Boclair v. Lashbrook

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided November 10, 2022·No. 3:18-cv-01188·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STANLEY BOCLAIR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 18-cv-1188-RJD ) JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER DALY, Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff Stanley Boclair, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when members of the Orange Crush tactical unit handcuffed him in a stress position, causing severe pain and injuring his left shoulder. Plaintiff proceeds on ten counts alleging deliberate indifference under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants John Baldwin, Jacqueline Lashbrook, Barry Myers, Michael Laminack, Philip Royster, Joshua Cornstubble, John Koch, Justin Engelage, Carson Winters, and Ezra Hunter (see Doc. 63). This matter is now before the Court to address a number of motions filed by Plaintiff. The Court addresses each motion separately, as set forth below. Motion to Obtain the Text of Local Rule 7.1 (Doc. 140) In this motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to “remain open to exigent circumstances confronting Plaintiff in accessing local rule 7.1 in exceptional circumstances.” In support of this Page 1 of 7 request, Plaintiff cites his limited access to the library. Plaintiff also mentions the three-day period following service of a response to file a reply. Plaintiff’s request and motion to the Court is not clear. Insofar as Plaintiff is seeking clarity regarding Local Rule 7.1, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a courtesy copy of the Court’s Local Rules. The Court notes, however, that Local Rule 7.1 makes no

mention of a three-day time period for any filing. Insofar as Plaintiff is seeking any other relief through this motion, it is DENIED. Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 141) Plaintiff asks the Court to recruit him counsel in this matter, citing concerns that prison officials are delaying and destroying his legal papers. With regard to Plaintiff’s contention that prison officials are destroying legal documents, the Court finds no evidence supporting this position. Indeed, Plaintiff seems to merely complain that a number of documents from various court cases were provided to him on July 14, 2022. Plaintiff points to no instance where a document was destroyed or his cases were hindered because he did not receive a document.

More generally to Plaintiff’s request for recruitment of counsel, the Court finds Plaintiff was previously recruited counsel and represented by an attorney in this case. Recruited counsel was allowed to withdraw as the Court found counsel was able to identify the John Doe defendants. In counsel’s motion to withdraw, however, counsel indicated there was a “fundamental disagreement” regarding the suit’s merits, settlement value, and strategy (see Doc. 91). Counsel also noted that Plaintiff refused to follow the advice of counsel. In Judge Yandle’s Order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw, she considered the Pruitt factors and determined Plaintiff was capable of proceeding pro se. Plaintiff has not set forth a compelling reason to reconsider this decision. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel is Page 2 of 7 DENIED. Motion for Estoppel by Conduct against AAG Jeanine Armstrong (Doc. 148) Plaintiff complains that AAG Jeanine Armstrong failed to intervene and ensure Plaintiff received medical treatment for a condition brought to her attention and, as such, Plaintiff asks that AAG Armstrong be disqualified as counsel. In support of his motion, Plaintiff relies on an email

sent by his counsel in an unrelated case wherein counsel informed AAG Armstrong of a rash on Plaintiff’s body and asked AAG Armstrong if there was anything she could do to assist with the situation. The email was sent February 8, 2021. AAG Armstrong responded to Plaintiff’s motion and explained she has no duty to provide health care for Plaintiff (Doc. 150). AAG Armstrong further explains the case at hand, and the case in which the correspondence occurred had no relation to a rash. Plaintiff replied to AAG Armstrong’s response (Doc. 154). This issue was already addressed by Judge Yandle wherein she denied Plaintiff’s request to disqualify AAG Armstrong from this matter. The Court again DENIES Plaintiff’s motion as

wholly baseless. Plaintiff has not established any basis to disqualify AAG Armstrong from this matter. The Court ADVISES Plaintiff to refrain from filing repetitive and frivolous motions that tax the limited resources of the Court and unfairly consume time the Court needs to serve other litigants seeking relief in the federal court system. See, e.g., Alexander v. U.S., 121 F.3d 312, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying monetary sanctions for duplicative filings in a habeas case). Motion for Relief from Order (Doc. 134) and to Establish Basis in a Motion of Estoppel Disqualifying AAG Jeanine Armstrong (Doc. 149)

Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its previous decision denying his Motion for Estoppel by Conduct against Jeanine Armstrong (Doc. 134) asserting documentation attached to the motion Page 3 of 7 at hand will “delineate” the basis for removing AAG Armstrong. There was no attachment to the motion at hand. Insofar as Plaintiff relies on the email attached to his Motion for Estoppel (Doc. 148) that was denied by the undersigned, his documentation does not establish a basis to disqualify AAG Armstrong. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. Motion to Compel (Doc. 151)

In this motion, Plaintiff complains that during “the most recent taking of [his] deposition,” he was “ambushed” with hundreds of pages of critical documents that counsel for Defendants left in the possession of a correctional officer with instructions that Plaintiff not retain or copy any of the same. Plaintiff also complains he did not receive his deposition notice until after the deposition was taken. Plaintiff asks that the Court instruct Defendants’ counsel to not ambush him with documents during a deposition, issue an order that Plaintiff be allowed to copy any documents presented for a deposition, and provide notice of a deposition at least two weeks in advance. Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion asserting the deposition referenced by Plaintiff

occurred during the early part of the COVID-19 lockdown on June 10, 2020 (Doc. 155). According to Defendants, a deposition notice was sent on May 13, 2020. At the time this deposition was taken, the parties were not certain about the size of the device Plaintiff would be utilizing to appear for his deposition. To avoid issues in seeing the documents that were to be addressed at the deposition, Defendants’ counsel sent the documents to the facility so they would be available to review in-person and the parties would not have to rely on reading the documents via video. Defendants explain the documents that were sent to the facility had already been exchanged as initial disclosures or through discovery. Defendants assert Plaintiff is correct in that the documents were not left for Plaintiff to possess following the deposition as he is not Page 4 of 7 entitled to the same. It appears Plaintiff seeks speculative relief for issues that are not certain to arise in this case. As such, his Motion is DENIED. Insofar as Plaintiff is prospectively concerned about the production of certain documents at his deposition, Plaintiff is advised that Defendants can provide hard copies of documents at his deposition for review and to question him about, and Plaintiff is

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