Board of School Commissioners v. Dunn

962 So. 2d 814, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 4
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJanuary 5, 2007
Docket1051387
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 962 So. 2d 814 (Board of School Commissioners v. Dunn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Board of School Commissioners v. Dunn, 962 So. 2d 814, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 4 (Ala. 2007).

Opinion

WOODALL, Justice.

This case arises under the Teacher Tenure Act, § 16-24-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

Section 16-24-8 provides the grounds for the cancellation of the employment contract of a tenured teacher:

“Cancellation of an employment contract with a teacher on continuing service status may be made for incompetency, insubordination, neglect of duty, immorality, failure to perform duties in a satisfactory manner, justifiable decrease in the number of teaching positions or other good and just cause, but cancellation may not be made for political or personal reasons.”

On December 21, 2004, the superintendent of the Mobile County Public School System recommended to the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County (“the Board”) that it terminate the employment of Marion Dunn, a tenured science teacher and the head varsity basketball coach at B.C. Rain High School in Mobile, based upon Dunn’s alleged “failure to perform [his] duties in a satisfactory manner and other good and just cause.” The proposed termination resulted from Dunn’s institution of a physically abusive form of team discipline during basketball practice.

The Board voted to terminate Dunn’s employment, and Dunn filed with the superintendent a written notice of contest of the Board’s action, as allowed by § 16-24-9(b). Pursuant to § 16-24-20(b), the parties selected an experienced employment-law arbitrator as the hearing officer.

The responsibilities of the hearing officer are found in § 16-24-10(a):

“The hearing officer shall conduct a de novo hearing and shall render a decision based on the evidence and/or information submitted to the hearing officer. The hearing officer shall determine which of the following actions should be taken relative to the employee: Cancellation of the employment contract, a suspension of the employee, with or without pay, a reprimand, other disciplinary action, or no action against the employee. The hearing officer shall render a written decision, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, within 30 days after its hearing.”

An ore tenus hearing was held on April 7, 2005. On April 30, 2005, the hearing officer rendered his written decision. The hearing officer found beyond question “that the Board ha[d] reasonably and substantially proven that Dunn engaged in serious misconduct, as set forth in the five [816]*816charges[1] made in the superintendent’s recommendations to the Board.” However, the hearing officer did not cancel Dunn’s employment contract. Instead, he ordered that Dunn be barred from any coaching position for four years, that he be suspended without pay for 30 days, and that he apologize to his players orally and to each of their parents or guardians in writing. Dunn’s employment as a science teacher was not terminated.

The Board appealed the decision of the hearing officer to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals, exercising the discretion given to it by § 16-24 — 10(b), agreed to hear the appeal. After reviewing the record before the hearing officer and the briefs of the parties, the Court of Civil Appeals, in a plurality opinion issued per curiam, found the hearing officer’s decision arbitrary and capricious, reversed that order, and, as allowed by § 16 — 24—10(b), remanded the case for the parties to conduct another hearing consistent with the procedures set forth in the Act. Board of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile County v. Dunn, 962 So.2d 805 (Ala.Civ.App.2006).

Dunn petitioned this Court for certiorari review. We granted his petition to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Rule 39(k), Ala. R.App. P. (“The scope of review includes the application of the law to the stated facts.”).

The Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he decision of the hearing officer shall be affirmed on appeal unless the Court of Civil Appeals finds the decision arbitrary and capricious .... ” § 16-24-10(b)(emphasis added). “ ‘On certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals.’ ” Ex parte Helms, 873 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Ala.2003)(quoting Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala.1996)).

The plurality decision of the Court of Civil Appeals properly acknowledges that the Act gives hearing officers “broad decision-making authority over teacher terminations.” Dunn, 962 So.2d at 809. Consequently, their decisions are “subject to very limited appellate review.” 962 So.2d at 809. Indeed, by the explicit terms of the Act, the decision of a hearing officer must be affirmed on appeal unless the decision is found to be arbitrary and capricious.

The plurality opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals correctly states that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review is “extremely deferential,” Dunn, 962 So.2d at 808, and that the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer. That opinion also aptly states that where “reasonable people could differ as to the wisdom of a hearing officer’s decision!,] ... the decision is not arbitrary.” Dunn, 962 So.2d at 809. Additionally, we find no fault with the following statement in that opinion:

“If the decision-maker has ‘ “examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a ‘rational connection between the [817]*817facts found and the choice made,’ ” ’ its decision is not arbitrary. See Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dye, 921 So.2d [421, 426 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d [372, 389 (3d Cir.2004) ](quoting in turn Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).”

Dunn, 962 So.2d at 810. We must honor these principles in conducting our review.

As previously mentioned, the proceedings to terminate Dunn’s employment followed his institution of a physically abusive form of team discipline during basketball practice. The substance of the testimony concerning Dunn’s wrongdoing is described at length in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals:

“At the hearing on April 7, 2005, the evidence established that before the start of the 2004-2005 basketball season, Dunn, acting as the head coach of the varsity basketball team, agreed, at the request of two of his players, to institute a form of team discipline known as the ‘one-minute drill’ or ‘circle’ during basketball practice. Pursuant to that form of team discipline, when the team thought that one of its members needed to be disciplined for violating a team rule or for not performing up to capacity, the team members would encircle the player to be disciplined and hit or kick that player in the center of the circle for 15, 30, or 60 seconds, depending on the offense, while Dunn stood by and timed the punishment with a stopwatch. The record indicates that Dunn decided the length of time of the circle drill.

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Bluebook (online)
962 So. 2d 814, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 4, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/board-of-school-commissioners-v-dunn-ala-2007.