Bogus v. Davis

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedJune 4, 2021
Docket6:19-cv-00278
StatusUnknown

This text of Bogus v. Davis (Bogus v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bogus v. Davis, (E.D. Tex. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION

BRETT DAVID BOGUS, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Case No. 6:19-cv-278-JDK-KNM § LORIE DAVIS, et al., § § Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Brett David Bogus, a Texas Department of Criminal Justice inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for disposition. Plaintiff’s amended complaint raised several claims, including that various Defendants denied him access to legal materials and the courts, retaliated against him for filing grievances, inflicted physical and emotional distress, failed to properly investigate his grievances, wrongly denied his grievances, cyberstalked him, forged a mail receipt on his behalf, and conspired against him. Docket No. 32. On March 9, 2021, Judge Mitchell issued a Report recommending that the Court dismiss all of Plaintiff’s pending claims except his claim that Defendant Andrew Ginsel removed Plaintiff’s medically unassigned status in retaliation for grievances Plaintiff had filed. Docket No. 47 at 20. Plaintiff objected to this Report. Docket No. 51. Where a party timely objects to the Report and Recommendation, the Court reviews the objected-to findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In conducting a de novo review, the Court examines the entire

record and makes an independent assessment under the law. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days). Plaintiff raises several points in his objections. First, Plaintiff argues that he has shown a genuine dispute as to a material fact and must merely provide notice that a cause of action probably or potentially

exists to state a claim. Docket No. 51 at 1–2. But the case law Plaintiff cites in support of this argument concerns causes of action for legal negligence under Mississippi law. The Magistrate Judge correctly set out the standards for stating a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, this objection is without merit. Second, Plaintiff argues that he did not receive approximately fifteen percent

of the legal materials he requested, which prejudiced him on his direct appeal and petition for discretionary review in state courts. Docket No. 51 at 3. But Plaintiff does not elaborate on this conclusory claim of actual injury. A review of court records shows that in Plaintiff’s direct appeal, counsel filed an Anders brief and Plaintiff filed a pro se brief. The appellate court concluded that the appeal was “wholly frivolous and without merit.” Bogus v. State, No. 14-15-832-CR, 2017 WL 1366674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 13, 2017, pet. ref’d). His petition for discretionary review argued that the Anders brief was erroneous and that constitutional, plain, reversible, and structural errors existed in the record. The Court of Criminal Appeals

refused his petition for discretionary review on March 7, 2017. Bogus v. State, No. PD-0657-17 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2017). Based on this record, Plaintiff offers nothing to show an injury in fact resulting from the purported denial of legal materials. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Accordingly, this objection is without merit. Third, Plaintiff’s objections reiterate the allegations of his complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the law library created “new rules” specifically to

impede his access and that Officer Ricky Minton wrote him a false disciplinary case. Docket No. 51 at 3–4. He also complains that Minton swore at him in the dorm because Plaintiff continued to complain about him. Id. at 5. Plaintiff argues that TDCJ has failed to adequately investigate his complaints. Id. However, Plaintiff does not controvert the Magistrate Judge’s determination that he did not show constitutionally cognizable harm and that he has no liberty interest in having

complaints investigated to his satisfaction. Although he argues that he has a liberty interest in due process and equal protection and the failure to investigate his grievances are an “act of omission” that is “actionable to the same extent as an act of commission,” this contention lacks any basis in law. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373–74 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Cole v. Abbott, 91 F.App’x 936 (5th Cir. 2004) (no state-created liberty interest in grievance procedure). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection on this point is without merit. Fourth, Plaintiff complains that TDCJ’s law library policies—which allow

three items of legal research material three times per week—constitutes a denial of access to court. Docket No. 51 at 7. As the Magistrate Judge observed, however, Plaintiff has failed to show any harm resulting from this alleged denial. See Lockamy v. Dunbar, 399 F. App’x 953 (5th Cir. 2010), citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. His conclusory allegation that the claimed denial of access to court “prevent[ed] success on direct appeal” is insufficient to show actual harm. Accordingly, this objection is without merit.

Fifth, Plaintiff states that he filed grievances referring to Defendants Spears- Hollis, Mitchell, Karnes, and Yancy’s failure to protect him from “intentional conduct.” Docket No. 51 at 9–10. He argues that the substantial risk was clear and that whether Defendants had sufficient knowledge and notice is a question of fact. The Magistrate Judge discussed Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims and ordered Defendant Ginsel to answer this claim. Beyond that, the fact that Plaintiff’s

grievances did not receive the response he believed appropriate does not show a constitutional violation. Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374. Accordingly, this objection is without merit. Sixth, Plaintiff complains of being denied medical treatment by Defendant Michael Sizemore. Docket No. 51 at 10–12. He complains that the only medications Sizemore will provide Plaintiff are Effexor and Cymbalta, both of which are anti- depressants. Plaintiff also raises an argument concerning “involuntary force” in the distribution of psychotropic medications for the first time in his objections. Id. at 12. But Plaintiff provides no additional details. Further, as a practice manager,

Defendant Sizemore is not a medical provider and plays no role in the provision of medical care or the prescribing of medications. See, e.g., Tijerina v. Stanley, No. 5:16- cv-102, 2019 WL 1396964 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019); Hunt v. Pierson, No. 6:15-cv-559, 2016 WL 1357913, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2016) (citing Criollo v. Milton, 414 F. App’x 719, 721 (5th Cir.

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Related

Geiger v. Jowers
404 F.3d 371 (Fifth Circuit, 2005)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Christopher v. Harbury
536 U.S. 403 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kenneth Lockamy v. Chequita Dunbar
399 F. App'x 953 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Carlos Criollo v. Paulette Milton
414 F. App'x 719 (Fifth Circuit, 2011)
Sarah Doe v. Jerald Neveleff
751 F.3d 383 (Fifth Circuit, 2014)

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