Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada v. Arata Expositions, Inc.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided May 21, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-00960·Unknown

Opinion

EXHIBIT 10 Proposed Order

Bryce C. Loveland, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 10132 Christopher M. Humes Esq., Nevada Bar No. 12782 William D. Nobriga, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 14931 BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP 100 North City Parkway, Suite 1600 Las Vegas, NV 89106-4614 Telephone: 702.382.2101 Facsimile: 702.382.8135 > || Email: bcloveland@bhfs.com chumes@bhfs.com wnobriga@bhfs.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 11 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CASE NO.: 2:24-cv-00960-JCM-NJK |? | TEAMSTERS LOCAL 631 SECURITY FUND FOR SOUTHERN NEVADA; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 14 TEAMSTERS CONVENTION INDUSTRY TRAINING FUND; BOARD OF TRUSTEES FINDINGS OF FACT, OF THE TEAMSTERS LOCAL 631 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND VACATION TRUST FUND ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 16 DEFAULT JUDGMENT Plaintiffs, ig ||*: ARATA EXPOSITIONS, INC., a Maryland corporation; AE I & D, LLC, a Maryland limited liability company,, 71 Defendants. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’, the Boards of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Securit: Fund for Southern Nevada and Teamsters Convention Industry Training Fund (collectivel referred to as the “Trust Funds”) request for entry of Default Judgment against Arata Expositions Inc. (“Arata”) and AE I & D, LLC (“AE I & D”). Default having been entered agains Defendants, the Court having reviewed the Plaintiffs’ Motion, being fully advised, and goo cause appearing, the Court now makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law.

I. Findings of fact. 1. Plaintiffs are the Trust Funds and are fiduciaries for purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1500. 2. Arata Expositions, Inc. and AE I & D, LLC acted as employers within the State of Nevada employing persons (“Covered Employees”) who perform work covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Arata and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 631 (“Union”). 3. The CBA requires Arata and AE I & D to make employee benefit contributions to the Trust Funds on behalf of its Covered Employees. 4. The Trust Funds are ERISA employee benefit trust funds that provide benefits to Covered Employees. 5. The Trust Funds are established by Trust Agreements (“Trust Agreements”). 6. Under ERISA and the Trust Agreements, Arata is obligated to make their books and records available for a contract compliance review (“Audit”). 7. Arata and AE I & D have failed to adequately respond to the Trust Funds’ requests to make their books and records available for an Audit, by failing to provide all of the needed documents to complete the Audit. 8. The Trust Funds’ governing documents provide that if Arata and AE I & D fail to make their books and records available for an Audit, the Trust Funds are permitted to presume contributions in the amount of $100,000 for each year covered by the attempted audit. 9. The Trust Funds have repeatedly requested that Arata and AE I & D make their books and records available for an Audit as required by ERISA and the Trust Agreements. 10. Arata and AE I & D have repeatedly refused to make their books and records sufficiently available for the Trust Funds to conduct an Audit. 11. Arata and AE I & D, therefore, is presumed to have failed to meet their obligations to remit employee benefit contributions to the Trust Funds as set forth in the CBA and Trust Agreements, and as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1145. 12. As a result of their delinquencies, Arata and AE I & D are liable to the Trust Funds for unpaid contributions, interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees. II. Conclusions of Law. 1. “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Pope v. U.S., 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court to grant default judgment against a defendant who has failed to plead or defend an action. To determine whether a default judgment is appropriate, courts may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1986). 3. As to the first factor, the Trust Funds will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered because they “will likely be without other recourse for recovery if default judgment is not entered in their favor.” Tr. of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 13 Defined Contribution Pension Trust for S. Nev. v. Tile Concepts, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01067-GMN-GWF, 2016 WL 8077987 (D. Nev. Dec. 7, 2016) (citing Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Scudier, 53 F.Supp.3d 1308, 1318 (D. Nev. July 8, 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants have failed to meet their obligations to remit employee benefit contributions and have failed to participate in both of their respective audits. Both employers also refused to participate or otherwise defend themselves in this action as required by relevant case law. Therefore, because the Trust Funds will have no recourse against them unless default judgment is granted, the first Eitel factor favors the entry of default judgment. 4. The second and third Eitel factors address the merits and sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that both employers failed to meet their obligations to provide requested documents as required under the CBAs and Trust Agreements to which Defendants are bound. As a result, both employers are liable to the Trust Funds for unpaid contributions, interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). As discussed in Part II(A) herein, as a result of having default entered against them, both employers have admitted these facts, which should be taken as true. The second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of default judgment. 5. The fourth Eitel factor concerns the damages at stake in the case. The damages in this case are reasonable and well-documented, based on an the Trust Funds’ governing documents and the calculations performed within the Motion for Default Judgment. Moreover, the damages in this case are also dictated by statute. ERISA states that, in cases like this one, courts shall award unpaid contributions, interest on the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of the action, and other legal or equitable relief that the court determines appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). This factor also favors the entry of default judgment. 6. Regarding the fifth Eitel factor, there is no possibility of dispute concerning the material facts. Because both employers have had a default entered against them, the allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted and taken as true. Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (cit

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Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada v. Arata Expositions, Inc., (D. Nev. 2025).

Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada v. Arata Expositions, Inc. (Board of Trustees of the Teamsters Local 631 Security Fund for Southern Nevada v. Arata Expositions, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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