Bolt v. Toyota Motor Corp.

351 F. Supp. 2d 597, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26179, 2004 WL 3037716
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 9, 2004
Docket2:03-cv-00251
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 351 F. Supp. 2d 597 (Bolt v. Toyota Motor Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bolt v. Toyota Motor Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 597, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26179, 2004 WL 3037716 (E.D. Tex. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVIS, District Judge.

Before the Court are Toyota Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, (Docket No. 65) and the related briefing. Having considered the parties’ written submissions, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

Delores Bolt (“Bolt”) filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas after decedent James Bolt was found asphyxiated and lodged in the wheel-well of a Toyota-made airport tug at DFW Airport. James Bolt was repairing the tug when he died. Bolt filed products liability claims alleging design and manufacturing defects against several Toyota entities. Bolt also filed claims against United Air Lines, Inc., the tug’s owner, alleging that United was negligent in its training and supervision of maintenance personnel. Toyota filed a cross-claim against United on the same grounds. United filed a third-party complaint against James Bolt’s employer, Western Ground Services, alleging that Western may be liable to United under an indemnity agreement and that Western was negligent in its training and supervision of maintenance personnel. Toyota also filed a third-party complaint against Western alleging that Western failed to adequately train and supervise its maintenance employees.

Bolt filed this case on June 30, 2003, and the Court originally scheduled trial for November of 2004. United’s bankruptcy proceedings slowed the case’s progress toward trial, and the parties were not ready for trial in November. After the bankruptcy court lifted the stay related to United’s bankruptcy, this Court put the case on an expedited trial schedule. The case is currently set for jury selection on April 18, 2005.

APPLICABLE LAW

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The first determination to be made under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is whether the claim could have been filed in the judicial district to which transfer is sought. In re .Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir.2004). If so, under section 1404(a), a court examines “the convenience of the parties and witnesses.” Id. The convenience determination involves examining several private and public interest factors, none of which are given dispositive weight. Id. The private factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of the compulsory process to secure witnesses’ attendance; (3) the willing witnesses’ cost of attendance; and (4) all other practical problems that make the case’s trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. The public factors include: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having local issues decided at home; (3) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary conflict of law problems involving foreign law’s application. Id. A court should also consider the plaintiffs forum choice, but the plaintiffs *600 forum choice by itself is not conclusive or determinative. In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2003); Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 331 F.Supp.2d 567, 571 (E.D.Tex.2004) (Folsom, J.). A court must consider these factors in light of all the claims alleged in the case and not restrict its analysis to only the plaintiffs claims. In re Volkswagen, 371 F.3d at 204.

VENUE IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Federal jurisdiction of this case is premised on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, this case could have been brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resided if all defendants resided in the same district; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a judicial district in which a substantial part of the property at issue was located; or (3) if there is no other district in which the action could have been brought, in a judicial district in which any defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action was commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Bolt does not deny that she could have brought this case in the Northern District. Given that James Bolt died in the Northern District while working for Western on a United-owned tug, it is easily conceivable that at least one defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District. Because the case could have been brought in the Northern District, the Court turns to the public and private interest factors.

APPLICATION OF THE TRANSFER FACTORS

The transfer factors must be applied to all claims brought in this case. See In re Volkswagen, 371 F.3d at 204. This case involves claims that Toyota produced a product with design and manufacturing defects, that United and Western failed to adequately train and supervise their maintenance personnel, and that James Bolt was negligent when he worked on the tug. Although several factors support transfer, the Court finds that the reasons to retain the case in the Eastern District outweigh the reasons to transfer.

The Private Factors

(1) The plaintiffs forum choice.

While the plaintiffs forum choice is neither controlling nor determinative, it is a factor to be considered. In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d at 434. Although Bolt resides in Colorado, Bolt chose to bring her suit in the Eastern District.

(2) The relative ease of access to sources of proof.

Proof relating to the tug’s design and manufacture is not located in the Eastern or Northern District. Proof relating to United’s and Western’s alleged failure to adequately train their personnel is likely located in either the Northern District or Colorado, where James Bolt’s employment was based. Proof relating to James Bolt’s death, such as medical or investigative reports and any witness accounts of the circumstances just prior to or just after his death, is in the Northern District. Because medical and investigative reports can easily be sent to the Eastern District, this factor only slightly favors transfer.

(3) The availability of the compulsory process to secure witnesses’ attendance.

The parties have not identified any unwilling witnesses that would be subject to compulsory process in the Northern District but not in the Eastern District. As such, this factor does not support transfer.

*601 (4) The willing witnesses’ cost of attendance.

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351 F. Supp. 2d 597, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26179, 2004 WL 3037716, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bolt-v-toyota-motor-corp-txed-2004.