The plaintiff, Bobbi Jo Bridges, appeals a trial court judgment in favor of her
ex-husband, Ryan Casey Bridges, denying her request to relocate the principal
residence of their children to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. Finding no abuse
of the trial court's vast discretion with regard to such matters, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
The parties were married on March 24, 2000 in St. Tammany Parish and
thereafter established their matrimonial domicile in St. Tammany Parish. Of their
marriage, three children were born: K.G.B., born April 21, 2001 (who is now a
major); J.R.B, born October 9, 2008; and G.P.B., born February 6, 2010. On June
26, 2015, Ms. Bridges filed a petition seeking a divorce and the determination of
other incidental matters, including custody of the children, in St. Tammany Parish.
The parties were ultimately divorced on October 17, 2016. On November 5, 2018,
the parties entered into a consent judgment regarding child custody and a joint
custody implementation plan. Therein, Ms. Bridges was awarded primary custody
and domiciliary parent designation of K.G.B.; the parties were awarded shared
physical custody of J.R.B. and G.P.B on a seven-day/seven-day schedule; Mr.
Bridges was designated as the domiciliary parent of J.R.B and G.P.B. as to their
educational and extracurricular activities; and Ms. Bridges was designated as the
domiciliary parent of J.R.B. and G.P.B. as to their medical care.
On May 14, 2019, Ms. Bridges sent, via certified mail, a letter notifying Mr.
Bridges of a potential relocation of the residence of the minor children J.R.B and
G.P.B. from St. Tammany Parish to Dubai. Thereafter, in June 2019, Ms. Bridges
filed a motion seeking the court's approval to relocate the residence of J.R.B. and
2 G.P.B. with her to Dubai. 1 Therein, Ms. Bridges stated that she had notified Mr.
Bridges of the proposed relocation of the minor children's residence, but that Mr.
Bridges had refused to give his express written consent, and therefore a
contradictory hearing on the relocation was necessary. Ms. Bridges alleged in her
motion that the proposed relocation was in good faith because it was based on an
employment/career opportunity for her with financial enhancement and that it was
in the best interest of the children because of the enhanced educational and
extracurricular opportunities available to the children in Dubai. Ms. Bridges
further alleged that there had been a change in circumstances materially affecting
the welfare of the children since the rendition of the November 5, 2018 stipulated
judgment of custody such that a modification of custody was warranted. In this
regard, Ms. Bridges pointed to disagreements between the parties concerning the
children's health, education, and extracurricular activities; the parties' inability to
communicate; and the amount of time the children spend with their paternal
grandparents during Mr. Bridges' custodial time. Therefore, Ms. Bridges
requested that the trial court approve her request to relocate the minor children's
residence to Dubai and to modify the parties' current custodial arrangement to
accommodate that relocation.
A hearing on the matter was initially scheduled for August 28, 2019.
However, on August 29, 2019 a "Special Setting Case Management Schedule" was
issued by the trial court, setting the trial of the matter for September 30, 2019. The
case management schedule specifically provided that "[ eJach party [would] have
approximately two hours to present their case and/or cross examine their
opponent's witnesses." The trial of the matter was then held on September 30,
2019, and at the conclusion of evidence, the trial court took the matter under
advisement. On October 10, 2019, the trial court issued oral reasons for judgment, 1 Ms. Bridges asserted that the major child, K.G.B., planned to relocate with her to Dubai.
3 finding that Ms. Bridges met her burden of proving that her request to relocate the
minor children's residence to Dubai was made in good faith; however, considering
the factors set forth in La. R.S. 9:355.14(A), the trial court found that Ms. Bridges
failed to meet her burden of proving that the relocation was in the children's best
interest. Therefore, the trial court denied and dismissed Ms. Bridge's request to
relocate the residence of the minor children to Dubai. Since Ms. Bridges had
already moved to Dubai, the trial court noted that the parties' current custodial
arrangement was now unworkable, and therefore, requested that the parties confect
a new custodial plan, and if they were unable to do so, to re-set the matter for a
hearing.
Pursuant to judgment signed on November 14, 2019, the trial court denied
and dismissed Ms. Bridges' request to relocate the children's residence. The trial
court also ordered that Ms. Bridges would have periods of physical custody of the
children in Dubai for extended periods when school was not in session and when
she was in St. Tammany Parish. From this judgment, Ms. Bridges has appealed.
On appeal, Ms. Bridges contends that: (1) the trial court erred in imposing a two-
hour time limit per side for the presentation of evidence in violation of the United
States and Louisiana Constitutions; (2) she suffered prejudice because of the
inability to call and proffer the testimony of all of her witnesses; (3) the trial court
erred in "taking judicial notice of' the alleged crime and unrest in the Middle East
without taking evidence on the issue; (4) the trial court erred in considering its own
"personal family reflections" in its findings of fact; (5) the trial court failed to
"review and/or accept" the mandated factors for the relocation of a child's
residence, as set forth in La. R.S. 9:355.14; and (6) the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to set out a definite time period for visitation in favor of Ms.
Bridges.
4 LAW AND DISCUSSION
Manner of Trial (Assignment of Error Numbers 1 & 2)
Ms. Bridges assigns as error that the trial court inappropriately limited the
time of trial to two hours and refused to permit her to call and proffer the testimony
of all of her witnesses. She claims that the two-hour time frame was arbitrary and
unreasonable, prejudicial, and a denial of her constitutional rights to due process
and access to court.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 163 l(A) provides that the "court
has the power to require that the proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and
in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to control the proceedings at the trial, so
that justice is done." Additionally, La. C.C.P. art. 1632 provides for the normal
order of trial, but expressly permits the trial court to vary the order "when
circumstances so justify." It is only upon a showing of a gross abuse of discretion
that appellate courts have intervened, as the trial judge has great discretion in
conducting a trial. Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen v. Carlton, 2012-0775
(La. App. pt Cir. 12/21112), 111So.3d1076, 1081.
On appeal, Ms. Bridges contends that the trial court-in imposing the time
limitations that it did-failed to follow the guidelines set forth in Goodwin v.
Goodwin, 618 So.2d 579, 583-84 (La. App. 2nct Cir.), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1340
(La. 1993), and Plaia v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc., 2014-0159 (La. App. 4th Cir.
10/26/16), 229 So.3d 480, 490-91, writs denied, 2016-2264, 2016-2261, and 2016-
2258 (La. 2/3/17), 215 So.3d 692, 698, and 699.
In Goodwin, 618 So.2d at 583, the court set forth that while the due process
clauses of the Louisiana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantee litigants rights to a fair hearing, "due process" does
not mean that litigants are entitled to an unlimited amount of the court's time. The
5 court noted that with today's overcrowded dockets, some trial judges, seeking to
cut down the length of trials in cases pending before them, have imposed time
limits on litigants for the presentation of evidence. Id. The court recognized that
litigants still have a right to present all of their relevant, non-cumulative evidence,
provided the probative value is not outweighed by undue delay and wasting the
court's time. Id. The court then adopted the five following non-exclusive factors
that should be considered in determining whether the trial court denied a party its
due process rights and exceeded the authority granted by statute: (1) before
imposing time limitations in a case, the trial judge should be thoroughly familiar,
through pretrial proceedings, with the claims of the parties, the proposed testimony
and number of witnesses, and the documentary evidence to be presented; (2) if
they are used, time limits should be imposed on all parties, before any party
presents any evidence, and sufficiently in advance of trial for the litigants to
prepare for trial within the limits imposed; (3) the trial judge should inform the
parties before the trial begins that reasonable extensions of the time limits will be
granted for good cause shown; (4) the trial judge should develop an equitable
method of charging time against each litigant's time limits; and (5) the trial judge
should put all of his rulings regarding time limits and the reasons for the rulings on
the record. Goodwin, 618 So.2d at 583-84. These factors were subsequently used
by the court in Plaia, 229 So.3d at 490-91.
Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion or that it denied Ms. Bridges her due process rights in imposing the
two-hour time limit per side for trial or in regard to her ability to call or proffer the
testimony of witnesses. The record reflects that the trial court was aware of the
issue before it, and as previously noted, the trial court issued a case management
schedule on August 29, 2019. The case management schedule set the matter for
trial for September 30, 2019 and set forth that each party was allotted
6 "approximately two hours to present their case and/or cross examme their
opponent's witnesses." Thus, the two-hour time limit imposed by the trial court
was applied equally to both parties and both parties knew one month in advance of
trial that their trial time would be limited to approximately two hours per side.
This was sufficiently in advance of trial to allow the parties to prepare for trial
within time limits imposed. Although the case management schedule did not
inform the parties the reason or reasons why the two-hour time limit per side was
being imposed or that reasonable extensions of the time limit would be granted for
good cause shown, we note that the record does not contain any objection-written
or otherwise-by either party to the time limitation set forth in the case
management schedule or a written request for additional time to present their case.
At the beginning of trial, the trial court asked counsel, "[D]id we set two
hours for each side on this one ... ?" Counsel for Ms. Bridges then stated, "I believe
that's what the order said. If you want to give us more time, I'd be happy to take
it." The trial court then stated, "If that's what the order said, that's what the order
meant. You will each have two hours." At this time, neither party objected to the
trial court's imposition of the two-hour time limitation. The trial court then noted
that the parties would be responsible for maintaining their time, although the trial
court stated that its bailiff would be keeping track of the parties' time as well.
Thus, the trial court's method for charging time against each party's time limit was
equitable.
During the presentation of Ms. Bridges' case, her counsel called three
witnesses, including Ms. Bridges, to the stand to testify. 2 At the conclusion of Ms.
Bridges' case, she had 11 minutes, 20 seconds left of her time, and Mr. Bridges
had 1 hour, 10 minutes, 51 seconds left of his time. During the presentation of Mr.
Bridges' case, his counsel called four witnesses, including Mr. Bridges, to the 2 Ms. Bridges also offered the deposition testimony of an expert, Karen M. Kirk, a licensed clinical social worker into evidence.
7 stand to testify. At the conclusion of Mr. Bridges' case, Mr. Bridges had a little
less than 10 minutes left of his time, and Ms. Bridges was out of time. Notably,
during and after the examinations and cross-examinations of the witnesses, each
party's time remaining time was brought to their respective counsel's attention and
again, no objection was made by either party to the time limitation.
Near the end of trial, following the examination of Mr. Bridges by the trial
court, the trial court noted that time had run out for counsel for Ms. Bridges, but
stated that it would allow them time to "follow up with anything on cross." Thus,
even though counsel for Ms. Bridges had run out of time, the trial court granted
them additional time to complete his cross-examination of Mr. Bridges.
Following Mr. Bridges' testimony and near the conclusion of the
presentation of Mr. Bridges' case, counsel for Ms. Bridges requested that they be
allowed to call a rebuttal witness. When the trial court inquired whether counsel
for Ms. Bridges had time left, they responded that they would like to proffer. The
trial court then stated it was "not going to allow it if time's run out. That's for
rebuttal time, also."
Other than this rebuttal witness that counsel for Ms. Bridges sought to call at
the end of trial, the record does not reflect that either party was unable to call any
witness to the stand because of the time limitation. Although the trial court denied
counsel for Ms. Bridges' request to call the rebuttal witness, counsel for Ms.
Bridges neither specifically requested additional time to call the rebuttal witness
nor did they set forth any reasons why additional time for that rebuttal witness was
necessary. Rather, when the trial court pointed out that their time was up, counsel
for Ms. Bridges replied that they would proffer the testimony. While the statement
by the trial court to counsel for Ms. Bridges that it was "not going to allow it if
time's run out" is unclear as to whether it was referring to the testimony of the
rebuttal witness or to the proffer thereof, it is evident that the trial court did not
8 allow counsel for Ms. Bridges to call the rebuttal witness or to make a complete
record of that witness's full testimony. However, we note that counsel for Ms.
Bridges never identified that rebuttal witness and did not make (or attempt to
make) a statement setting forth the substance of that rebuttal witness's testimony.
See La. C.C.P. art. 1636 (providing that "[w]hen the court rules against the
admissibility of any evidence, it shall either permit the party offering such
evidence to make a complete record thereof, or permit the party to make a
statement setting forth the nature of the evidence" (Emphasis added)). 3 As such,
we cannot say that the trial court denied Ms. Bridges (or her counsel) the right to
proffer the testimony of any witness.
Accordingly, we find no merit to these assignments of error.
Relocation (Assignment of Error Numbers 3, 4, and 5)
Next on appeal, Ms. Bridges contends that the trial court, in rendering its
judgment denying her request to relocate the children's residence, erred in: failing
to consider all of the mandated factors or provisions of La. R.S. 9:355.14; taking
judicial notice of and relying on its own personal knowledge of danger, unrest,
and/or crime in the Middle East; and interposing its own family history in its
factual findings.
Generally, the relocation of a child's principal residence to a location out of
state or in state is governed by Louisiana's relocation statutes, La. R.S. 9:355.1-
9:355.19. La. R.S. 9:355.2. When the relocation of the children's principal
residence is contested, La. R.S. 9:355.10 requires that the relocating parent prove
that the proposed relocation is: (1) made in good faith; and (2) in the best interest
of the child. Thus, Louisiana's relocation statutes retain the "best interest of the
child" standard as the fundamental principle governing decisions made pursuant to
3 Counsel for Ms. Bridges neither objected nor directly attempted to offer a proffer that was denied by the trial court either at the time of the attempt to call the rebuttal witness or later in the proceedings.
9 its provisions. Cu role v. Curo le, 2002-1891 (La. 10115/02), 828 So.2d 1094,
1096.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14(A) provides that:
In reaching its decision regarding a proposed relocation, the court shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether relocation is in the best interest of the child, including the following:
(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and with the non-relocating person, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life.
(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development.
(3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the non- relocating person and the child through suitable physical custody or visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.
(4) The child's views about the proposed relocation, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child.
(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by either the person seeking or the person opposing the relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.
(6) How the relocation of the child will affect the general quality of life for the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.
(7) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation.
(8) The current employment and economic circumstances of each person and how the proposed relocation may affect the circumstances of the child.
(9) The extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his financial obligations to the person seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property, and alimentary obligations.
(10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting person.
( 11) Any history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence by either the person seeking or the person opposing relocation, including a consideration of the severity of the conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation.
(12) Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.
10 A trial court's determination in a relocation matter is entitled to great weight
and will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.
Curo le, 828 So.2d at 1096. However, as to any underlying factual findings made
by the trial court, such as whether the proposed relocation was made in good faith
and whether the proposed relocation was in the best interest of the child, the
manifest error standard of review is applicable. See Cu role, 828 So.2d at 1097-98
and 1100-01.
In this case, the trial court, in its oral reasons for judgment, found that Ms.
Bridges' request to relocate the minor children's residence was made in good faith
because it was based on an opportunity for Ms. Bridges, who was ambitious and
accomplished, to advance in her career and Ms. Bridges sincerely believed that the
move would be beneficial to the children. Next, as to whether the proposed
relocation of the children's residence to Dubai was in the children's best interest,
the trial court thoroughly examined and analyzed the evidence in accordance with
the factors set forth in La. R.S. 9:355.14(A) as follows.
With regard to the first factor, the trial court found that since the parties
separated in 2015, the minor children have enjoyed a close and loving relationship
with both of their parents, spending equal time between the two households in St.
Tammany Parish, but that Ms. Bridges had recently moved with the parties' major
child to Dubai with the intent to reside there for three years. The trial court also
found that the minor children had extended family-both maternal and paternal-
in St. Tammany Parish, that the minor children had lived their entire lives and
attended school in St. Tammany Parish, and that they had friends in St. Tammany
Parish. The trial court noted that the children also had a particularly close and
loving relationship with their paternal grandparents (who resided in St. Tammany
11 Parish), as well as their older sibling, who chose to move with their mother to
Dubai.
Insofar as the second factor was concerned, the trial court noted that the
minor children had some medical and mental health issues, were on medication,
and were emotionally fragile due to alleged sexual abuse by their maternal cousin.
The trial court further noted that both of the minor children had anger issues and
had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder, and that
one of the children had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder. The trial
court pointed out that the children had been engaged in extensive weekly therapy
for some time in order to deal with their issues and that their doctors were located
in St. Tammany Parish.
As to the third factor, the trial court found the distance, time and expense to
travel between St. Tammany Parish and Dubai was great, that Ms. Bridges, due to
her job benefits, could travel with relative ease, whereas it would be cost and time
prohibitive for Mr. Bridges to travel to Dubai on any significant basis. In addition,
the trial court noted that the minor children would have to be accompanied by an
adult on flights to and from to Dubai, which could take approximately 24 hours in
travel time each way.
As to the fourth factor, the trial court reached no conclusion. The trial court
noted that other than each parent's self-serving testimony, the only testimony on
the issue was from a social worker that the children had seen. The trial court noted
that the social worker was not a court-appointed expert, but rather was engaged by
Ms. Bridges and had minimal input and contact with Mr. Bridges. The trial court
did not consider the social worker's "gratuitous opinions" on relocation because
her report was commissioned by Ms. Bridges. The trial court also noted that while
children's therapy with the social worker was supposed to focus on the children's
anger and trauma issues, it soon transpired into questioning the children on their
12 feelings about their mother's move to Dubai, and further, according to the social
worker's notes, the children were conflicted on the issue of relocation. The trial
court also noted that the social worker had no particular training or experience in
treating child victims of sexual abuse, and found that another therapist with such
experience should be engaged by the parties immediately.
The trial court found there was no issue as to factor number five, as prior to
Ms. Bridges' move to Dubai, the parties worked well in an equal joint custodial
arrangement. On factor number six, the trial court found that the relocation of the
children would greatly affect their quality of life. The trial court found that while
there would certainly be financial, educational, and cultural benefits to the children
in Dubai, the children were still of tender years and remaining in St. Tammany
Parish would provide them with stability, safety, a fulfilling family life, and a good
education. The trial court also noted that as a region, the Middle East was highly
unstable, that the rights that men and women have in the United States were not
guaranteed, even in "cosmopolitan Dubai," and that living in a democracy would
be greatly beneficial during the children's formative years. The trial court also
found that the children had medical and mental health care needs, which could be
continued in St. Tammany Parish, and that they needed their father and his loving
family in their lives to help cope and heal.
The trial court did not attribute any specific significance to factor number
seven, noting that both parties were in good faith, both in proposing and objecting
to the relocation of the minor children's residence. Additionally, the trial court
found there was no issue as to factor numbers nine and eleven. As to factor
number eight, the trial court found that the move to Dubai was a marvelous
opportunity for Ms. Bridges and would improve her circumstances. And, with
regard to factor number ten, the trial court found that relocation by Mr. Bridges to
Dubai was impossible.
13 Thus, according to the trial court's reasons for judgment, it found the
evidence weighed in favor of the children remaining in St. Tammany Parish (or in
favor of Mr. Bridges' objection to the relocation of the children's residence) on
four factors (i.e., factors two, three, six, and ten), in favor of relocation of the
children's residence to Dubai (or in favor of Ms. Bridges' request to relocate the
children's residence) on one factor (i.e., factor eight), equally in favor of both
parties on one factor (i.e., factor one), and in favor of neither party (or that the
factor was not at issue) on five factors (i.e., factors four, five, seven, nine, and
eleven). Therefore, after considering all of the evidence in light of the factors set
forth in La. R.S. 9:355.14(A), the trial court found that Ms. Bridges failed to meet
her burden of proving that the relocation of the children's residence to Dubai was
in their best interest. Based on our review of the record, we find no manifest error
in the trial court's factual finding in this regard, as these findings are fully
supported by the testimony at trial-in particular the testimony of both parties-
and is not clearly wrong.
To the extent that Ms. Bridges claims on appeal that the trial court failed to
consider all of the mandated factors or provisions of La. R. S. 9 :3 55.14, interposed
its own family history in its factual findings, and took judicial notice of or relied on
its own personal knowledge of danger, unrest, and/or crime in the Middle East, we
find no support in the record for her contention. Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:355.14(A) requires the trial court to "consider all relevant factors in determining
whether relocation is in the best interest of the child." (Emphasis added). While
Ms. Bridges argues in her brief that the trial court used its "own list of the
'relocation factors,"' the record and the trial court's reasons for judgment reflect
otherwise. As previously set forth, the trial court's reasons for judgment reflect
that it thoroughly examined and analyzed the evidence in accordance with the
14 relevant factors set forth in La. R.S. 9:355.14(A)4 and concluded that the majority
of factors weighed in favor of the children's residence remaining in St. Tammany
Parish. Nor do we find any evidence in the trial court's reasons for judgment
that the trial court interposed its family history into the factual findings in this case.
While the trial judge mentioned her past estranged relationship with her father
when she was questioning K.B., the parties' major child, regarding K.B.'s
estranged relationship with her father and paternal grandparents, we note that the
trial court's statements in this regard formed no part of its judgment or reasons for
judgment, or its factual findings as to whether the proposed relocation of the
children's residence to Dubai was in their best interest.
With regard to Ms. Bridges' contention that the trial court improperly took
"judicial notice" of or relied on its own personal knowledge of danger, unrest,
and/or crime in the Middle East, Ms. Bridges points to references about the Middle
East, the United Arab Emirates, and/or Dubai made by the trial court during trial.
Specifically, she points to the trial court's statements that it was aware of the
location of the United Arab Emirates and its proximity to "a lot of places that
aren't safe, quite frankly," that women previously were not allowed to drive in the
United Arab Emirates, and that the ability to communicate via Facetime was
limited because of the control exercised by that country over the internet and that
people "don't have the same freedom of speech that we do."
Judges do not operate in a vacuum, and their life experiences necessarily
come into play when they are on the bench. Madison v. State, Dept. of Public
Safety & Corrections, 2014-1067 (La. App. 3rct Cir. 5/6/15), 164 So.3d 381, 385,
writ denied, 2015-1117 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 147. However, notwithstanding
these statements made by the trial court during trial, we find no evidence that the
trial court relied on its personal knowledge about Dubai in reaching its decision 4 As set forth above, the trial court found that five factors were either not at issue (or not relevant) or weighed in favor of neither party.
15 herein. Notably, Ms. Bridges, during her testimony, admitted both that women
have only been allowed to drive in the United Arab Emirates for approximately
seven years and that the internet was controlled in Dubai and/or the United Arab
Emirates. We also note that those statements were made by the trial court during
trial and formed no part of the trial court's judgment or reasons for judgment or its
factual findings. As such, we cannot say that the trial court erred in making such
statements during trial.
As to the trial court's reasons for judgment, other than the undisputed fact
that Ms. Bridges and the parties' major child had already moved to Dubai and the
significant distance between Dubai and St. Tammany Parish, the trial court's only
reference to life in the Middle East was with respect to factor number six.
Specifically, the trial court, after noting that there would be financial, educational,
and cultural benefits available to the children in Dubai, stated that the "Middle East
as a region remains highly unstable, and all the rights and opportunities that men
and women in the United States of America value are not guaranteed
. ... m... Du b ai.. "
Judicial notice is a court's acceptance, for purposes of convenience and
without requiring a party's proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact. Black's
Law Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004). See also S.J. Lemoine, Inc. v. St. Landry Parish
School Bd., 527 So.2d 1150, 1153 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1988) (providing that judicial
notice is a method by which courts dispense with formal proof when there is no
real necessity for it because the facts noticed are indisputable as a matter of
notorious common knowledge or as being easily capable of immediate
verification). A court is authorized to take judicial notice of an undisputed fact that
is capable of accurate and ready determination. See La. C.E. art. 20l(B)(2). Facts
that may be judicially noticed may include laws of nature, geographic and
historical facts, time, the calendar, laws and other matters of common knowledge.
16 See Pierce v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State University, 392 So.2d 460,
464 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
From our review of the record, we need not address whether the stability of
the Middle East and whether the lack of certain personal freedoms in the United
Arab Emirates or Dubai are well-known indisputable facts for which the trial court
could properly take judicial notice because the trial court's statements in this
regard were only part of its analysis in regards to factor number six. In regards to
factor number six, it is apparent that the trial court concluded that factor number
six weighed in favor of the children's residence remaining in St. Tammany Parish
because the children had medical and mental health care needs, which could be
continued in St. Tammany Parish, and that they needed their father and his loving
family in their lives. Thus, the trial court's statements relative to the life in Middle
East were essentially irrelevant to its ultimate factual findings on factor number
six. Furthermore, the trial court found that the majority of the other relevant
factors, i.e., factors two, three, and ten, which had nothing to do with safety, life, or
available freedoms in the United Arab Emirates or Dubai, weighed in favor of the
children's residence remaining in St. Tammany Parish.
Having found no manifest error in the trial court's factual determination that
Ms. Bridges failed to prove that it was in the best interest of the children to relocate
their residence to Dubai, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying and dismissing Ms. Bridge's request to relocate the minor children's
residence to Dubai.
Custodial Schedule (Assignment of Error Number 6)
Lastly, on appeal, Ms. Bridges contends that the trial court, after denying her
request to relocate the minor children's residence, erred in failing to set out a
17 specific physical custodial arrangement. As set forth above, Ms. Bridges, in her
motion that was before the trial court, sought approval to relocate the minor
children's residence to Dubai, and in conjunction therewith, a modified physical
custodial schedule to facilitate the relationship between the children and Mr.
Bridges. Ms. Bridges did not request, in the alternative, that the trial court modify
the parties' physical custodial schedule in the event her request to relocate the
children's residence was denied.
At trial, Ms. Bridges testified that she had already moved to Dubai. She
further testified that, if the trial court granted her request to relocate the children's
residence, Mr. Bridges should be granted physical custody "whenever [the
children] are out of school for the summer, ... [w]hen they're out of school for
holiday breaks, ... [and] anytime that [Mr. Bridges] [was] available." After
denying Ms. Bridges' request to relocate the minor children's residence to Dubai,
the trial court, in its oral reasons for judgment, noted that Ms. Bridges had already
moved to Dubai, that the parties' equal physical custodial plan would no longer
work, and that a new physical custody plan would need to be confected. The trial
court requested that the parties try to "work it out"-either through their parenting
coordinator, a mediator, or by themselves-but if they were unable to do so, then
the matter could be reset by motion. The trial court stated that it hoped that the
physical custodial plan provided Ms. Bridges with the opportunity to have the
children visit her in Dubai for extended periods of time when school was not in
session and that she have periods of physical custody when she comes back to visit
the United States.
With regard to physical custody m favor of Ms. Bridges, the judgment
signed by the trial court, which was prepared by counsel for Ms. Bridges,
provided: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
[Ms.] Bridges shall have periods of physical custody of the minor children in
18 Dubai for extended periods when school is not in session and also periods of
physical custody when she is in St. Tammany Parish, State of Louisiana." Ms.
Bridges contends that this provision is not clear or specific and merely prolongs
litigation and intra-family discord between the parties.
Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court erred or
abused its discretion with regard to this issue. Ms. Bridges sought approval to
relocate the minor children's residence to Dubai and to modify the parties'
physical custodial schedule to accommodate that request, and the trial court denied
those requests. Ms. Bridges did not ask the trial court to set a specific physical
custodial schedule in the event it denied her request to relocate the children's
residence; thus, that issue was not properly before the trial court. While the trial
court recognized that given its ruling and the fact that Ms. Bridges had already
moved to Dubai, the parties' current physical custodial schedule would need to be
modified, the trial court specifically ordered the parties either to work out a
schedule or have the matter set on the court's docket. The judgment signed by the
trial court essentially provided Ms. Bridges with the same periods of physical
custody that she believed Mr. Bridges should be awarded in the event she was able
to relocate the minor children's residence with her to Dubai. To the extent that Ms.
Bridges finds the judgment unclear or non-specific or that the parties have been
unable to work out a more definitive physical custodial arrangement, Ms. Bridges'
remedy is to have the issue properly placed before the trial court.
Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the November 14, 2019
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the
plaintiff/appellant, Bobbi Jo Bridges.
AFFIRMED.
19 BOBBI JO BRIDGES STATE OF LOUISIANA
~VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
RYAN CASEY BRIDGES NUMBER 2020 CU 0300
WHIPPLE, C.J., concurring.
While I recognize that a trial court has much discretion in the manner, mode,
and conduct of trial of matters coming before it, I write separately to note that the
imposition of a two-hour time limit for opening and closing arguments, presentation
of the evidence and witnesses' testimony, as well as direct and cross examination,
causes me grave concern. While judicial efficiency is an important goal, great care
should be taken to ensure meaningful access to the courts. However, because there
was no contemporaneous objection to the limitations imposed by the trial court, I
concur in the decision reached by the majority.