United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2294.
BOCA CIEGA HOTEL, INC., a Florida corporation; Barry G. Jones, d/b/a All Suites Motel; Brenda Louise Jones, d/b/a All Suites Motel; John Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOUCHARD TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., Maritrans Operating Partners L.P., Tug Captain Fred Bouchard Corporation, a New York corporation, Barge B 155 Corp., a New York corporation, Jose Salamanca, Captain; Pepito G. Amora, Thomas A. Baggett, Defendants-Appellees.
April 17, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. (No. 93-1616-CIV-t-17C), Elizabeth A. Kovachevich, Judge.
Before BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
In this case we must decide whether the claims presentation
procedure of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA or Act), 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2761 (West Supp.1994), constitutes a mandatory
condition precedent to the filing of private lawsuits under the
Act. We conclude that it does and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 10, 1993, four vessels collided in Tampa Bay,
spilling thousands of gallons of oil and other oil pollutants in
the process.1 Pursuant to OPA, 2 the Coast Guard designated
1 Because the district court dismissed this action before extensive discovery could occur, we take all allegations in the complaint as true. 2 See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701(32) & 2714. Appellees Bouchard Transportation (Bouchard), as owner and operator
of the vessel "Tug Captain Fred Bouchard" and barge "B. 155," and
Maritrans Operating Partners (Maritrans), as owner and operator of
the vessel "Seafarer" and barge "Ocean 255," (collectively,
Appellees) as the "responsible parties" for the spill.3 The
Appellants brought this action individually and on behalf of
several plaintiff classes to recover business, property, and
tourist damages sustained as a result of the spill. The complaint
alleged liability under OPA's citizen suit provisions and various
Florida statutory and common-law theories.
Appellees Bouchard and Maritrans moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to
Appellees, federal subject matter jurisdiction did not exist
because Appellants had failed to comply with OPA's claims 4 presentation procedure. Conforming to OPA, Bouchard and Maritrans
had organized a claims clearinghouse to identify, process, and
settle claims arising from the spill. Appellees took the position
that resort to this claims presentation process is a mandatory
condition precedent to any OPA lawsuit, and that Appellants'
failure to present their claims rendered them unripe for judicial
resolution. Appellees also disputed the existence of federal
diversity jurisdiction because several of the named plaintiffs
shared Florida citizenship with defendant Thomas Baggett.
In responding to Appellees' motions, Appellants never claimed
3 Appellees Jose Salamanca, Pepito Amora, and Thomas Baggett were named as defendants for their role in operating another vessel involved in the spill, the "Balsa 37." 4 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2713-2714. that they satisfied OPA's claims presentation requirement.5
Instead, they maintained that the claims presentation requirement
only applies to actions seeking to recover from the OPA-created
cleanup fund (Fund),6 not to actions brought directly against the
responsible parties. Appellants also argued that the district
court possessed diversity jurisdiction over their state law claims.
In February 1994, the district court ruled in favor of
Appellees and granted their motions to dismiss. Boca Ciega Hotel,
Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 844 F.Supp. 1512 (M.D.Fla.1994).
This appeal follows.
II. DISCUSSION
The only issue before us is whether the district court
correctly found that compliance with OPA's claims presentation
requirement is a mandatory condition precedent to the existence of
jurisdiction over private actions brought under the Act.7
A. Standard of Review
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which we
5 Appellants did not allege compliance with the claims presentation procedure until their reply brief. Assuming, arguendo, that Appellants now are asserting compliance with OPA's claims presentation provision, we decline to address the issue because we generally do not address issues first raised in a reply brief. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27 F.3d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir.1994). Moreover, even assuming that the alleged post-dismissal claims presentation could render this case moot, the issue before us is a classic example of one "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982); Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520-21 (11th Cir.1992). 6 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (West 1989 & Supp.1994); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701(11) & 2712. 7 Appellants do not appeal the district court's finding that diversity jurisdiction did not exist. See Boca Ciega, 844 F.Supp. at 1516. exercise de novo review. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v.
Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 633 (11th Cir.1995).
B. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
1. The Act's Plain Text.
It is axiomatic that the interpretation of a statute must
begin, and usually ends, with the text of the statute. Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct.
2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992); United States v. Kirkland, 12
F.3d 199, 202 (11th Cir.1994). When interpreting the text, we give
undefined terms their plain, ordinary, and most natural meaning.
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 788,
793, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 (1995); Brown v. Gardner, --- U.S. ----, ----
, 115 S.Ct. 552, 555, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994).
The text of OPA's claims presentation provision states:
(a) Presentation
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [delineating presentation to the Fund], all claims for removal costs or damages shall be presented first to the responsible party or guarantor....
....
(c) Election
If a claim is presented in accordance with subsection (a) of this section and—
(1) each person to whom the claim is presented denies all liability for the claim, or
(2) the claim is not settled by any person by payment within 90 days after the date upon which (A) the claim was presented, or (B) advertising was begun pursuant to section 2714(b) of this title [delineating the claims clearinghouse procedures], whichever is later,
the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or guarantor or to present the claim to the Fund. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713 (emphasis supplied). OPA defines a "claim" as
"a request, made in writing for a sum certain, for compensation for
damages or removal costs resulting from an incident." 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 2701(3). "Damages" are "specified in section 2702(b) of this
title." 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(5). Section 2702(b)'s definition of
damages clearly includes the relief sought by Appellants in this
case. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(B), (D), and (E).
Appellants do not claim that the language of § 2713 is
ambiguous. Nor could they. Appellants' complaint constitutes a
"claim" as OPA defines that term. Section 2713 is very clear that
"all claims ... shall be presented first to the responsible
party...." Congressional use of the word "shall" in § 2713(a) is
naturally read to place a mandatory condition on all claims. See
Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the Southern Dist. of
Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300-02, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 104 L.Ed.2d 318
(1989). In contrast, no reading of § 2713(a)'s language suggests
that Congress intended to limit its applicability to claims against
the Fund.
The language of § 2713(c)'s election of remedies provision
bolsters our interpretation of § 2713(a). Section 2713(c) allows
a claimant8 whose "claim is presented in accordance with subsection (a)" to "elect to commence an action in court against the
responsible party ... or to present the claim to the Fund." 33
U.S.C.A. § 2713(c) (emphasis supplied). The natural reading of §
2713(c) is that claimants like Appellants, filing "in court against
8 Defined as "any person or government who presents a claim for compensation...." 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(4). the responsible part[ies]," as well as claimants seeking recovery
from the Fund, must present their claims in accordance with §
2713(a), supporting our conclusion that § 2713(a) applies to all
claims. In contrast, accepting Appellants' interpretation of §
2713(a) would make parts of § 2713(c) superfluous or nonsensical,
a result to be avoided when interpreting statutes. See Ratzlaf v.
United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 655, 659, 126 L.Ed.2d
615 (1994).
2. The Act's Structure and Purpose.
Despite the clarity of OPA's plain language, Appellants argue
that limiting the claims presentation requirement to claims against
the Fund is more consistent with the overall structure and purpose
of the Act. While discovery of the plain meaning of an unambiguous
statute will almost always end our inquiry, in rare and exceptional
circumstances, we may decline to follow the plain meaning of a
statute because overwhelming extrinsic evidence demonstrates a
legislative intent contrary to the text's plain meaning. Hallstrom
v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 28-30, 110 S.Ct. 304, 310, 107
L.Ed.2d 237 (1989); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73-75,
105 S.Ct. 479, 482, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984); Kirkland, 12 F.3d at
202. We therefore turn to Appellants' contention that the
structure and purpose of OPA so clearly contradicts the plain
meaning of the claims presentation provision that we should limit
that provision to claims against the Fund.
Appellants' reliance on the "overall purpose" of OPA—which
they claim is "to expand the liability of responsible parties"—is
misplaced. Courts have long recognized that statutes, especially large, complex statutes like OPA, are the result of innumerable
compromises between competing interests reflecting many competing
purposes and goals. Therefore, "vague notions" about a statute's
overall purpose cannot be allowed "to overcome the words of its
text regarding the specific issue under consideration." Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2071, 124
L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (emphasis in original). In short, "[w]e will
not attempt to adjust the balance between ... competing goals that
the text adopted by Congress has struck." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct.
at 2072.
Moreover, Appellants present nothing from OPA's text and
little from its legislative history to convince us that expanded
liability was the only, or even primary goal of the Act. On the
contrary, passages from the legislative history support Appellees'
claim that one goal of the claims presentation provision was to
temper the Act's increased liability with a congressional desire to
encourage settlement and avoid litigation. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No.
242, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 66 (1989); 135 Cong.Rec.,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. H7962 (Nov. 2, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Lent).
See also Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 830 F.Supp. 309, 310
(E.D.Va.1993). Even if Appellants could produce textual evidence
of an overall congressional purpose, the pursuit of broad policy
goals in some portions of a statute generally does not demonstrate
an intent to alter the plain statutory command of another
provision. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 537, 542, 130 L.Ed.2d 439
(1994). Appellants' claim that OPA's preservation of state oil spill
remedies, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a), contradicts § 2713's plain meaning
fails for the same reason. While the side-by-side co-existence of
state remedies requiring no presentation and OPA remedies requiring
presentation might be relevant if we were interpreting a facially
ambiguous statute, the clarity of § 2713(a) forecloses that
possibility. A general statutory provision like OPA's savings
clause does not trump the more specific command of § 2713(a). See
Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 119
L.Ed.2d 157 (1992); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S.
504, 523, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1992, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989).
Finally, Appellants' policy objections to the claims
presentation requirement are directed at the wrong forum. As the
Supreme Court noted when construing the notice provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6972 (West 1989 & Supp.1994),—a provision similar to the one now
before us—"we are not at liberty to create an exception where
Congress has declined to do so." Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26, 110
S.Ct. at 309. "In the long run, experience teaches that strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the
legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of
the law." Id. at 31, 110 S.Ct. at 311 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825-27, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2497, 65 L.Ed.2d 532
(1980)). If Appellants perceive a policy shortcoming caused by
OPA's claims presentation requirement, that shortcoming "arises as
a result of the balance struck by Congress," Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at
30, 110 S.Ct. at 311, and is properly remedied by congressional action.
Having found nothing in the text or legislative history of OPA
remotely approaching the type of extraordinarily clear evidence
needed to justify departing from the plain meaning of a statute's
text, we turn to Appellants' remaining argument.
3. The CERCLA Analogy.
Appellants devoted a considerable amount of time and space in
their briefs and at oral argument to the proposition that OPA's
similarity with the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675
(West Supp.1994), requires us to interpret OPA's claims provision
consistently with CERCLA's provision, which limits the presentation
requirement to claims asserted against CERCLA's Fund. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 9612(a). See, e.g., United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 841 (4th Cir.1992) (holding that
CERCLA's claims presentation provision only applies to claims
asserted against the Fund). Appellants' argument is without merit.
The differences between OPA and CERCLA are more important and
significant than the similarities which Appellants rely upon.
Unlike OPA's claims provision, which states that "all claims ...
shall be presented ...," CERCLA's claims provision states that
"[a]ll claims which may be asserted against the Fund ... shall be
presented." Compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(a) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612
(emphasis supplied). This significant textual change does not
suggest that courts should interpret OPA's claims provision as
having the same scope as CERCLA's. On the contrary, the change in
the text, combined with evidence that Congress was aware of CERCLA when it enacted OPA,9 suggests that Congress intended the change in
OPA's language to have substantive consequences and purposely
rejected the CERCLA approach limiting the presentation requirement
to those claims asserted against the Fund. See Brown, --- U.S. at
----, 115 S.Ct. at 556; NRA, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 541-
42.
Appellants' invocation of the doctrine of reading statutes in
pari materia is misplaced. While it is true that similar statutes
should be read consistently, see, e.g., Morales, 504 U.S. at ----,
112 S.Ct. at 2037, that general rule has no bearing in this case.
First of all, the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia only
makes sense when the word or phrase being interpreted has acquired
special, non-literal significance as a legal term of art. See
Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307-09, 112 S.Ct. 711, 716,
116 L.Ed.2d 731 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 263-65, 72 S.Ct. 240, 250, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)).
Appellants fail to identify any word or phrase in § 2713 which has
become a legal term of art. If Appellants are suggesting that all
claims presentation provisions should be interpreted consistent
with CERCLA's, then their argument flies in the face of clear
precedent to the contrary. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 28-31, 110
S.Ct. at 310-11 (holding that RCRA's notice provision is a
9 There is evidence in OPA's text, compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612(a), and legislative history, see S.Rep. No. 94, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1989), that Congress was aware of, and occasionally borrowed from, CERCLA when enacting OPA. But contrary to Appellants' argument, when that fact is coupled with a comparison of the respective claims procedures' text, the most logical conclusion is that Congress rejected the CERCLA limitation when adopting OPA's claims presentation provision. condition precedent to all claims); National Envtl. Foundation v.
ABC Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1096, 1097 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that
Clean Water Act's notice provision is a condition precedent to all
claims.).
Second, the doctrine of reading statutes in pari materia
suggests that Congress presumably knows and adopts the "cluster of
ideas" attached to the borrowed term of art, and resort to the
doctrine should occur "unless otherwise instructed." See Molzof,
502 U.S. at 307, 112 S.Ct. at 716 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at
263-65, 72 S.Ct. at 250). Here, where the text of the statutory
provision "otherwise instructs," id., the doctrine of reading
statutes in pari materia has no place. Appellants' argument that
OPA's claims presentation requirement should be read consistently
with CERCLA's therefore is rejected.
In conclusion, Appellants have presented nothing which even
approaches the sort of extraordinary showing of contrary
legislative intent we require before departing from the plain
meaning of a clear statutory text. We therefore hold that the
clear text of § 2713 creates a mandatory condition precedent
barring all OPA claims unless and until a claimant has presented
her claims in compliance with § 2713(a) and either: (1) all
responsible parties deny all liability; or (2) the claim is not
settled by payment within 90 days after (A) the claim was
presented, or (B) advertising was begun under section 2714(b) of
the Act, whichever is later. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c).
C. Consequence of Dismissal
All parties agree that the district court's dismissal should not be treated as a dismissal with prejudice. Appellants remain
free to refile this action, if and when they comply with OPA's
claims presentation procedure. See also Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31-
33, 110 S.Ct. at 312 (holding that after dismissal, plaintiffs may
refile suit after compliance with RCRA's 60-day notice
requirement). Cf. United States v. Daniel Good Real Property, ---
U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 492, 506-07, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993)
(stating that congressional failure to specify a consequence for
noncompliance with a statute's timing requirement counsels against
dismissal for noncompliance).
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court correctly interpreted §
2713(a) as creating a mandatory condition precedent to bringing any
claims under OPA. Consequently, the district court was correct
when it granted the Appellees' motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.