IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00401-CR
BOBBY JOE NICHOLS, JR., Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2016-986-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bobby Joe Nichols, Jr. appeals from a conviction for failure to register as a sex
offender for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison. Nichols complains that his
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, violated Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution's guarantee against
cruel or unusual punishment, and violated the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section
13 of the Texas Constitution's prohibition against unusual punishment because it was
grossly disproportionate. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This provision was made applicable to
the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 675, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962). The Texas Constitution
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishment be inflicted." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
In issues two and three, in addition to his complaints regarding the United States
Constitution, Nichols complains that his sentence violates the Texas Constitution which
should provide different protections than the United States Constitution due to the
difference in the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" contained in the Eighth
Amendment and "cruel or unusual punishment" contained in Article I, Section 13 of the
Texas Constitution. (emphasis added). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has
considered the distinction between "and" and "or" and determined that there is no
significant difference between protection against cruel "and" unusual punishment under
the United States Constitution and the protection against cruel "or" unusual punishment
under the Texas Constitution. Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Because we are required to follow established precedent of the Court of Criminal
Appeals, we cannot say that the Texas Constitution provides any additional protections
on this basis. We will therefore consider Nichols's issues pursuant to the same standards
in the two constitutions.
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 2 When a sentence falls within the range of punishment provided by the legislature,
it is generally not grossly disproportionate to the offense committed. State v. Simpson, 488
S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Here, Nichols concedes that his ten year sentence
is within the statutory range of punishment for the offense of which he was convicted.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 (punishment for third degree felony is two to ten years'
imprisonment); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 62.102(b)(2) (offense is third degree
felony).
However, even if a sentence falls within the statutory punishment range, the
sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment if the sentence is grossly disproportionate
to the offense or to sentences in other similar offenses. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
289-90, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). To determine whether a sentence for a
term of years is grossly disproportionate for a particular defendant's crime, we consider
the severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the
culpability of the offender, and the offender's prior adjudicated and unadjudicated
offenses. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010); McGruder v. Puckett, 954
F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Supreme Court's holding in Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991), modified the gross-
disproportionality test previously set out in Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed.
2d 637 (1983)). In the rare case in which this analysis leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality, we compare the defendant's sentence with the sentences received by
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 3 other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60. If this comparative analysis confirms
that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual. Id.
As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint regarding gross disproportionality for
appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court
either by objection or through a motion for new trial, and the trial court either ruled
against or refused to rule on the complaint. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Nichols filed a motion
for new trial in which he called to the attention of the trial court that he challenged the
sentence assessed against him, specifically alleging that the sentence created a violation
of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and was also a violation of the prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment as set forth in Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas
Constitution. Nichols claimed the penalty which he was assessed is grossly
disproportionate to the conduct which precipitated the charge, which was the failure to
register as a sex offender because his business address had changed to his personal
residence when he began working from home. His home address was already registered
as his home address and did not change. Nichols contends that there was no evidence
presented of additional offenses committed by him because he denied each contention
when asked by the State regarding pending allegations of criminal conduct against him.
Nichols argues that when weighing the severity of the sentence in light of the harm
caused or threatened in what is in essence, a "technical and harmless" crime, the sentence
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 4 of the maximum punishment allowed is grossly disproportionate.
In an effort to comply with the second and third prongs of the tests in Solem and
Harmelin, Nichols has provided us with what he represents to be the statutes and ranges
of punishment for the forty-nine other states which would be the equivalent or rough
equivalent of the punishment range for the level of registration in Texas's offense of
failure to register as a sex offender. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 62.102(b)(2). It is
pointed out in Nichols's brief that eight other states have statutes which impose penalties
which are the same or more severe than Texas. However, the range of statutory penalties
of the various states is not one of the measures under the three-pronged test mentioned
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00401-CR
BOBBY JOE NICHOLS, JR., Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2016-986-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bobby Joe Nichols, Jr. appeals from a conviction for failure to register as a sex
offender for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison. Nichols complains that his
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, violated Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution's guarantee against
cruel or unusual punishment, and violated the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section
13 of the Texas Constitution's prohibition against unusual punishment because it was
grossly disproportionate. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This provision was made applicable to
the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 675, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962). The Texas Constitution
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or
unusual punishment be inflicted." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
In issues two and three, in addition to his complaints regarding the United States
Constitution, Nichols complains that his sentence violates the Texas Constitution which
should provide different protections than the United States Constitution due to the
difference in the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" contained in the Eighth
Amendment and "cruel or unusual punishment" contained in Article I, Section 13 of the
Texas Constitution. (emphasis added). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has
considered the distinction between "and" and "or" and determined that there is no
significant difference between protection against cruel "and" unusual punishment under
the United States Constitution and the protection against cruel "or" unusual punishment
under the Texas Constitution. Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Because we are required to follow established precedent of the Court of Criminal
Appeals, we cannot say that the Texas Constitution provides any additional protections
on this basis. We will therefore consider Nichols's issues pursuant to the same standards
in the two constitutions.
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 2 When a sentence falls within the range of punishment provided by the legislature,
it is generally not grossly disproportionate to the offense committed. State v. Simpson, 488
S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Here, Nichols concedes that his ten year sentence
is within the statutory range of punishment for the offense of which he was convicted.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 (punishment for third degree felony is two to ten years'
imprisonment); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 62.102(b)(2) (offense is third degree
felony).
However, even if a sentence falls within the statutory punishment range, the
sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment if the sentence is grossly disproportionate
to the offense or to sentences in other similar offenses. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
289-90, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). To determine whether a sentence for a
term of years is grossly disproportionate for a particular defendant's crime, we consider
the severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the
culpability of the offender, and the offender's prior adjudicated and unadjudicated
offenses. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010); McGruder v. Puckett, 954
F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Supreme Court's holding in Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991), modified the gross-
disproportionality test previously set out in Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed.
2d 637 (1983)). In the rare case in which this analysis leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality, we compare the defendant's sentence with the sentences received by
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 3 other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60. If this comparative analysis confirms
that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual. Id.
As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint regarding gross disproportionality for
appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court
either by objection or through a motion for new trial, and the trial court either ruled
against or refused to rule on the complaint. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Nichols filed a motion
for new trial in which he called to the attention of the trial court that he challenged the
sentence assessed against him, specifically alleging that the sentence created a violation
of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and was also a violation of the prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment as set forth in Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas
Constitution. Nichols claimed the penalty which he was assessed is grossly
disproportionate to the conduct which precipitated the charge, which was the failure to
register as a sex offender because his business address had changed to his personal
residence when he began working from home. His home address was already registered
as his home address and did not change. Nichols contends that there was no evidence
presented of additional offenses committed by him because he denied each contention
when asked by the State regarding pending allegations of criminal conduct against him.
Nichols argues that when weighing the severity of the sentence in light of the harm
caused or threatened in what is in essence, a "technical and harmless" crime, the sentence
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 4 of the maximum punishment allowed is grossly disproportionate.
In an effort to comply with the second and third prongs of the tests in Solem and
Harmelin, Nichols has provided us with what he represents to be the statutes and ranges
of punishment for the forty-nine other states which would be the equivalent or rough
equivalent of the punishment range for the level of registration in Texas's offense of
failure to register as a sex offender. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 62.102(b)(2). It is
pointed out in Nichols's brief that eight other states have statutes which impose penalties
which are the same or more severe than Texas. However, the range of statutory penalties
of the various states is not one of the measures under the three-pronged test mentioned
in Solem and Harmelin; the test, rather, is the range of sentences which are actually
assessed. No proof of the sentences that even might potentially be actually assessed has
been provided.
Additionally, when a claim of this nature has not been presented to the trial court,
the trial court has had no opportunity to examine its ruling in light of the claim of
disproportionality. Nichols did file a motion for new trial which raises the issue of
disproportionate sentencing. However, at the hearing on that motion, no evidence or
argument was presented which would go toward satisfaction of the tests which must be
met under Solem and Harmelin. The trial court was not presented with the extensive list
of statutes from across the nation as presented to this Court to aid it in ruling on this issue
once it was raised. Even if we were to conclude that the threshold factor in Solem and
Harmelin should be resolved in Nichols's favor, because he failed to proffer evidence to
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 5 the trial court with his motion for new trial showing sentences for failure to register as a
sex offender in this or other jurisdictions involving defendants with a criminal history
similar to his, Nichols failed to carry his burden to show that his ten-year sentence was a
grossly disproportionate sentence that was unconstitutional. See Hammer v. State, 461
S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.).
The trial court must be given the opportunity to rule on the issues and should be
accorded the opportunity to be informed prior to making its decision. When the trial
court has not been presented the evidence upon which to rule, even if the burden had
been met at this level to show the imposition of a disproportionate sentence, this claim
has not been adequately preserved for appeal. See Pantoja v. State, 496 S.W.3d 186, 193
n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd). Nichols's issue regarding disproportionate
sentencing is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
TOM GRAY Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Neill Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed October 9, 2019 Do not publish [CR25]
Nichols, Jr. v. State Page 6