Bocanegra Garcia v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-3911
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REYNALDO BOCANEGRA GARCIA, No. 25-3911 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-121-572 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 24, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: HIGGINSON, NGUYEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.***

Reynaldo Bocanegra Garcia (“Bocanegra Garcia”), a native and citizen of

Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, sitting by designation. dismissing his appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”) protection. “We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and

CAT claims for substantial evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025,

1028 (9th Cir. 2019). “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency

determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. “When the

BIA adopts and affirms an IJ’s decision and cites its Burbano decision,” we “review

the IJ’s decision as if it were that of the BIA.” Tista v. Holder, 722 F.3d 1122, 1125

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir.

2009)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Bocanegra

Garcia’s application for asylum is untimely. Applications for asylum must be filed

within one year after the date of the individual’s arrival in the United States, but this

filing timeline may be excused by “changed circumstances which materially affect

the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the

delay.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); see Singh v. Holder, 656 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th

Cir. 2011). We review the IJ’s determinations regarding the extraordinary

circumstances for substantial evidence. See Ruiz v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 586, 599 (9th

Cir. 2025). Bocanegra Garcia entered the United States in 2005 but did not apply

for asylum until 2017.

2 25-3911 The IJ explained that Bocanegra Garcia did not meet his burden of proving an

exception to the filing requirement. Bocanegra Garcia’s claim for an exception is

on the basis that he believed the individual responsible for his brother’s murder,

Timoteo Morales Acevedo (“Acevedo”), was to be released from prison in 2017.

Because Acevedo had threatened Bocanegra Garcia and his family, Acevedo’s

impending release made the threats more immediate. The IJ explained that

Bocanegra Garcia did not meet his burden of proving an exception to the filing

requirement, in part because Acevedo remained in prison as of 2021 and therefore

Bocanegra Garcia’s cited change of circumstances was not evident. Accordingly,

the evidence does not compel finding that Bocanegra Garcia qualifies for the

exception.

2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal.1

For withholding claims, a petitioner must show that “it is more likely than not that

he would be subject to persecution on one of the specified grounds.” Sanjaa v.

Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Robleto-Pastora v. Holder,

1 A claim for withholding is not subject to the same statutory filing deadline as asylum. Shire v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2004). Regardless, the IJ proceeded to address the merits of both asylum and withholding claims. Because the following discussion on withholding would apply to Bocanegra Garcia’s asylum claim on the merits, we would similarly find that substantial evidence supports denial of asylum as well. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2023) (discussing the nexus standard for both asylum and withholding claims).

3 25-3911 591 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010)). “The agent(s) of persecution must be ‘the

government or . . . persons or organizations which the government is unable or

unwilling to control.’” Robleto-Pastora, 591 F.3d at 1057 (alteration in original)

(quoting Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2004)). The IJ denied

relief on the grounds that Bocanegra Garcia failed to establish both past persecution

and a nexus to his membership in a particular social group (“PSG”). The BIA

assumed for the purposes of review that Bocanegra Garcia is a member of a

cognizable family-based PSG but adopted and affirmed the remainder of the IJ’s

decision.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Bocanegra Garcia failed to

demonstrate past persecution. The IJ observed that Bocanegra Garcia continued to

live unharmed in the same town for four years after his brother’s murder, as did his

family who still live there. Although the IJ recognized Bocanegra Garcia received

threats from people Acevedo knew, the IJ reasoned that such threats were not by

Acevedo directly. As we have held, threats, without more, do not necessarily

constitute past persecution. Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000). As such,

Bocanegra Garcia “has not presented evidence that compels such a finding.” Marcos

v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s no-nexus finding. We have

explained that there is a difference between targeting a family member “as an

4 25-3911 instrumental means” of furthering some other goal, and being “motivated

intrinsically by [the] familial relationship.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th

1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2023). “Purely personal retribution” is not persecution “on

account of” a protected ground. Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th

Cir. 2001). Here, the record adequately supports the IJ’s conclusion that the harm

Bocanegra Garcia fears is “one of a fear of vengeance or reprisal from Acevedo, but

not a matter of persecution on account of family membership.” The IJ pointed out

that the letter provided by petitioner’s mother does not mention her testifying in

court against Acevedo, and Bocanegra Garcia testified he did not attend the court

proceedings and could not offer any details on her testimony. The record therefore

does not compel the conclusion that Bocanegra Garcia’s family membership is “a

reason” Acevedo would harm him. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C).

3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that

Bocanegra Garcia failed to establish eligibility for CAT protection. To qualify, a

petitioner must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be

tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

This torture must be “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official . . . or other person acting in an official

capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Bocanegra Garcia did not demonstrate that he

would more likely than not be tortured in Mexico by, or with the consent or

5 25-3911 acquiescence of, a public official. First, he did not establish the state-action prong.

As the IJ held, there was no connection between Acevedo and Mexican government

officials. Further, Bocanegra Garcia did not establish that torture is likely upon his

return. The IJ explained that no past torture was alleged, and, moreover, Bocanegra

Garcia’s family has continued to live in the same town without harm. We have held

that this is one basis for deeming insufficient evidence of likelihood of torture. See

Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2010).

Finally, based on the country conditions report, the IJ recognized that Mexican

prison conditions were harsh, but Bocanegra Garcia did not claim that he might be

detained or held in custody upon returning to Mexico. Bocanegra Garcia argues that

the government would not protect him from general crime. However, we have held

that “evidence that a government has been generally ineffective in preventing or

investigating criminal activities” does not “raise an inference that public officials are

likely to acquiesce in torture, absent evidence of corruption or other inability or

unwillingness to oppose criminal organizations.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d

1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). The record thus does not compel the conclusion that

Bocanegra Garcia is likely to be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a

Mexican official.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The motion for stay of removal, Dkt. 2, is denied.

6 25-3911