 25 issue.’” Id. (quoting Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990)). “In the 26 typical disparate impact case, in which the plaintiff argues that a selection criterion excludes 27 protected applicants from jobs or promotions, the plaintiff proves discriminatory impact by 1 applicant group and those in the relevant segment of the workforce.” Id. (citing Wards Cove 2 Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989)). 3 B. Discussion 4 Although Bonazza insists that he is asserting a disparate treatment claim, that claim fails 5 because he has identified no legally cognizable adverse employment action. “[A]n adverse 6 employment action is one that ‘materially affect[s] the compensation, terms, conditions, or 7 privileges of . . . employment.’ ” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Chuang v. 8 Univ. of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Adverse 9 employment actions are not limited to termination and may include actions such as hires, transfers, 10 promotions, [and] demotions.” Szalay v. Bd. of Supervisors, Cnty. of Pima, No. CV02-479- 11 TUCJMR, 2008 WL 880551, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008). Bonazza has cited no authority, 12 however, that supports his position that hiring an individual for a temporary position constitutes an 13 adverse employment action under Title VII. Nor has the Court found any such authority. 14 Furthermore, to the extent that Bonazza relies on the theory that the adverse employment action 15 was MUFG’s failure to hire him for a permanent position, he has not established a prima facie 16 case on that theory because he does not allege – much less present any evidence – that Union Bank 17 was hiring for a permanent position or that he applied for any such position. Indeed, he conceded 18 at his deposition that he knew of no such position and did not apply for a permanent position with 19 Union Bank. 20 Bonazza’s disparate impact claim is similarly deficient. Construing his claim liberally, 21 Bonazza’s claim might fit within the disparate impact framework to the extent he is alleging that 22 MUFG has a policy or practice of hiring white males for temporary positions while preserving the 23 permanent positions for women and non-white individuals, leading to the outcome Bonazza 24 contends can be seen at Union Bank, namely, a permanent work force that favors women and non- 25 white individuals over white men. The problem with this claim is that he has presented no 26 evidence that such a practice exists. Bonazza concedes that he is not aware of any white man who 27 applied for a permanent position and was turned down and Bonazza himself did not apply for a 1 the race and/or gender breakdown of individuals who have applied for temporary vs. permanent 2 || positions with MUFG or the outcomes of those applications. Finally, the LinkedIn pages of a 3 small number of MUFG employees (even assuming they are admissible) offer no support for his 4 || disparate impact claim because Bonazza has provided no reliable statistical information to provide 5 context for this evidence. Consequently, no inference of disparate impact discrimination can be 6 || drawn from that evidence. 7 Because Bonazza has not made a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate 8 treatment or disparate impact, he cannot prevail on his Title VII claims and no issues remain to be 9 || tried. 10 || Vv. CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s summary judgment motion is GRANTED. 12 || Bonazza’s summary judgment motion is DENIED. This case is dismissed with prejudice. The 13 Clerk is instructed to enter judgment in favor of MUFG and close the case. IT IS SO ORDERED.

A 16 Dated: January 6, 2025

J PH C. SPERO 2 18 nited States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28