Bohn v. Harris

494 F. Supp. 101, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14575
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJune 6, 1980
DocketCiv. No. C 79-0574
StatusPublished

This text of 494 F. Supp. 101 (Bohn v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bohn v. Harris, 494 F. Supp. 101, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14575 (D. Utah 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

JENKINS, District Judge.

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Defendant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary)1 denying his claim for black lung disability benefits under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. Presently before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal of the Final Decision of the Secretary Denying Black Lung Benefits to Plaintiff and Defendant’s Motion to Affirm the Decision.

Jurisdiction and the standard for review of this action are found in 30 U.S.C. § 923(b), incorporating the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides in pertinent part that “the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . ” “Substantial evidence” is defined as “ . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Hanna v. Califano, 579 F.2d 67, 68 (10th Cir. 1978); Felthager v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 130, 131 (10th Cir. 1976); Trujillo v. Richardson, 429 F.2d 1149,1150 (10th Cir. 1970). See also, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e). However, the court is not bound to accept the conclusions of the Secretary as to legal questions, and is free to review those conclusions, keeping in mind that some deference is accorded the Agency’s own interpretation of its governing law. See, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) through (D). It should also be noted that in determining whether a conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing body must look not only at the evidence which supports the conclusion, but at that evidence which fairly detracts from it. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). The central issue, therefore, is narrow, i. e., whether there is substantial evidence upon the record as a whole to support the findings, conclusions and fin.1 decision of the Secretary that Plaintiff was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, arising out of his employment in the nation’s underground coal mines, on or before June 30, 1973. Paluso v. Mathews, 562 F.2d 33, 36 (10th Cir. 1977), reh., 573 F.2d 4, 10 (10th Cir. 1978).

Pneumoconiosis, commonly referred to as “black lung”, is a chronic chest disease which is caused by fine coal dust particles lodging themselves in the lung. Because of the devastating, progressive character of this disease and because the Act is basically remedial in nature, claims for compensation are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the claim. Paluso, supra at 36 and 573 F.2d at 10; Henson v. Weinberger, 548 F.2d 695, 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Puckett v. Mathews, 420 F.Supp. 364, 366 (D.C.Va.1976); Tonker v. Mathews, 412 F.Supp. 823, 827 (D.C.Va. 1976); Report No. 94-1254, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, pp. 1-3 (September 20, 1976); Report No. 92-743 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, p. 11 (April 10, 1972). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted in Paluso on rehearing:

We are of the view that all reasonable inferences and presumptions should be construed in favor of a miner who when he filed his claim believed that he was suffering from black lung, even though he had not mustered sufficient evidence of his disability prior to the cut-off date. We anchor this approach to a variety of factors, including a claimant’s ignorance [104]*104or misunderstanding of eligibility standards, lack of adequate medical evidence due to the progressive nature of black lung disease, a miner’s financial inability to seek proper medical confirmation, and inexact methods of diagnosis. It is a matter of overriding importance that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be given liberal construction, (citations).
* * * * * *
Any doubts which arise as to when black lung caused total disability are to be resolved in favor of these good faith claimants. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).

Generally speaking, a living miner shall be considered totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if his pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful work in the immediate area of his residence requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any work in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time, and his impairment can be expected to result in death, or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 20 CFR 410.-412(a)(1), (2). Because of the medical difficulty in obtaining a clinical diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, and as a matter of public policy, Congress established certain standards and presumptions to assist coal miners in establishing their claims.

There is an irrebuttable presumption that a living coal miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if he is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust disease of the lung as established by chest x-rays yielding one or more opacities greater than one centimeter in diameter and which are classified as “complicated pneumoconiosis”.

There is a rebuttable presumption that a living coal miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if a chest x-ray, biopsy or autopsy yields a finding of “simple pneumoconiosis”. 20 CFR 410.-490(b)(l)(i) and 20 CFR 410.428. Mutter v.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Oliver v. Califano
476 F. Supp. 12 (D. Utah, 1979)
Gray v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare
402 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Michigan, 1975)
Mutter v. Weinberger
391 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Virginia, 1975)
Puckett v. Mathews
420 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Virginia, 1976)
Tonker v. Mathews
412 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Virginia, 1976)
Putsakulish v. Califano
448 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
494 F. Supp. 101, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14575, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bohn-v-harris-utd-1980.