BODHISATTVA SKANDHA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL & Others.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: October 31, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1286
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1286

BODHISATTVA SKANDHA

vs.

ATTORNEY GENERAL1 & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, a pro se prisoner, has

been designated a vexatious litigant. See Skandha v. Clerk of

the Superior Court for Civil Business in Suffolk County, 472

Mass. 1017, 1019 (2015). As a result of the designation, any

lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff in Suffolk County Superior

Court is subject to preauthorization before it may proceed.

On or about July 18, 2024, the plaintiff filed a complaint

for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages

1Andrea J. Campbell, in her official capacity as Attorney General and individually.

2Carol Mici, Commissioner of Correction, and Kenneth Lizotte, Superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, individually and in their official capacities. against Attorney General Andrea J. Campbell, Carol Mici,

Commissioner of Correction, and Kenneth Lizotte, Superintendent

of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (M.C.I.

- Norfolk), in Suffolk County Superior Court.3 On July 26, 2024,

pursuant to a 2011 screening order, the Suffolk Superior Court

regional administrative justice (RAJ) dismissed the plaintiff's

complaint after determining it lacked any legal basis for the

plaintiff to claim the relief he sought. From this dismissal,

the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

"We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo,

accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the

complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the

plaintiff's favor . . . . " Lanier v. President and Fellows of

Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022). "In assuming the

facts as alleged, however, '[w]e do not regard as "true" legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations'" (citation

omitted). Edwards v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged must

'plausibly suggest[ ] (not merely be consistent with) an

entitlement to relief'" (quotation omitted). Id., quoting

Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).

3 The gravamen of the complaint was the plaintiff's request for the Attorney General to investigate prison conditions at M.C.I. – Norfolk and illegal drugs transaction therein.

2 The plaintiff essentially challenges the dismissal of his

complaint in a variety of ways. He claims the RAJ misapplied

the screening order in violation of his equal protection rights,

the screening order was "too stale" to be applied to him, and

that the RAJ did not apply any law to the facts of his case. We

disagree.

The plaintiff has not asked the RAJ to lift or modify the

screening order. Instead, he has raised these claims for the

first time on appeal. As a result, we treat them as waived.

See Tenants' Dev. Corp. v. AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC, 495 Mass.

207, 215 n.13 (2025); Fitzpatrick v. Dep't of Correction, 102

Mass. App. Ct. 617, 624 n.12 (2023). In any event, as a panel

of this Court has previously held in an unpublished decision,

"to the extent that the plaintiff challenges the validity of the

order entered in 2011, he has no chance of success." Skandha v.

Baima, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2020). The plaintiff has failed

to show any changed circumstances that might warrant termination

or modification of the order. The RAJ properly dismissed the

complaint against all the defendants based on the screening

order.

Furthermore, relative to the complaint against the Attorney

General, the plaintiff's underlying claims are met with several

obstacles, all of which are fatal. To the extent the suit was

brought against the Attorney General in her official capacity,

3 it is barred by sovereign immunity. See Sullivan v. Chief

Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 448 Mass. 15, 24-

25, 31-33 (2006); Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 762-63

(1997). If the suit is construed as against the Attorney

General in her personal capacity, it is barred by absolute

immunity. See Dinsdale v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 176, 180

(1997); Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney for the Hampden

Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 248 (1985). Finally, the plaintiff lacks

a judicially cognizable interest in the investigation or

prosecution of other persons. See Matter of an Application for

a Criminal Complaint, 477 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2017); Shepard v.

Attorney Gen., 409 Mass. 398, 400-401 (1991). The complaint was

properly dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Neyman & Walsh, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: October 31, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.