Bobie v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co.
This text of 110 F. Supp. 242 (Bobie v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is a suit in Admiralty by Libellants 1 against the Steamship Marion Lykes and her owners and operators for damages, etc., 'for their alleged wrongful and illegal discharge as seamen on such Steamship. It is claimed that they were discharged because of their refusal to work in excess of eight hours in one day.2 [243]*243The suit is brought and Libellants claim the right to recover under Section 673-, Title 46 U.S.C.A. as amended. The case has been tried on a Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties, the pertinent parts of which are referred to in the discussion.
1: Under Paragraph One 3 of such Stipulation, Libellants’ case as set forth in their pleadings must fall. In such Stipulation, it is said that each Libellant "duly served aboard the vessel and upon completion of the voyage on January 4, 1950, each was paid off, signing off articles, along with the rest of the crew ” In other words, it is stipulated that Libellants were not discharged from such Steamship, but retained their employment thereon until the end of the voyage. Since they were not discharged, Libellants are not entitled to recover damages, etc., as sued for in their pleadings.
2: However, it appears from the brief of Libellants that their real complaint is that because they refused to work more than 8 hours in any one day on such Steamship, they were denied employment for another or second voyage, and are, therefore, entitled to recover wages, etc., up to the time they were able to obtain other employment.4
The parties in their briefs discuss whether, under the Collective Bargaining Agreement 'between Respondents and the National Maritime Union (of which Libellants were members), Respondents were required to employ Libellants on such second voyage. The Stipulation shows four clauses from such Agreement,5 which presumably are the controlling ones. It is perfectly clear therefrom that because Libellants, as stipulated, refused to work more than 8 hours in any one day, Respondents were not compelled to employ them on the second voyage. Such Articles provide that all employees must be satisfactory to Respondents.
3: But Libellants say that such Agreement is in conflict with Section 673, Title 46, of the 'Code, and must yield to the requirements thereof. They say that un[244]*244•der Section 673, as amended, they are entitled to recover such wages, etc., as stated, from tfhe time they were refused such employment for the second voyage up to the ■time that they were able to obtain other ■employment. I do not think so.6 It will be observed that Section 673, as amended,7 protects two' classes of seamen in the matter of working hours. The first class is seamen on tugs who it is stated shall not be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in one day, etc. The sec•ond class is seamen generally who it is stated shall not be required to work more than eight hours in one day, etc. According to the Stipulation, Libellants were requested to work more than eight hours in one day, but refused. They worked only eight hours. They were not required to work within the meaning of Section 673.
But had Libellants been required to work more than eight hours in one day on the Steamship, that fact would not have compelled Respondents to employ them on the second voyage, nor entitled them to recover here. There is nothing in the wording of Section 673 that gives Libellants that right. Section 673 carries its own [245]*245penalty of $500 for its violation. Thereunder a seaman who is required to work more than eight hours in one day may be discharged and have his wages paid him and sue for such penalty. Libellants bring forward no reason why, if they are entitled to sue at all, they are not confined to a suit for the penalty prescribed by such Section.
Believing that under no theory presented, either by the pleadings or the briefs in this case, Libellants are entitled to recover from Respondents, Judgment will be rendered for Respondents.
Let appropriate Decree be drawn and presented.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
110 F. Supp. 242, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bobie-v-lykes-bros-s-s-co-txsd-1953.