Bobby Lewis Shaw v. Bill Armontrout, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary

900 F.2d 123, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 4536, 1990 WL 33453
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 28, 1990
Docket89-1055
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 900 F.2d 123 (Bobby Lewis Shaw v. Bill Armontrout, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bobby Lewis Shaw v. Bill Armontrout, Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary, 900 F.2d 123, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 4536, 1990 WL 33453 (8th Cir. 1990).

Opinion

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Bobby Lewis Shaw was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 239, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on collateral review in the state courts of Missouri. Shaw v. State, 686 S.W.2d 513 (Mo.Ct.App.1985). Shaw then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). The district court denied Shaw’s petition. We affirm.

The State of Missouri forbids the execution of condemned offenders who “lack[] capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment about to be imposed upon [them].” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 552.060.1 (1986). Accordingly, “any inmate ... sentenced to death [who appears to have] a mental disease or defect excluding fitness for execution” is afforded a hearing in state court on the question of the inmate’s competence to be executed. Id. § 552.060.2-3. Bobby Lewis Shaw had a competence hearing under section 552.-060.3, complete with the full complement of procedural protections identified in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 413-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2603-05, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion). After receiving the reports and testimony of experts who had interviewed and tested Shaw, the state court made findings of fact:

1. ... Shaw is aware [ ] he is currently under a sentence of death ... and ... [he] understand^] the “nature” of the punishment imposed upon him.
2. ... Shaw is cognizant [ ] his death sentence arises from a conviction of capital murder ... and ... [he] understand^] the “purpose” of the punishment imposed upon him.
3. ... [W]hile Shaw may suffer from certain mental deficiencies, his memory of past events is intact and he is capable of answering specific questions about [the] past events [] his attorney may determine relate to [the legal issues still viable in his case].
4. ... [B]ased upon all of the evidence presented, Shaw ... does not lack the capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment about to be imposed upon him....

Based on these findings, the state court concluded Shaw was mentally fit to be executed. In re Competency of Bobby Lewis Shaw, No. CV186-897CC, slip op. at 2-4 (Mo.Cir.Ct. Oct. 7, 1987), appeal dismissed, No. 69954 (Mo.Sup.Ct. Nov. 12, 1987).

On appeal, Shaw claims the eighth amendment categorically prohibits the execution of a brain damaged person like himself. We disagree. A condemned inmate’s mental faculties need not be unimpaired for the inmate to be declared fit for execution. Mental impairments exist in sufficiently varying degrees that an inmate may be brain damaged and still possess “the mental awareness required by the [e]ighth [a]mendment as a prerequisite to [the inmate’s] execution.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 419, 106 S.Ct. at 2606 (Powell, J., concurring).

Nevertheless, Shaw’s cerebral condition is central to an individualized determination whether death is an appropriate punishment for him. Under Ford v. Wainwright, the eighth amendment bars the execution only of those persons who are “ ‘unaware of the punishment they are *125 about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.’ ” Penry v. Lynaugh, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2954, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. at 2608 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); Smith v. Armontrout, 857 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam). Missouri law embraces the eighth amendment standard. Compare Mo.Rev.Stat. § 552.060.1 with Penry, 109 S.Ct. at 2954. Thus, Shaw’s mental condition must be measured by this standard.

Among the experts who presented reports and testified at Shaw’s competence hearing was a psychiatrist of Shaw’s own choosing. After examining Shaw, this psychiatrist prepared a report stating that Shaw exhibits “neuropsychological defects[ ] suggesting generalized cerebral impairment.” Legal File of Competency Proceeding at 53. The psychiatrist reported that Shaw’s “intellectual functioning correspond^] with his tested I.Q. in the borderline range [of nonretardation],” that “his abstract thinking appear[s] to be somewhat limited,” and that Shaw’s mood is depressed. Id. at 54. Shaw’s psychiatrist, however, identified no lack of mental awareness:

Mr. Shaw [is] in touch with reality-He [is] oriented to day, date, place, and person.
[The] [c]ontent of [Shaw’s] thought [does] not reveal any delusions, obsessions, phobias, bizarre ideas, or any psychotic features.
... [Shaw’s] short term and long term memory [is] ... average_ [He displays] adequate attention and short term memory. Simple calculations [are] done well.... Insight and judgment [are] well[ preserved....
Mr. Shaw is fully aware of the nature of the punishment about to be imposed upon him. He stated that he received the death penalty on a capital murder charge involving the death of a prison guard....
Mr. Shaw knows who his attorney is.... He stated that his case is on appeal in [f]ederal [c]ourt now and further stated[ ] “they have had pretty hard evidence on both cases, so I couldn’t beat the case and [the conviction] may not be overturned.”

Id. at 53-55.

Shaw’s psychiatrist repeated many of his conclusions at the competence hearing:

Q. What did you find with respect to Mr. Shaw’s memory [of] current and past events?
A. [His] [m]emory was reasonably well preserved.
Q. He was able to recall events, then, with reasonable accuracy?
A. As far as I could verify; yes, he was able to give me the details of his family history, his previous conviction, and also his trouble as a juvenile; and that kind of thing, yes, he was able to give me some details.

Transcript of Competency Proceeding at 109. Shaw’s psychiatrist also testified to Shaw’s understanding of his death sentence:

Mr. Shaw knows the type of punishment [that] will be imposed upon him to the point [] he knows [] it is the death penalty, and the reason why he received it; and, also, he knows [] death is fi-nal_ “[D]eath is final,[”] he said ... “when a person is dead he’s dead.” So he understands the finality of death.

Id. at 103.

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Bluebook (online)
900 F.2d 123, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 4536, 1990 WL 33453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bobby-lewis-shaw-v-bill-armontrout-warden-missouri-state-penitentiary-ca8-1990.