Boissonneault v. Delaware Podiatric Medicine, P.A.

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: N24C-08-300 DJB
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAWARE

MARK BOISSONNEAULT, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ. Act. No. N24C-08-300 DJB ) DELAWARE PODIATRIC ) MEDICINE, P.A., ) Defendant. )

Date Submitted: May 21, 2026 Date Decided: June 30, 2026

Memorandum Opinion

On Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED

Krista M. Reale, Esquire, Margolis Edelstein, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for Plaintiff

Mark A. Denney, Esquire, Baird, Mandalas, Brockestedt & Federico, LLC, attorney for Defendant

BRENNAN, J. This breach of contract action arises from an employment agreement between

Plaintiff Mark Boissonneault (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) and Defendant Delaware

Podiatric Medicine, P. A. (hereinafter “DPM”). Following a year of employment at

DPM, Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff filed suit and alleges breach of contract, a

violation of the Delaware Wage Payment & Collections Act (hereinafter

“DWPCA”), and a retaliation claim under Workers’ Compensation Law (hereinafter

“WCL”). 1 In its Answer, Defendant filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff, alleging 0F

breach of contract. 2 1F

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule

56, arguing he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claims for breach of

contract, violations of the DWPCA, and retaliation in violation of the WCL. Pending

before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 3 Naturally, Defendant 2F

opposes. Because genuine issues of material facts exist with respect to all counts,

Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

I. FACTS 4 3F

1 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) at ¶ 13, D.I. 28. 2 Defendant’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, D.I. 30. 3 D.I. 60. 4 The facts that form the basis of this Opinion are gleamed from the undisputed facts from the 2024 Opinion, the pleadings, and documentary exhibits submitted by the parties. This recitation of the facts is largely drawn from the Superior Court’s

December 9, 2024, Opinion on Motion to Dismiss previously filed and decided in

this case. 5 Briefly, the parties entered into an employment agreement (hereinafter 4F

“the Agreement”) providing for Plaintiff’s employment at DPM for a three-year

period. 6 The Agreement set Plaintiff’s base salary, and in addition, if certain 5F

benchmarks were achieved, Plaintiff was eligible to receive a bonus. Any bonus

earned was to be calculated according to a formula tied to renumeration. 7 6F

The Agreement further provided that Plaintiff’s employment could only be

terminated prior to the end of the agreed upon term for specific reasons. One such

reason is for “due cause.” Per the Agreement, a termination for due cause required

DPM to follow certain procedural requirements, including providing written notice

detailing the reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. 8 The Agreement’s definition of 7F

“due cause” includes, among other things, “a material breach of any Employee’s

obligations.” 9 8F

Plaintiff was terminated for “due cause” after one year of employment at

DPM. 10 Although DPM provided Plaintiff with written notice of termination via 9F

5 Boissonneault v. Del. Podiatric Med., P.A., 2024 WL 5055538 (Del. Super. Dec. 9, 2024). 6 Id. at *1. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id. at *2. letter, the letter did not state the basis for his termination; instead, the reason was

verbally stated to Plaintiff, which, in part, forms the basis of his breach of contract

claim. 11 Additionally, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim alleges DPM breached the 10F

contract by terminating the Agreement early and failing to pay him $68,635.76 in

bonus payments. DPM argues Plaintiff was in material breach of the Agreement,

alleging he engaged in a pattern of workplace misconduct, including mistreatment

of staff, “aggressive treatment of patients,” and failure to disclose certain

information. 12 11F

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on April 6, 2026. 13 12F

DPM responded in Opposition on May 4, 2026. 14 Plaintiff’s Reply was filed on 13F

May 8, 2026. 15 Oral argument was held on May 21, 2026. 16 This is the Court’s 14F 15F

decision DENYING summary judgment.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56, the moving party has the burden to

demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is

11 Id. 12 Id. 13 D.I. 60. 14 D.I. 72. 15 D.I. 73. 16 D.I. 61. entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 17 If the moving party meets its initial 16F

burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that material issues

of fact exist. 18 All reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to 17F

the non-moving party. This Court will not grant summary judgment if there are

genuine issues of material fact in dispute. 19 18F

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment alleging no material facts are in

dispute and the record shows he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his

claims. Defendant argues material facts are in dispute, which include its

counterclaim breach of contract action, therefore summary judgment is not

appropriate.

A. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff’s primary claim is that DPM breached the Employment Agreement

by (1) terminating Plaintiff without cause; (2) failing to articulate the basis of

Plaintiff’s for cause termination in the Termination Letter; and (3) failing to pay

17 Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 18 Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance v. Broan-Nutone, LLC., 2025 WL 1013540, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2025). 19 Heasley v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 2022 WL 951261, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 28, 2022). Plaintiff in accordance with terms of the compensation structure set forth under

Section 10 of the contract. 20 19F

In response, DPM contends that Plaintiff committed a material breach by

failing to comply with subparts b and d of the Agreement, and therefore argues that

the threshold issue in this case is not whether DPM breached the contract by failing

to articulate the basis of Plaintiff’s for cause termination, but rather whether

Plaintiff’s material breach of the Agreement discharged DPM’s duty to continue

performing. 21 DPM maintains that Plaintiff was in breach because he both failed 20F

to devote his “best skill to the care and rendering of professional podiatry services

to such patients as [DPM] shall entrust to [Plaintiff]” and failed to pledge his “careful

avoidance of all personal acts, habits, and usages which might injure in any way,

directly or indirectly, the professional or personal reputation of [DPM]” 22 Therefore, 21F

DPM posits genuine issues of fact remain concerning the materiality of the contract,

which are questions of fact best suited for a jury. 23 22F

A breach of contract arises when “there is a contractual obligation, a breach

of that obligation, and damages.” 24 A contract can be nullified where a party to the 23F

20 D.I. 60 at 13, 15. 21 D.I. 72 at 6-7. 22 D.I. 30 at 18-19; D.I. 72 at 6-7. 23 Id. at 7. 24 Broadkill Beach Builders, LLC v. Frampton, 2025 WL 1804011 at *3 (Del. Super. Jun. 30, 2025). contract substantially fails “to live up to the material terms of [the] valid contract.” 25 24F

A material breach “acts as a termination of the contract going forward, abrogating

any further obligations to perform by the non-breaching party.” 26 25F To justify

abandoning ones performance because of a material breach by another party, one

must show that “the failure of performance on the part of the other go to the

substance of the contract.” 27 Materiality is not a mere failure to comply with one 26F

aspect of the contract, but instead arises when “a party fails to perform a substantial

part of the contract or one or more of its essential terms or conditions.” 28 27F

Plaintiff contends DPM materially breached the Agreement by terminating

Plaintiff without due cause and failing to specify the grounds upon which his

termination was based in the written termination notice. Whether Defendant failed

to comply with the terms set forth under the Agreement concerning the notice

constitutes a material breach is a genuine issue of material fact and one not

appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage. 29 28F

25 DeMarie v. Neff, 2005 WL 89403, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2005). 26 Cook Children's Health Care Sys. v. Cornerstone On Demand, Inc., 2019 WL 6903999, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 18, 2019) (citing Carey v. Estate of Myers, 2015 WL 4087056, at *20 (Del. Super. July 1, 2015)). 27 DeMarie, 2005 WL 89403, at *4 (citing Saienni v. G & C Capital Group, Inc., 1997 WL 363919, at *3 (Del. Super. May 1, 1997) (internal citations omitted)). 28 Zeisloft v. Mergenthaler, 2015 WL 3609914, at *3 (Del. C.P. June 8, 2015) (citing 23 Samuel Williston & Richard A, Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 63:3 (4th Ed. 2002) (internal citations omitted)). 29 Grottenthaler, 2022 WL 17249642, at *5 (internal citations omitted). The same is true for Plaintiff’s claim that DPM breached Section 10 of the

Contract for failing to compensate Plaintiff under the bonus compensation structure

outlined therein. Section 10 of the Contract provides:

Both parties have agreed that once [DPM] receives renumeration above $270,000 in one year (including DME, x-ray and ancillary revenue received during process of the normal office cycle) the pay will increase as a bonus structure in addition to Employees base salary to 35% of any excess moneys received. 30 29F

Plaintiff argues the patient billing records, in conjunction with Dr. Hanlon’s

deposition testimony acknowledging Plaintiff raised payment discrepancies,

demonstrate DPM breached the contract by failing to pay him compensation owed

under Section 10. While not specifically addressed by DPM in its Reply, the

record demonstrates a genuine issue of fact exists regarding this issue, as it is

contested. At argument, much was discussed regarding the differing

interpretations of the record evidence on this point.

Specifically, Section 10 provides that if DPM received an excess of

$270,000 in renumeration for services Plaintiff performed in one year, Plaintiff

was entitled to receive a bonus payment of 35% of the excess amount generated.

Plaintiff maintains the records and testimony show that DPM was in breach and

failed to pay. However, Dr. Hanlon testified that Plaintiff generated fraudulent

reports to support the false assertion that he was owed money. Dr. Hanlon

30 D.I. 60, Ex. A. explained that, “[Plaintiff] was producing these fraudulent reports and asserting

them as true . . . and [would] show me these reports that basically depicted how

much money he thought he was bringing in on a monthly basis.” 31 30F

Consequently, a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary

judgment on the breach of contract claim. Thus, this is a question for the jury and

not a question that demands judgment as a matter of law.

B. DWPCA With respect to Count II, Plaintiff argues judgment as a matter of law is

appropriate on his DWPCA violation claim, as DPM failed to compensate Plaintiff

pursuant to the compensation terms under the Agreement. Per Plaintiff the issue is

simple: he was an employee and the contract was performed and executed in

Delaware. 32 In response, DPM contends the DWPCA does not apply to bonus 31F

compensation payments. 33 Alternatively, DPM argues that Plaintiff has failed to 32F

demonstrate that he was wrongfully terminated and thus, DPM was unreasonable in

subsequently denying future payments, which is a question best suited for the fact-

finder. 34 33F

31 D.I. 60, Ex. B, 28:23-24, 29:1-11. 32 Id at 17. 33 D.I. 72 at 8. 34 Id. Section 1101(a)(4) of the DWPCA limits recovery to “a person suffered or

permitted to work by an employer in this State.” 35 Under the DWPCA, wages are 34F

defined as “compensation due to an employee by reason of the employee's

employment, payable in legal tender of the United States or check or bank draft

convertible into cash on demand at full face value, subject to such deductions,

charges, or allowances.” 36 The statutory language does not specifically address 35F

whether bonus payments constitute recoverable wages under the Act, and instead

broadly defines wages as “compensation due to an employee.” However, in

Gallagher v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co, this Court determined that the DWPCA

does not apply to wage claims stemming from an alleged failure to pay “additional

payments that are not part of the regular recurrent compensation for services

rendered by the employee.” 37 It is worth noting that the Gallagher Court ruled prior 36F

to the legislature’s amendment. The Act’s statutory language was amended in 2022,

to its current form which defines wages more broadly. 38 37F

Regardless, the original Act’s language, which defined wages as

“compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount

35 SerVaas v. Ford Smart Mobility LLC, 2021 WL 3779559, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2021) (citing 19 Del. C. § 1101(a)(3)). 36 19 Del. C. § 1101(a)(8). 37 Gallagher v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 2010 WL 1854131, at *7 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 2010). 38 Id. is fixed or determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of

calculation,” 39 was not significantly changed. 3 F Although the statute has been

amended since the Gallagher Court issued their opinion, the modifications are

relatively insubstantial and do not support a rational basis to undermine the Court’s

analysis and subsequent holding, that bonus compensation are not recoverable wages

under the DWPCA.

In this case, Plaintiff has standing to assert a claim under the DWPCA because

he was permitted to work by DPM, an employer in this State. Under the terms of

the Agreement, in addition to Plaintiff’s base salary, if certain benchmarks were met,

Plaintiff was eligible to receive 35% of the excess amount of renumeration payments

exceeding $270,000. If these payments are considered bonus payments, as separate

and distinct from Plaintiff’s base wages paid for work and services performed as an

employee of DPM, they are not recoverable wages under the DWPCA.

However, a factual issue remains regarding whether Plaintiff satisfied the

required condition to receive the bonus compensation. A cross-motion was not filed

with respect to whether this claim should survive, therefore, the issue of whether the

condition precedent was met will be presented to the jury. Dr. Hanlon testified that

Plaintiff generated false billing reports and wrongfully claimed he was entitled to

additional payments, which creates a genuine issue of material fact. Whether the

39 19 Del. C. 1953, § 1101(a) (5). jury will be permitted to decide whether a violation of the DWPCA occurred is a

question that Court and counsel will revisit at the appropriate time. At this time,

however, summary judgment is improper.

C. RETALIATION UNDER WCL

Finally, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his retaliation claim.

Plaintiff maintains he has successfully established a valid claim for workers’

compensation retaliation because he requested workers compensation benefits after

he sustained a needle stick injury, following which, DPM terminated his

employment. As a result, Plaintiff suggests this Court should find, as a matter of

law, that a causal connection has been proven to show his termination was in

retaliation for DPM paying out for his injury pursuant to the WCL. In response,

DPM argues Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim had no bearing on his

termination, which was wholly based on unrelated conduct. 40 39F

In order to establish a prima facie claim for workers’ compensation retaliation,

Plaintiff must show that: “(1) Plaintiff exercised rights under the Workers’

Compensation Act; (2) [his employer] took an adverse employment action against

[him]; and (3) there was a causal connection between Plaintiff’s exercise of rights

and the adverse employment action.” 41 40F Plaintiff’s mere establishment that a

40 D.I. 72 at 8-9. 41 Weller v. Morris James, 2020 WL 2511118, at *2 (Del. Super. May 14, 2020) (internal citation omitted). workers’ compensation claim was filed and afterwards his employment was

terminated is not sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that there is a

causal connection between the two events. Plaintiff argues that his termination was

a direct result of the claim filed, while DPM retorts that they terminated Plaintiff

because of unrelated conduct. Although a factual dispute exists on this issue,

“[w]hen a claim lacks legal merit, factual disputes become immaterial to the

summary judgment analysis.” 42 41F In Emmert v. Prade, the Court of Chancery

determined that "factual disputes did not preclude summary judgment, where there

[is] no cognizable legal claim underlying them.” 43 The Court further explained, 2F

“while it is true that summary judgment is inappropriate when there are genuine

issues of material fact, this standard assumes there is an underlying legal claim.” 44 43F

In this case, Plaintiff’s claim is entirely premised on the conclusory allegation

that the timing of his workers’ compensation claim and subsequent termination

establish that DPM retaliated against him. It is illogical to conclude, solely based

on timing, that DPM retaliated against Plaintiff because he filed a workers’

compensation claim. There has been no evidence offered to support such a

connection. Moreover, by Plaintiff’s own omission, DPM provided Plaintiff with

guidance and assistance in filing this claim. Namely, DPM initially instructed him

42 Emmert v. Prade, 711 A.2d 1217 (Del. Ch. 1997). 43 Id. 44 Id. to file a claim through “Bayhealth’s Workers Compensation policy” and then

directed him to file a claim through his own insurance policy after Bayhealth

informed Plaintiff of his ineligibility under Bayhealth’s policy. 45 4F Plaintiff

subsequently filed a claim for his injury through DPM’s policy, which they paid in

full a few weeks after. 46 Such efforts demonstrate an effort to facilitate, as opposed 45F

to impede, the claims process and undermine Plaintiff’s theory that DPM retaliated

against him.

Thus, Plaintiff’s cause of action under the WCL lacks legal merit and had a

cross-motion for summary been filed, the Court would have granted it. It will not

sua sponte dismiss the claims. It is worth noting that “where

a claim isn't legally cognizable, judgment as a matter of law may be entered

irrespective of any ‘immaterial factual disputes.’” 47 This issue will be presented to 46F

the jury, and it will be the jury’s job to decide whether Plaintiff can meet its burden

of proof.

D. DAMAGES Finally, Plaintiff argues his entitlement to liquidated damages for backpay and

lost wages has been demonstrated to such an extent that judgment as a matter of law

45 D.I. 28 at ¶¶ 58-60. 46 D.I. 60 at 18, Ex. E at plaintiff00098. 47 Wu v. Wang, 2026 WL 560320, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 26, 2026) (citing Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1365 (Del. 1995)). is required. 48 Specifically, Plaintiff contends the Agreement establishes a clear and 47F

objective formula for calculating Plaintiff’s bonuses’ and seeks $68,635.76 in unpaid

bonuses to which he is entitled. As explained above, DPM refutes Plaintiff’s

assertion that he is entitled to unpaid bonuses entirely, which creates a genuine issue

of material fact. Therefore, a triable issue of fact remains, and summary judgment

is improper.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. Given the factual

and legal issues raised in this ruling, the Court finds that it is in the interest of justice

that the parties return to mediation, with all parties present and participating in good

faith. This additional mediation must be completed within thirty (30) days of this

Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________ Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

48 D.I. 60 at 21.