FILED COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ji.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASA6 DIVISION II Y
BOBBI WOODWARD, as Personal Representative of the Estate of JOHANNA ELLWANGER, deceased, Appellant, No. 42757 5 II - -
V. ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO EXTEND TIME AND TO PUBLISH OPINION
HECTOR LOPEZ and NITA L.LOPEZ,. and the marital community composed thereof, TRENT DALE HERBERT and MICHELLE LEE HERBERT, and the marital community composed thereof, and NEDA J. HERBERT, a single woman,
THIS MATTER came before the court on the motions of a third parry requesting an
extension of time to file a motion to publish and requesting publication of the opinion filed in this
court on February 26, 2013. Neither party filed a response objecting to the publication.
Upon consideration of the motion, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for extension of time to file a motion to publish is granted. It is.
further
ORDERED that the final paragraph, reading " majority of the panel having determined A
that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public
record pursuant to RCW 2.6.it is so ordered. ", deleted. It is further 040, 0 is Order No. 42757 5 II — - - Granting Motions Page,Two
ORDERED that the opinion will be published.
It is SO ORDERED.
DATED this / day of Li 2013.
Neil H. Robblee PO Box 1329 Edmonds, WA 98020 1329 -
Matthew D.Mills Joseph P. Tall 2013 Harkins Street 2611 NE 113th Street, suite 300 Bremerton, WA 98310 Seattle, WA 98125 6700 - FILED. OURT OF APPEALS DIVIS10h
2013 FE6 26 AMP 23 STAT OF IYASEi.WGTON I BY OEP Y
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
BOBBI WOODWARD, as Personal Representative of the Estate of JOHANNA ELLWANGER, deceased, Appellant, No. 42757 5 II - -
V.
HECTOR LOPEZ and NITA L.LOPEZ, and UNPUBLISHED OPINION the marital community composed thereof; TRENT DALE HERBERT and MICHELLE LEE HERBERT, and the marital community composed thereof; and NEDA J.HERBERT, a single woman, Respondents.
VAN DEREN, J. —Bobbi Woodward, as personal representative of the Johanna Ellwanger
estate, appeals the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Hector and Nita Lopez, Trent and Michelle Herbert, and. eda Herbert (collectively the Lopezes).The trial N court held that no genuine issue of material fact remained and as a matter of law ( 1)express
easement on the Lopez property does not benefit Ellwanger's short subdivision plat ( P)432 S
lots, 2) implied easement exists on the Lopez property for the benefit of Ellwanger's SP 432 ( no lots, and (3) Ellwanger is not entitled to a private way of necessity through the Lopez property to access her SP 432 lots. Ellwanger also appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for
reconsideration of its summary judgment order. We affirm the trial court's order granting
1 For clarity,we refer to the appellant as Ellwanger throughout the opinion. No.42757 5 II - -
summary judgment dismissal of Ellwanger's claim of an express easement. But we hold that
Ellwanger produced evidence raising genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment on the existence of an implied.easement and private way of necessity. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of summary judgment on those issues and remand for trial.
FACTS
The parties' dispute arises from their respective interests in land that sits between State Route 16 and Bethel- Burley Road in Kitsap County, Washington. All the land at issue iii this
case was once owned by Florence Ford. In 1946, Ford conveyed a parcel of that land to a third
party, which conveyance separated her remaining land into a north and south parcel. Ford excepted a 30 foot wide strip of land running along the eastern portion of the conveyed property that connects Ford's remaining parcels to the north and south. Neda Herbert owns the parcel
Ford conveyed in 1946. In 1977, Ford subdivided her two remaining parcels under Kitsap County short
subdivision applications 431 and 432. Each short subdivision resulted in four lots:A,B,C,and a SP 431north of theHerbert property;and SP4321ies southof the Herbertproperty. -
A,B,and C of SP 431 are rectangular in shape and abut SR 16 to the east and abut Lot D to the west. Lot D abuts Bethel -Burley Road to the west, Olympic Drive to the northwest and lots A,
B,and C to the east. All of the SP 432 lots are rectangular in shape and abut SR 16 to the east
and Bethel -Burley Road to the west.
Each subdivision application included legal descriptions of the lots and a sketch of the
subdivision. The application required legal descriptions that included reference to ingress or
2 We refer to this parcel as.he Herbert parcel. The Herberts purchased the property in 1964 from t Guy and Violet Coen.
2 No. 42757 5 II - -
egress for all proposed parcels not having street frontage. The legal description of each of the lots in SP 431 stated that the lot is " t] with and [ ogether subject to easements per sketch. ".Clerk' s
Papers (CP)at 88. The included sketch depicted a 60 foot wide easement along the east boundary of lots A,B,and C of SP 431.
The subdivision application for SP 432 did not mention or depict any easement. Neither
the legal description ofthe lots nor the sketch included an easement benefitting or burdening any of the SP 432 lots. But a 1995 survey conducted for the Ford estate depicted the 60 foot
easement through SP 431 ' lots A,B,and C and noted that the easement was for the benefit of lots '
A,B,and C of SP 431,and was to benefit all of the SP 432 lots.
When Herbert purchased her property in the mid to late 1960s,the northern and southern
boundaries of the property were fenced 3 In 1996, Hector and Nita Lopez purchased lot C of SP . 431, which lot adjoins the north side of the Herbert property. According to Herbert's deposition testimony, in 1998, a logging company clearing lot A in SP 432 knocked down the barbed wire
fences that ran along the north and south boundaries of the Herbert property and put in a road Within the 30 footwide strip of land refainedand theroadacid utilityeaseinent the -- - -
east 60 feet of. A,B,and C of SP. 31 lots 4
In 2007,Ellwanger obtained title to all of the lots in SP 432, lots B and D of SP 431, and
the 30 foot wide strip retained by Ford in 1946. Ellwanger began to develop her SP 432
properties, but the Lopezes resisted when Ellwanger attempted to lay utility lines within the 30
foot wide strip and the 60 foot easement running through the Lopez property. Ellwanger sued
the Lopezes, seeking (1) quiet title in the 30 foot wide strip; 2) declaration that her to ( a
3 The date of Herbert's purchase is referred to as 1964 and as 1969. 4 We refer to lot C of SP 431 as the Lopez property. 3 No.42757 5 II - -
properties are dominant estates entitled to use the 60 foot easement through the Lopez property
for ingress, egress, and utilities; and (3) money damages, fees, and costs.
The Lopezes moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that no material fact is in
dispute and that as a matter of law: 1) express easement on the Lopez property does not ( the benefit the SP 432 lots, 2) easement by implication exists on the Lopez property in favor of ( no
the SP 432 lots, and ( ) 3 Ellwanger is not entitled to a private way of necessity through the Lopez
property for the benefit of her SP 432 lots. Ellwanger asserted that genuine issues of material
fact remain about whether an implied easement exists on the Lopez property benefitting
Ellwanger's SP 432 lots and whether the access to Ellwanger's SP 432 lots through the Lopez property is necessary.
Ellwanger produced a declaration of Frederick A.Kegel, a professional engineer and land
surveyor,who met Ford sometime around 1978 to 1980. Kegel declared that " ord intended to F
create an easement all the way across SP 431 in order to maintain her right and the right of her
heirs, successors and assigns, to grant further easement to her or assigned properties to the South
foofstrip. " CP at44. - viathe30" 432) - SP" "" Healsodeclaredthat Ford accessed horproperties - - - - via
the road within the 30 foot wide strip. Kegel stated:
The extension of a 60 foot wide access and utility easement across the full width of SP 431 is not a normal procedure unless the subdivider has the intent to extend access to adjoining properties, whether they own them or not.. Based upon this fact, it is my opinion that ... Ford was well aware of the access problems to Lots - A,' C, and D of SP 432 which the swamp . alongside Bethel -Burley Road B, presented. Therefore, it would be prudent of her to keep her options open to access SP 432 across SP 431.
CP at 44.
Ellwanger also provided a declaration from wetland expert Vaughn Everitt. Everitt
declared that the west side of each of the SP 432 lots between the potential building sites and the
rd No. 42757 5 II - -
Bethel -Burley Road is wetland. He explained that there are no existing roads to the SP 432 lots, so wetland fill and mitigation would be necessary to gain access from the Bethel- Burley Road.
Everitt opined that because wetland mitigation typically costs $ 000 an acre, it would be 200,
prohibitively expens[i] ve" to construct a road and lay utilities across the wetlands. CP at 38. Thus, he reasoned that the only reasonable access to the SP 432 lots is along the road within the
30 foot wide strip and the easement the Lopez property.
The trial court granted the Lopezes' motion for partial summary judgment. Ellwanger
unsuccessfully sought reconsideration.
ANALYSIS
Ellwanger argues that summary judgment was improper and that the trial court erred in
denying her motion for reconsideration because several genuine issues of material fact remain
regarding whether an implied easement exists and whether she is entitled to a private way of
necessity through the Lopez property. We agree. Because we reverse the trial court's summary
Ellwanger'complaintasserted access to her property wasalso allowed through an express -- - -- - - - -§ easement. The Lopezes moved for summary judgment arguing that as a matter of law the express easement on the Lopez property did not benefit Ellwanger's SP 432 lots. Ellwanger did not brief or argue the express easement theory in response to the Lopezes' motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Lopezes' summary judgment motion, which included that no express easement existed for the benefit of Ellwanger's SP 432 properties. Ellwanger sought reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment decision, but again, did not brief or argue the express easement theory. On appeal, Ellwanger assigns error to the entirety of the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, which includes the dismissal of Ellwanger's express easement claim. But Ellwanger does not argue, cite to the record, or cite.uthority supporting an a assignment of error to the trial court's order granting summary judgment on the issue of whether the express easement on the Lopez property benefits the SP 432 lots. Accordingly,we do not address the initial claim of express easement, which appears abandoned. See State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 868 69,83 P. d 970 (2004), - 3 abrogated in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. . 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. .177 (2004); also Howell v. Spokane & S 2d E see Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wn. d 619, 624, 818 P. d 1056 (199 1)assignment of error 2 2 ( unsupported by legal argument will not be considered on appeal); State v. Dennison, 115 Wn. d 2 609, 629, 801 P. d.1990)stating that the court need not consider arguments that are not. 193 ( 2 ( 5 No.42757 5 II - -
judgment order and remand for trial on the issues of implied easement and private way of
necessity, we do not reach the trial court's denial of Ellwanger's reconsideration motion. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's order for summary judgment de novo., performing the same
inquiry as the trial court. Ruvalcaba v. KwangHo Baek, 175 Wn. d 1, 6,282 P. d 1083 (2012). 2 3
Summary judgment is appropriate `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving parry is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "' Visser
v. Craig; 139 Wn.App. 152, 157, 159 P. d 453 (2007)quoting CR 56( )). 3 ( c
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Atherton Condo, Apartment-Owners Ass'n Bd. ofDirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115
Wn. d 506, 516, 799 P. d 250 (1990).After the moving party submits adequate affidavits,the 2 2 "`
nonmoving parry must set forth specific facts which sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and disclose the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact. "' Visser, 139 Wn.
App at T58quoting1Vleyerv. Univ.of Wash.;105Wn. 847, 852; 19 98 Tfthe - - - - -- - ' - ( - - d - P: ci 2 7 " nonmoving party fails to do so,then summary judgment is proper."Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn. d 16,26, 109 P. d 805 (2005). 2 3
We consider all evidence submitted and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. McPhaden v. Scott, 95 Wn. App. 431, 434, 975
P. d 1033 '1999).But a nonmoving party "` 2 ( may not rely on speculation [or on] argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain. "' Visser, 139 Wn. App. at 158 (alteration in
developed in the briefs and for.which a party has not cited authority); RAP 10.3 a)( appellate ( 6) ( brief should contain argument supporting issues presented for review, citations to legal authority, and references to relevant parts of the record). - 6 No. 42757 5 II - -
original)quoting Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., Wn. d 1, 13,721 P. d 1 ( 106 2 2
1986)). expert opinion on an ultimate issue of fact is sufficient to preclude summary An -
judgment. Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wn. d 451,457, 824 P. d 1207 (1992); 2 2 Lamon v.McDonnell Douglas Corp., Wn. d 345, 352, 588 P. d 1346 (1979).In the context of a summary 91 2 2 "
judgment motion, an expert must support his opinion with specific facts, and a court will
disregard expert opinions where the factual basis for the opinion is found to be inadequate." Rothweiler v. Clark County, 108 Wn. App. 91, 100, 29 P. d 758 (2001).A fact is an event, an 3 "
occurrence, or something that exists in reality. It is what took place, an act, an incident, a reality
as 'distinguished from supposition or opinion."Grimwood v. Univ. ofPuget Sound, Inc., 110
Wn. d 355, 359, 753 P. d 517 (1988)internal citation omitted). 2 2 (
II. EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION
Ellwanger argues that issues of material fact remain as to whether an easement by
implication exists through the Lopez property for ingress, egress, and utilities for the benefit of
the SP 432 lots and,thus,the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on this issue. We
agree. - -- - -- - -- - - - - - -- - - - - --
Easements by implication arise by intent of the parties,. which is shown by facts and
circumstances surrounding the conveyance."Roberts v. Smith, 41 Wn.App. 861, 864, 707 P. d 2 The factors relevant to 143 (1985). " establishing an implied easement ... are ( ) 1 former unity of
title and subsequent separation; 2) apparent and continuous quasi-easement for the ( prior benefit of one part of the estate to the detriment of another; and (3) certain degree of necessity a
6" A quasi -easement' refers to the situation where one portion of property is burdened for the ` benefit of another portion, which would be a legal easement if different persons owned the two portions of property."McPhaden, 95 Wn. App. at 437 n. (citing Adams v. Cullen, 44 Wn. d 3 2 502, 504, 268 P. d 451 (1954)). 2 7 No. 42757 5 II - -
for the continuation of the easement."McPhaden, 95 Wn. App. at 437 (footnote omitted).
Unity of title and subsequent separation is an absolute requirement. "' Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep
Co., Wn. d 664, 668,404 P. d 770 (1965)quoting Adams v. Cullen,44 Wn. d 502, 505, 268 66 2 2 ( 2
P. d 451 (1954)); 2 Roberts, 41 Wn. App. at 865. But presence or absence of the second and third factors is not conclusive. Hellberg, 66 Wn. d at 668;Roberts.,41 Wn.App. at 865. " ather, 2 R
they are aids to determining the presumed intent of the parties as disclosed by the extent and character of the use, the nature ofthe property, and the relation of the separated parts to each
other."McPhaden, 95 Wn.App. at 437. -
Absolute necessity is not required to establish an implied easement. Evich v. Kovacevich,
33 Wn. d 151, 157 58,204 P. d 839 (1949).The test of necessity is whether the parry 2 - 2 "
claiming the right can, at reasonable cost, on his own estate, and without trespassing on his
neighbors, create a substitute."Bays v. Haven, 55 Wn.App. 324, 329,777 P. d 562 (1989). 2
Although prior use is a circumstance contributing to the implication of an easement, if the land cannot be used without the easement without disproportionate expense, an easement may be
implied on the basisof Necessity alone: Fossurri OYChads v:Pugsley 77 Wn:App: - 447451 ' ---- --
892 P. d 1095 (1995)citing Adams, 44 Wn. d at 507 09). 2 ( 2 -
Here it is undisputed that Ford owned all of the property comprising SP 432 and SP 431,
which includes the Ellwanger and Lopez properties. The parties agree that the properties at issue
had unity of title and were subsequently separated. But, the parties disagree about whether there was reasonable necessity and apparent and continuous use of the Lopez property for the benefit
of the SP 432 lots. On appeal from summary judgment dismissal,the parties' dispute is whether
genuine issues of material fact remain related to the apparent and continuous use and reasonably necessity factors.
8 No.42757 5 II - -
To show lack of apparent and continuous use of the Lopez property to benefit the SP 432
lots,the Lopezes submitted deposition testimony from Herbert stating that the north and south
boundaries of the Herbert parcel, including both.ends of the 30 foot wide strip, had been fenced
in by barbed wire from 1964 until 1998. Hector Lopez testified in his deposition that his
property was fenced along the southern boundary when he purchased it in 1996. Ellwanger submitted a declaration from Kegel stating that although the SP 432 lots abut Bethel- Burley
Road, Ford continued to access those properties from the north by way of the 30 foot wide strip
that connects the Lopez property to the SP 432 lots. Kegel stated that he met Ford sometime
around 1978 to 1980. Kegel also declared that in 1997 he observed an existing roadbed and
fence gates at each end of the 30 foot wide strip.
To rebut Kegel's declaration, the Lopezes submitted a private water agreement between
the owners of SP 431 lots A and C ( opez property)dated 1979 and the sales history from the L
Kitsap County auditor's office showing that the Lopez property was sold in 1977. The Lopezes
argue that these documents show that Ford did not own the Lopez property at the time Kegel knew Fordand, -Ls_' th - Kegel cannot offer testimony regarding the useofthe alleged quasi=
easement during unity of title. But the record does not show that the Lopezes moved to clarify or,
to strike any part of Kegel's declaration as lacking personal knowledge,therefore any deficiency alleged on appeal is waived. See Lamon, 91 Wn. d at 352. On this record, we cannot determine 2 whether Kegel's declaration is deficient, and we must view the facts and reasonable inferences
therein in the light most favorable to Ellwanger. Kegel's declaration and Herbert and Lopez's
deposition testimony create a material factual dispute regarding the nature of Ford's use of the .
Lopez property to access her SP 432 lots.
9 No. 42757 5 II - -
To show that an easement through the Lopez property is not reasonably necessary,the
Lopezes point to undisputed evidence that all of the SP 432 lots abut Bethel -Burley Road; thus, ingress, egress, and utility access for the SP 432 lots are available by way of Bethel -Burley Road..The Lopezes argue that mere convenience and economy do not demonstrate the requisite necessity for an easement by implication through the Lopez property.
Ellwanger provided a declaration from wetlands expert Everitt. Everitt declared that wetland occupies the west side of each of the SP 432 lots between the building sites and Bethel- Burley Road. He said that the SP 432 lots have only two means of access, either'over the " presently existing 60 foot easement across the Lopez property and 30 foot road across the Herbert property, or over and through the wetlands." CP at 35. Everitt explained that local, state, and federal law requires exhaustion of all other options before wetland fill is permitted. If
wetland fill is required,it must be minimized and a plan to mitigate the impact and compensate for the wetland fill must be submitted and approved by local, state, and federal agencies. Everitt
estimated that the typical cost of wetland mitigation is $ 00, 00 an acre. Based on those facts, 2 0 he oP inedthat " [] i t would be "rohibitivelY pPens iv e 16'struct a road aricl laY utilities - - - p - ex [ ] -
the wetlands, which must be done unless access is obtained across the Lopez property.easement
and 30 foot road."CP at 38. He further declared that in his expert opinion, T] e only "[ h
reasonable access to the subject properties is over the 30 foot road that crosses the Herbert
property and the easement that crosses the Lopez property."CP at 35. The Lopezes argue that Everitt's expert testimony does not create a material issue of fact
because it is conclusory and lacks- n estimate of actual costs that would be incurred by a
Ellwanger to create access to Bethel -Burley Road across the wetlands. But in this case, Everitt's
10 No. 42757 5 II - -
expert opinion is sufficiently supported by his explanation of the wetlands on the SP 432 lots and
the practical and legal problems of gaining access to the SP 432 lots through those wetlands. Viewing the declarations of Kegel and Everitt in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party,they raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the parties' intent, prior
use, and reasonable necessity of gaining access to the SP 432 lots through the Lopez property.
Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Lopezes on
Ellwanger's claim of an implied easement.
III: CONDEMNATION OF A PRIVATE WAY OF NECESSITY
Ellwanger also argues that summary judgment should not have been granted because an
issue of material fact remains as to whether she is entitled to condemn a private way of necessity '
through the Lopez property to benefit her SP 432 lots, We agree.
RCW 8.4:authorizes a landowner to condemn a private way of necessity over the 010 2
land of another if it is necessary for proper use and enjoyment of his land 7 The landowner's . necessity need not be absolute. Beeson v. Phillips, 41 Wn.App. 183, 187, 702 P. d 1244 (1985). 2 Butit mustbe reasonablynecessary under the facts ofthe case;as distiriguishe - oninnere y
convenient or advantageous. "' Ruvalcaba, 175 Wn. d at 7 (citation omitted in original)quoting 2 (
7 RCW 8.4.states: 010 2 An owner ... of land which is so situate with respect to the land of another that it is necessary for its proper use and enjoyment to have and maintain a private way of necessity or to construct and maintain any drain, flumeor ditch, on, across, over or through the land of such other ... may condemn and take lands' of such other sufficient in area for the construction and maintenance of such private way of necessity, or for the construction and maintenance of such drain, flume or ditch, as the case private way of necessity" may be. The term " ... include[s]right of way a on, across, over or through the land of another for means of ingress and egress, and the construction and maintenance thereon of roads, logging roads, flumes, canals, ditches, tunnels, tramways and other structures upon, over and through. 11 No.42757 5 II - -
Brown v. McAnally, 97 Wn. d 360, 367, 644 P. d 1153 (1982)). "'[e condemnor has the 2 2 T] h
burden of proving the reasonable necessity for a private way of necessity, including the absence of alternatives. "' Ruvalcaba, 175 Wn. d at 7 (quoting Noble v. Safe Harbor Family Pres. Trust, 2
167 Wn. d 11,. 216 P. d 1007 ( 009)). 2 17, 3 2
The parties do not dispute that each of the SP 432 lots abuts Bethel -Burley Road. Based on this apparent access to Bethel -Burley Road,the Lopezes argue that Ellwanger does not need a
private way of necessity through the Lopez property. The Lopezes further argue that summary
judgment on this issue was proper because Ellwanger did not submit evidence ofthe quantitative
cost to access the lots by way of Bethel- Burley Road or the reasonableness of that access. We
disagree.
Ellwanger produced evidence that created a material factual dispute regarding the
feasibility of accessing the SP 432 lots by way of Bethel- Burley Road and the need to access the
lots through the Lopez property. As we discussed above, Ellwanger's wetlands expert, Everitt,.
declared that the building sites on the SP 432 lots are separated from the Bethel- Burley Road by
wetland" - - - tliaftlze onlyreasonable d access:for ingress; egress, - utilities is through the - -- " ancl " -
Lopez property to the north. Everitt described the requirements and process for gaining access to
the SP 432 lots across the wetlands and opined that it would be prohibitively expensive. Once
again, Everitt's expert opinion raises genuine issues of material fact regarding feasibility and
reasonable necessity of access through the.Lopez property.
Considering the evidence and reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to Ellwanger, we hold that Ellwanger has demonstrated genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
require trial on whether an implied easement exists through the Lopez property for the benefit of
the SP 432 lots and whether Ellwanger is entitled to condemn a private way of necessity through
12 No. 42757 5 II - -
the Lopez properly.. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of the Lopezes - the issues relating to the existence of an implied easement and a private way of on necessity, and we remand for trial on those claims. But we affirm the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing the express easement claim. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.6.it is 040, 0 so ordered.
VAN DEREN, J. We concur:
a/ - k INN- BRINTNALL, J.
ill w 0A WORSWICK, Cl