Bobadilla v. State of Nevada, ex rel. its Department of Probation and Parole

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 APRIL BOBADILLA, ) 4 ) Plaintiff, ) Case No.: 2:23-cv-00723-GMN-DJA 5 vs. ) ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 6 STATE OF NEVADA, ex rel. its ) DISMISS 7 DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION AND ) PAROLE, et al., ) 8 ) Defendants. ) 9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 12), filed by Defendant 11 State of Nevada ex rel. Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation (“NPP”). 12 Plaintiff April Bobadilla filed a Response, (ECF No. 15), to which Defendant filed a Reply, 13 (ECF No. 16). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 14 and dismisses all federal and state claims against NPP and its employees acting in their official 15 capacity. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants NPP and the Las Vegas Metropolitan 18 Police Department (“LVMPD”) for their alleged wrongful arrest and detention in May 2021. 19 (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1). When Plaintiff applied for housing at a Budget Suites, a 20 background check revealed fugitive warrants. (Id. ¶ 18). Budget Suites notified LVMPD, who 21 arrested Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff subsequently spent one month in the Clark County 22 Detention Center, during which time she told the staff that the fugitive warrants were incorrect 23 because her previous criminal cases had already been closed. (Id. ¶ 20). Specifically, Plaintiff 24 alleges that Defendants failed to clear the fugitive warrants out of the system after her previous 25 /// 1 criminal cases had been closed and dismissed with prejudice, resulting in her wrongful arrest 2 and detention. (Id. ¶ 17). 3 Plaintiff brings six claims against NPP and LVMPD, as well as their employees, in both 4 their individual and official capacities. Her first three federal causes of action under 42 U.S.C. 5 § 1983 are for wrongful seizure, false imprisonment at Clark County Detention Center, and 6 Monell liability. (Id. ¶¶ 24–38). Plaintiff also brings three state causes of action for negligence, 7 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. (Id. ¶¶ 39–49). LVMPD 8 filed an Answer, (ECF No. 6), and NPP filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in 9 part. (See generally Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 12). 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim upon 12 which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading must give fair notice of a 13 legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, and although a court must take all 14 factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Bell 15 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires “more

16 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 17 not do.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 18 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 19 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial 20 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard 22 “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 23 If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 24 be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 25 amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Pursuant 1 to Rule 15(a), the court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in 2 the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 3 movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 4 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the 5 amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Defendant NPP, as a state agency, seeks to dismiss all claims against it. It makes four 8 arguments for dismissal: (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal claims; (2) Monell 9 liability inapplicable to state agencies; (3) immunity from state claims; and (4) failure to 10 comply with Nevada’s mandatory naming requirement. (See generally Mot. Dismiss). The 11 Court addresses each argument in turn.1 12 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity for Federal Claims 13 Plaintiff brings three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And as relevant here, Plaintiff’s 14 claims are alleged against NPP, a subdivision of the State of Nevada, as well as NPP’s 15 supervisors and employees, in their individual and official capacities. (Compl. ¶¶ 7–9).

16 Defendant NPP argues that to the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages for her federal claims, 17 the claims should be dismissed under Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Mot. Dismiss 3:16–28). 18 Section 1983 actions involve the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 19 secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To bring a successful § 1983 claim, a 20 plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of a constitutional right and (2) must show that the alleged 21 violation was committed by “a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 22 42, 49 (1988). Moreover, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 23 24

25 1 Because the Court agrees with Defendant’s first three arguments and dismisses all federal and state claims against NPP and its employees in their official capacity, the Court does not address Defendant’s naming requirement argument. 1 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 2 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 3 The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall 4 not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity . . . against one of the United States by 5 Citizens of another State . . . .” U.S. Const. amend XI. Thus, “[a] suit generally may not be 6 maintained directly against the State itself, or against an agency or department of the State, 7 unless the State has waived its sovereign immunity.” Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, 8 Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684 (1982). The Eleventh Amendment gives state agencies and state 9 officials sued in their official capacity immunity from claims brought against them in federal 10 court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–71 11 (1989). 12 Official capacity suits essentially constitute actions against the “entity of which an 13 officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). As such, courts must treat suits 14 against state officials in their official capacities as suits against the state. Id. Individual 15 capacity suits, however, “seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for

16 actions taken under color of state law.” Id. Thus, “to establish personal liability in a 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the 18 deprivation of a federal right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 19 Plaintiff does not argue that the NPP, a state agency, or its officers in their official 20 capacity, have waived immunity. Rather, Plaintiff responds that under a recent Nevada 21 Supreme Court case, she has a private right of action to enforce her search-and-seizure rights 22 under the Nevada Constitution, and that no qualified immunity defense applies. (Resp. 6:16– 23 7:10, ECF No. 15) (citing Mack v. Williams, 522 P.3d 434 (Nev. 2022)). Defendant replies that 24 Plaintiff’s Mack argument is misplaced because she is not bringing a cause of action under the 25 Nevada Constitution. (Reply 3:10–4:5, ECF No. 16). 1 The Court agrees with Defendant. The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Mack does 2 not apply to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, and Nevada has not otherwise waived its Eleventh 3 Amendment immunity. Therefore, the Court grants NPP’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 4 claims as brought against NPP and its officers acting in their official capacity. See Taylor v. 5 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of constitutional claims in a 6 § 1983 case against a Nevada state agency on Eleventh Amendment grounds).2 While 7 Plaintiff's claims fail against NPP and its employees in their official capacities, Plaintiff’s 8 individual capacity claims may proceed. See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 9 1992). 10 B. Monell Claim 11 Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s third count alleging Monell liability should be 12 dismissed because “NPP is an arm of the state and not a local government unit.” (Mot. Dismiss 13 4:1-4). Pursuant to Monell, local governments can be sued directly under § 1983 for violations 14 of constitutional rights. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 15 (1978). But “the Supreme Court has expressly declined to extend Monell’s theory of municipal

16 liability under § 1983 to state entities.” Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada 17 Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2010); see Will, 491 U.S. at 70–71. 18 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Monell Claim against NPP is dismissed with prejudice. 19 C. Immunity from State Claims 20 The remaining claims against Defendant NPP are state law claims for negligence, 21 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. (Compl. ¶¶ 39–49). 22 Defendant asks the court to dismiss these state law claims because Nevada did not waive its 23 sovereign immunity. (Mot. Dismiss 4:12–5:11). In Plaintiff’s Response, she reasserts her Mack 24

25 2 Because NPP’s argument is granted based on immunity from suit, amendment would be futile, and thus, the complaint against it is dismissed with prejudice. 1 argument and further argues that the Ex Parte Young doctrine allows for relief against state 2 officials for violations of federal law. (Resp. 9:8–10:18).3 3 The Eleventh Amendment bars state law claims against a state that are brought into 4 federal court under supplemental jurisdiction. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 5 U.S. 89, 100, 121 (1984). The supplemental jurisdiction provided by Congress “does not 6 abrogate state sovereign immunity for supplemental state law claims.” Stanley v. Trustees of 7 Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Raygor v. Regents of Univ. 8 of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 541 (2002). Further, a state’s consent to suit in its own courts does 9 not constitute consent to suit in federal courts. Stanley, 433 F.3d at 1134. Because Congress 10 did not abrogate Nevada’s sovereign immunity, and because Nevada’s consent to suit in state 11 court does not constitute consent to suit in federal court, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state 12 law claims against Defendant NPP and their officers in their official capacity, with prejudice.4 13 V. CONCLUSION 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant NPP’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 12), 15 is GRANTED.

16 DATED this __5___ day of January, 2024. 17 18 ___________________________________ Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 20 21 22

23 3 Plaintiff’s arguments are not persuasive in this case. First, as stated above, the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding in Mack 24 does not apply to this case because Plaintiff is not asserting an unlawful search and seizure claim. Second, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies to suits for injunctive relief against state officers to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal, 25 not state, law. See Hason v. Medical Bd. of California, 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). 4 The Court will, however, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against the NPP supervisors and employees in their individual capacities.