Bolton v. Allen

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 13, 2012
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2012-1272
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNI'I`ED STATES DISTRICT COURT L E D

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NUV l 3 2012 R<)bert L. Bolt<)n, ) C|erk, u.s. District and ) B¢nkruptcy Courts Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1272 (UNA) ) Nancy Allen et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM OPH\IION

This matter is before the Court on review of the plaintiff s pro se complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperz's. The application will be granted and the complaint will be dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine discussed below.

The plaintiff appears to be a pretrial detainee at the Correctional Treatment Facility in the District of Columbia. See Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights ("Compl.") at 4. The plaintiff sues Judge Herbert B. Dixon of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, United States Attomey for the District of Columbia Ronald C. Machen, and other individuals who are participating in his criminal prosecution, for allegedly failing to protect his constitutional rights during his arrest and indictment, between January and June of 2012. See id. at 6-7. The plaintiff

"would like this Honorable Court to dismiss" his criminal case "with prejudice." Id. at 5. He

f also seeks his "immediate release" and $50,000 in monetary damages from each defendant. Id.

The proper recourse for the plaintiff is to apply for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but "a federal court may dismiss an action when there is a direct conflict between the exercise of federal and state jurisdiction and considerations of comity and federalism dictate that the federal court should defer to the state proceedings." H0ai v. Sun Rej?ning and Marketing Co., Inc., 866 F.2d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. l989) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45

(l97l); Pennzoil Co., v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. l, 9-10 (1987)). Such is the case here because

the plaintiff will have the opportunity to litigate the underlying claims of this action in the pending criminal proceeding in Superior Court. See Bria'ges v. Kelly, 84 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (fmding Younger doctrine applicable "when there are ongoing [judicial] state proceedings [that] implicate important state interests [and] afford an adequate opportunity in which to raise the federal claims"); Reed v. Caulfz`eld, 734 F. Supp. 2d 23, 24-25 (D.D.C. 20lO) ("[W]hile Section 2241 establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts to consider pretrial habeas corpus petitions, it is established that federal courts generally should abstain from the exercise of that jurisdiction ‘if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in

the state court or by other state procedures available to the petitioner. ) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5“‘ Cir. 1987)); see also Wz`lliams v. Warden-Cent. Det. Facilily, 538 F. Supp. 2d 74, 76 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Federal courts, respecting comity, will interfere with ‘state courts only in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist."’) (quoting Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. l14, 117 (1944)). In addition, it appears from the allegations that the plaintiff would not be entitled to monetary damages without first having his detention officially invalidated by, inter aIia, a court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Given "the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal

prosecutions" absent a showing of irreparable injury that is "both great and immediate,"

Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, this Court, finding no such harm shown, will dismiss the instant action.'

DATE; october 21 ,2012 U t d States Distr1ctJudge

l A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.