Bob Stone Cordage Co. v. United States

48 Cust. Ct. 169
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedApril 12, 1962
DocketC.D. 2331
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 48 Cust. Ct. 169 (Bob Stone Cordage Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bob Stone Cordage Co. v. United States, 48 Cust. Ct. 169 (cusc 1962).

Opinion

Kao, Judge:

In the cases listed in the schedule of protests, attached to this decision and made a part hereof, which have been consolidated for purposes of trial, plaintiffs contest the assessment of duty at the rate of 15 per centum ad valorem on certain imported twine, composed of Mexican sisal. The assessment was made by the collector of customs at the port of entry, by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 1005 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T.D. 51802, for—

Cords and twines (whether or not composed of three or more strands, each strand composed of two or more yarns), tarred or untarred, single or plied, wholly or in chief value of manila (abaca), sisal, henequen, or other hard fiber.

It is claimed in the protests that said twine is entitled to free entry within the provisions of paragraph 1622 of said act, as amended, for—

All binding twine, and twine chiefly used for baling hay, straw, and other fodder and bedding materials, manufactured from New Zealand hemp, henequen, manila, istle or Tampico fiber, sisal grass, or sunn, or a mixture of any two or more of them, of single ply and measuring not exceeding seven hundred and fifty feet to the pound.1

The merchandise in issue was invoiced as binder twine. According to the chemist’s reports, which have been received in evidence, it [171]*171consists of a single-ply twine (Agave fiber) having the following specifications:

Protest Entry Brand No. of feet per pound Percentage of oil, by weight Weight of ball
260654-K 0248 01963 Ozark Champion 453 473 12.6 10.2 8 lbs. 3.5 ozs. 8 lbs. 0.2 ozs.
58/21043 5137 460 Blue Bow A.C. 457 387 11.8 11.4 7 lbs. 11.5 ozs. 8 lbs. 3.0 ozs.
307886-K 06828 Hy Glo 2 352 over 8% 8 lbs. 4}4 ozs.
59/22486 09804 AC 469 over 8 7 lbs. 7.8 ozs.

The consumption entries and the collector’s answers to the protests have also been admitted into evidence without objection. As to the latter documents, however, it appears that they were filed more than 90 days after receipt of the protests to which they were addressed, except in the instance of protest 260654 — K, and, hence, under settled law, are untimely and may not properly be considered as evidence. United States v. California Milk Producers Association et al., 35 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 126, C.A.D. 382; Oakland Food Products Co. et al. v. United States, 32 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 28, C.A.D. 281. Whether or not the Government, by not objecting to the admission of said answers, in effect, has conceded the facts therein contained relating to the classification of the instant merchandise, need not here be determined, since the issue raised by plaintiffs in connection therewith is posed by the timely answer in protest 260654r-K. There, the merchandise is described by the collector as “Binder Twine,” classified under “Par. 1005(b), TA 1930” and assessed with duty at the rate of “15%.” It further states as the basis of affirmation, “Appraiser’s advisory classification.”

At the outset, it must be remarked that counsel for plaintiffs relies heavily upon the collector’s description of the merchandise as “Binder Twine” in support of an argument to the effect that such description constituted a classification of the merchandise in issue, and that, therefore, the collector was not authorized to liquidate the entries as dutiable under paragraph 1005 (b), as modified.

The collector’s function, as defined by section 505 of the Tariff Act of 1930, is to “ascertain, fix, and liquidate the rate and amount of duties to be paid on such [entered] merchandise as provided by law * * Under section 514 of said act, protest lies against his decision “including the legality of all orders and findings entering into the same, as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable.” Basically, therefore, it is the assessment of duties, not the classification per se, which is the protestable act. The classification may be attacked as a finding entering into the decision as to the rate and amount of duties, but it is clearly [172]*172subordinate to, and becomes merged in, the liquidation, which is the final computation of the amount of duties determined to be due the United States. United States v. B. Holman, Inc., 29 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 3, C.A.D. 164.

In any event, there is no tariff provision for “binder twine,” and the assessment of duty at the rate of 15 per centum ad valorem constitutes a determination that the twine, albeit described as binder twine, is not the “binding twine” provided for in paragraph 1622, but is, in fact, the single-ply twine described in said paragraph 1005(b), as modified. The argument on this phase of the case is, therefore, deemed untenable.

It appears from the official papers and the evidence given by the appraiser of merchandise at the port of New Orleans, La., that the merchandise in issue was advisorily classified as other than binding twine because it did not meet the “specifications recognized in the trade as binder twine.” “It is what we call underweight footage; it was irregularly woven or wound and according to our information, as gathered from the trade, it would not be good delivery as binder twine.”

In the case of United States v. Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc., 41 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 95, C.A.D. 535, it was held that the new language added to paragraph 1622 by the 1951 amendment did not enlarge the scope of the provision, but served merely to clarify the wording originally appearing in the act. It was further held that the phrase “All binding twine” embraced any twine meeting the specifications of paragraph 1622 and not exceeding the maximum length therein prescribed, chiefly used in agricultural pursuits, either for the tying or binding of small grains, or for tying and binding purposes in harvesting operations.

The merchandise involved in the Rueff case was a single-ply sisal twine, running 200 feet to the pound, with an average tensile strength of 240 pounds, containing 12 to 15 per centum of oil by weight, and treated with insect and rodent repellents. It was shown that twine of that character was designed to meet the requirements of automatic hay balers; that it was generally known as baler twine and chiefly used in automatic or pickup baling machines for the baling of hay.

It was also established that a commodity known as binder twine was ordinarily used in binder machines for wrapping or tying sheaves of small grain; and, to some extent, in a machine manufactured by the Allis-Chalmers Co., which produced a carpet-like bale of hay. Such twine was described as usually 500, 550, 600, or 650 feet to the pound, having an average tensile strength of 85-90 pounds, and containing not less than 10 per centum of oil.

It was the contention of the Government and of armeus euriae in the Rueff case that binder twine and binding twine were synonymous terms and that since the record established that baler twine was not [173]*173binder twine, it could not be embraced by the provision for “All binding twine.” One of the supporting factors in that contention was the disparity in length per pound between binder twine and baler twine.

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Bluebook (online)
48 Cust. Ct. 169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bob-stone-cordage-co-v-united-states-cusc-1962.