Bokma v. Olsen

2025 MT 37

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: OP 24-0575
• Status: Published

Opinion

02/18/2025

OP 24-0575 Case Number: OP 24-0575

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2025 MT 37

BILL B. BOKMA,

Petitioner,

v.

BOB OLSON, PROGRAM ADMINISTRATOR, S.T.A.R.T.,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC-20-773 Honorable David J. Grubich, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Petitioner:

Bill B. Bokma, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana

For Respondent:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Decided: February 18, 2025

Filed: ir,-6‘A•-if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion and Order of the Court.

¶1 Self-represented Petitioner Bill B. Bokma has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, requesting additional credit for jail time and elapsed time. He does not include

any additional documents. In compliance with this Court’s Order, the State responds that

Bokma is due additional jail time credit and that his other claims lack merit.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We summarize Bokma’s background here. After his December 2020 arrest for

felony driving under the influence of alcohol, Bokma was released on the condition that he

abstain from alcohol, which he failed to do. Bokma was arrested again. The State and

Bokma entered into a plea agreement where the State agreed to alternative sentences,

contingent upon Bokma’s acceptance into the Eighth Judicial District Adult Drug

Treatment Court Program (ADTC). The alternative sentences included a three-year

suspended commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC) upon acceptance into

ADTC, or a thirteen-month DOC commitment followed by a three-year, suspended term,

if not accepted into ADTC. Bokma pleaded guilty, and the ADTC accepted him.

¶3 On October 13, 2021, the District Court sentenced Bokma to the DOC with all time

suspended on the condition that the Defendant enter and successfully complete ADTC.

The court awarded twenty days of credit for time served. Bokma entered ADTC but

violated the treatment court’s conditions in his first month. On November 16, 2021,

Bokma’s Probation Officer submitted a report of violation (ROV), requesting Bokma’s

termination from ADTC. At that time, Bokma’s Probation Officer determined the violation

was for non-compliance and that Bokma would not be entitled to any elapsed time credit.

2 The State petitioned the court to terminate Bokma from the ADTC and to revoke his

suspended sentence.

¶4 The District Court held a hearing on December 22, 2021, to address Bokma’s

termination from the ADTC for his multiple violations. However, the State subsequently

filed a motion to dismiss the request for his termination because Bokma had begun to

engage in the treatment program. The court dismissed the State’s petition without

prejudice on January 14, 2022.

¶5 On November 16, 2022, the State again sought to terminate Bokma’s participation

in treatment court because of his repeated violations beginning in March 2022.1 His

Probation Officer asserted both non-compliance and compliance violations in the ROV.

The District Court held a hearing on February 7, 2023, and Bokma stipulated that he was

unable to complete ADTC.

¶6 The State sought to revoke his suspended sentence. After several continuances, the

District Court held a revocation hearing on July 19, 2023, where Bokma appeared with

counsel. The District Court determined that Bokma committed a non-compliance violation

because he failed to complete ADTC and committed him to the DOC for a three-year term,

awarding twenty-seven days of jail time credit and eight days of elapsed time credit.2

¶7 In his Petition, Bokma maintains he was originally sentenced on October 13, 2021,

to a suspended, three-year term with the DOC. The court revoked his sentence on July 19,

1 The State offers that Bokma complied with his treatment court conditions in July 2022 only. 2 Bokma appealed his sentence to this Court but later moved for dismissal, which we granted. State v. Bokma, No. DA 23-0474, Order (Mont. Sept. 27, 2023). 3 2023, and he received a three-year DOC term, with twenty-seven days of credit for time

served and eight days of street time. He maintains, however, that the court did not give

him credit for time between October 31, 2021, and February 7, 2023, despite having been

compliant with the terms of his probation. Bokma filed an Amendment with this Court on

October 21, 2024, reiterating his same claims.

¶8 Upon review of Bokma’s Petition, several questions arose, and this Court deemed

it necessary to have the State respond. We requested the State address the following issues

in its response: (1) whether Bokma was originally sentenced under § 61-8-741, MCA;

(2) how does the repeal of this statute affect elapsed time credit; and (3) whether Bokma is

entitled to the application of the Montana Incentives and Interventions Grid (MIIG) prior

to revocation? See § 46-23-1015, MCA.

¶9 The State maintains that Bokma was not sentenced pursuant to § 61-8-741, MCA,

because Bokma’s plea agreement had a penalty of thirteen months to the DOC followed by

a suspended period of commitment. This penalty identified in Bokma’s plea agreement

indicated to the State that he was sentenced pursuant to §§ 61-8-731(1)(b), and -731(1)(c),

MCA (2019), which the State notes the Montana Legislature renumbered in 2021 to

§§ 61-8-1008(1)(a)(i), and -1008(1)(a)(ii), MCA. 2021 Mont. Laws Ch. 498, § 4 and

2021 Mont. Laws Ch. 473, § 2. The State concludes that the statute’s repeal does not affect

elapsed time credit here. We agree.

¶10 The remaining issue is whether a defendant who is terminated from treatment court

for failure to abide by its conditions is nevertheless entitled to have the MIIG applied to his

revocation. Here, the State acknowledges that a non-compliance violation does not include

4 failure to complete treatment court and, therefore, the District Court erred in concluding

Bokma had a non-compliance violation. However, the State argues it was harmless error

because “the very nature of treatment courts mirrors the rehabilitative intent behind the

MIIG.” See § 46-18-203(11)(b), MCA (2021) and § 46-20-701(2), MCA (2021). The

State further concludes that Bokma’s revocation was proper given his repeated violations

and his failure to complete ADTC as part of his original sentence. The State observes that

Bokma’s successful completion of ADTC was a predicate condition for the court to

suspend his sentence, not a standard condition of probation. The State also maintains that

Bokma is precluded from challenging his sentence upon revocation through a petition for

habeas corpus relief, pursuant to § 46-22-101(2), MCA, and that he did not pursue an

appeal of the sentence upon revocation after filing his notice in 2023. Section

46-22-101(2), MCA.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 “The Montana Constitution provides in Article II, Section 19, that ‘[t]he privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended.’” Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279, ¶ 21,

334 Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337. In 2006, while acknowledging that the scope and availability

of postconviction relief had been limited by the Montana Legislature’s action in 1967, we

concluded, however, “that, as applied to a facially invalid sentence--a sentence which, as a

matter of law, the court had no authority to impose--the procedural bar created by

§ 46-22-101(2), MCA, unconstitutionally suspends the writ.” Lott, ¶ 22. A district court

has statutory authority to revoke a suspended sentence following a “filing of a petition for

revocation showing probable cause that the offender has violated any condition of a

5 sentence[.]” Section 46-18-203(1), MCA. This Court reviews a district court’s decision

to revoke a suspended sentence, determining whether a court abuses its discretion when it

acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of

reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Howard, 2020 MT 279, ¶ 9, 402 Mont.

54, 475 P.3d 392 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Addressing first whether Bokma received adequate custodial credit and/or elapsed

time credit, such a claim may be raised and considered in a habeas corpus proceeding. The

denial of credit for time served or elapsed time when a defendant is entitled to credit creates

a facially invalid sentence which we may review in a habeas corpus proceeding.

See LaForge v. Godfrey, No. OP 24-0495, 2024 Mont. LEXIS 1146, Order (Oct. 17, 2024);

Miller v. State & MASC, No. OP 23-0653, 2023 Mont. LEXIS 1163, Order (Nov. 21, 2023);

and Rood v. Laughlin, No. OP 20-0553, 2021 Mont. LEXIS 418, Order (May 4, 2021).

Here, the State submits that Bokma is entitled to forty-nine days of jail time credit.3 The

State notes that he received twenty-seven days when his sentence was revoked and that he

is also due twenty days from January 30 to February 18, 2021, in his original sentence.

The State adds that he served one day in jail on November 3, 2021, according to the

November 26, 2021 ROV. The State concludes Bokma is entitled to an additional twenty-

two days. We agree. Accordingly, Bokma’s sentence will be credited for forty-nine days.

3 We reach a total of forty-eight days, based on the State’s numbers from the record.

6 ¶13 Finally, owing to the District Court’s error in concluding that failure to complete

treatment court constitutes a non-compliance violation, and it having been well-briefed by

the State, we will address the interplay between the MIIG and treatment court. Montana

law provides for two types of violations—compliance and non-compliance. Section

46-18-203(11)(b)(2021), MCA.4 The more serious non-compliance violations do not

require proof of unsuccessful rehabilitative efforts to revoke a probationer’s sentence.

Non-compliance violations are not subject to MIIG procedures under statute “and may be

addressed directly through revocation proceedings.” Howard, ¶ 11 (citing State v.

Oropeza, 2020 MT 16, ¶ 7, 398 Mont. 379, 456 P.3d 1023 and § 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA).

“Non-compliance violations include ‘a new criminal offense, possession of a firearm,

harassing a victim or someone close to the victim, absconding, and failure to complete sex

offender treatment.’” Howard, ¶ 11 (citing Oropeza, ¶ 6 and [] § 46-18-203(11)(b)(i)-(v),

MCA). Compliance violations are violations of a person’s probationary sentence, which

are not non-compliance violations. Section 46-18-203(11)(b), MCA. We thus agree with

the State that the District Court erred in determining Bokma’s failure to complete ADTC

was a non-compliance violation, given that it is not defined as such under the statute.

See, e.g., §§ 46-18-203(11)(b)(i)-(v), and 46-23-1001(3)(a)-(e), MCA.

¶14 Bokma’s participation in ADTC was a predicate condition for suspending his

sentence, not a standard condition of probation. However, the record clearly establishes

that the ADTC conditions were nearly identical to conditions of probation and, thus,

4 The 2021 version of § 46-18-203, MCA, applied to Bokma’s July 2023 revocation proceeding.

7 Bokma’s failure to follow ADTC rules also constituted compliance violations of his

sentence. Here, the District Court reviewed Bokma’s history in ADTC and the ROVs. It

determined that Bokma had been unsuccessful in treatment court, which required the same

conditions as probation. As the State maintains, and we agree, the nature of the

rehabilitative purpose behind treatment court is the same as the intent behind the MIIG.

Accordingly, if a court determines a defendant’s sentence should be revoked after a review

of the record because sufficient, yet unsuccessful, intervention procedures were

implemented through treatment court (which in many instances constitute a violation of a

suspended sentence), then the revocation and disposition would be correct, although

entered pursuant to the wrong type of violation. This Court may affirm the district court’s

order of revocation because it reached the right result albeit for the wrong reason. City of

Helena v. O’Connell, 2019 MT 69, ¶ 20, 395 Mont. 179, 438 P.3d 318.

CONCLUSION

¶15 Bokma has demonstrated a facially invalid sentence. Section 46-22-101(1), MCA.

We remand this matter to the Cascade County District Court for amendment of its July 28,

2023 Evidentiary and Dispositional Order to credit Bokma with an additional twenty-two

days. State v. Heafner, 2010 MT 87, ¶ 11, 356 Mont. 128, 231 P.3d 1087. Although the

District Court erred in concluding Bokma had a non-compliance violation, Bokma’s

violation was not improper because rehabilitative efforts were exhausted through ADTC

and Bokma was not receptive to rehabilitation. Therefore,

¶16 IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Bokma’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED in part and Bokma’s

8 underlying criminal matter, Cause No. ADC-20-773, is REMANDED to the

Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, to AMEND its Order to include

credit for time served of forty-nine days, as noted above;

2. Bokma’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amendment concerning his

other claims are DENIED; and

3. this matter is CLOSED as of this Order’s date.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to: the Honorable David J.

Grubich, District Court Judge; Tina Henry, Clerk of District Court, under Cause No.

ADC-20-773 and for distribution to counsel of record there; counsel of record; and Bill B.

Bokma.

DATED this 18th day of February, 2025.

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur:

/S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE