2019 IL App (3d) 170638
Opinion filed September 4, 2019 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, KEWANEE ) SCHOOL DISTRICT 229, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, v. ) Henry County, Illinois. ) THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL ) TRUSTEES, BUREAU, HENRY AND STARK ) COUNTIES; ANGIE ZARVELL, Regional ) Appeal No. 3-17-0638 Superintendent of Schools; JEREMY S. ) Circuit No. 16-MR-73 HELTON, KATIE MARIE HELTON, CHAD ) J. JOOS, JOANNA R. JOOS, CAROL S. ) KERSEY, KEVIN W. ROSE, LAURA M. ) ROSE, CONNIE SUE STETSON, MARK ) The Honorable J. STETSON and MICHAEL J. STETSON, ) Terence M. Patton, in Their Capacities as Attorneys-in-Fact; ) Judge, presiding. CONNIE SUE STETSON, Individually; ) LAURA M. ROSE, Individually; ) STEVEN ENDRESS, Superintendent of ) Bureau Valley School District 340; and THE ) BUREAU VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT 340, ) ) Defendants ) ) (Connie Sue Stetson and Laura M. Rose, ) Defendants-Appellants). ) ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendants Jeremy S. Helton, Katie Marie Helton, Chad J. Joos, Joanna R. Joos, Carol S.
Kersey, Kevin W. Rose, Laura M. Rose, Connie Sue Stetson, Mark J. Stetson, and Michael J.
Stetson (collectively, the petitioner defendants) filed a petition to detach 2010 acres of Kewanee
Community Unit School District 229’s (District 229) boundary and annex it to Bureau Valley
Community Unit School District 340 (District 340). In October 2015, a hearing on the petition
was held, and defendant, the Regional Board of School Trustees, Bureau, Henry and Stark
Counties (Board), issued a denial of the petition. Defendants Connie and Laura (collectively, the
individual defendants) submitted a petition for rehearing and placed a notice of public hearing in
the local newspaper. In December 2015, the Board granted the petition for rehearing. In January
2016, a rehearing was held, and District 229 filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the Board
lacked jurisdiction to review the petition for rehearing, which the Board denied. Ultimately, the
Board granted the detachment petition despite District 229’s objections. In March 2016, District
229 filed a complaint for administrative review. The trial court found that it could not review the
Board’s decision on the petition for rehearing because it failed to keep a record of the
proceedings in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West
2016)) and reversed the Board’s grant of the petition for detachment. The individual defendants
filed a motion for vacation or modification of judgment, which the trial court denied. The
individual defendants appealed, and we affirm.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 The petitioner defendants and two other individuals filed a petition for school district
boundary change to detach 2010 acres of land from District 229 and annex it to District 340. All
2 12 individuals were registered voters and residents in District 229. In compliance with statutory
requirement, the petition identified a “committee of [10]” of the 12 individuals to act for the
petitioners. Before a hearing on the petition occurred, two of the petitioner defendants moved
outside of District 229.
¶4 In October 2015, a hearing was held, which Connie, Michael, Laura, and Carol attended.
The Board voted to deny the petition for detachment.
¶5 Before the Board issued its written decision, the individual defendants submitted a
petition for rehearing. In November 2015, the Board issued a written order denying this initial
petition for rehearing.
¶6 Subsequently, the individual defendants submitted a second petition for rehearing,
alleging that (1) counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, (2) the Board’s denial of the
detachment petition based on the individual defendants’ failure to provide notice to property
owners was error because notice was not statutorily required, and (3) the individual defendants
were not statutorily required to obtain signatures from all owners in the territory proposed to be
detached. A notice of public hearing on the request for rehearing was published in the
newspaper. The notice stated:
“NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING
Notice is hereby given that the Regional Board of School Trustees
for Bureau, Henry, and Stark Counties will conduct a public
meeting on Wednesday, December 9, 2015 commencing at 1:00
p.m. The purpose of the meeting is to consider a request for a
rehearing. The meeting will be held at Regional Office of
Education, 107 S. State Street, Atkinson, Illinois.”
3 District 229 claims that its superintendent, Dr. Chris Sullens, did not receive notice of the public
hearing until he discovered the notice in the newspaper three days before the scheduled public
meeting date.
¶7 In December 2015, a hearing on whether to grant the second petition and schedule a new
detachment hearing was held. Minutes were taken at the hearing, which showed that Connie had
testified in support of a rehearing, that District 229 testified in opposition to rehearing, and that
the Board had voted to grant the rehearing.
¶8 In January 2016, a new hearing on detachment was convened. District 229 challenged the
Board’s jurisdiction to engage in the new hearing claiming there was no evidence that the
individual defendants had requested rehearing within the time period prescribed in section 7-6(n)
of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7-6(n) (West 2016)). After the Board denied that motion to
dismiss, District 229 raised oral objections, alleging that the Board failed to create a record of the
proceedings on the petition for rehearing. The following discussion occurred:
“MS. VANDER BROEK: And then finally as just a matter
for the record, because there is no record of the rehearing, I would
like to file our continuing objection to this rehearing with the
Board. And I do have copies for all the board members if you
would like them, or if you just want the one.
[REGIONAL SUPERINTENDENT] ZARVELL: Again,
motion denied. The—There was no obligation to have a hearing to
determine if there needs to be a rehearing. The Regional Board of
School Trustees was required to meet per the Open Meetings Act.
4 We met those requirements. The Board met. We took public
comment. The Board has rendered their decision.”
Ultimately, the Board reversed its earlier decision and granted the individual defendants’
detachment petition.
¶9 In March 2016, District 229 filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit
court. District 229 also filed a motion for default judgment against eight of the petitioner
defendants, Jeremy S. Helton, Katie Marie Helton, Chad J. Joos, Joanna R. Joos, Carol S.
Kersey, Kevin W. Rose, Mark J. Stetson, and Michael J. Stetson, for failing to file an appearance
and against the Board and Angie Zarvell, the regional superintendent of schools, for failing to
timely file a record of the proceedings. The court granted the default judgment against the eight
petitioner defendants and extended the time of the Board, Zarvell, and District 229 to file
pleadings. In August 2016, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the briefing schedule to
allow the Board additional time to file a complete administrative record, which the court
allowed. In September 2016, the court entered another agreed order in which the briefing
schedule was extended again to allow the Board additional time to file an administrative record.
District 229 filed a brief in support of its complaint, and defendants filed a supplemental answer
to the complaint.
¶ 10 A hearing on the complaint was held. The trial court found that, without a written finding
and record, it could not determine whether the Board’s allowance of the petition for rehearing
was proper and, consequently, remanded the case for a new hearing. District 229 objected and
filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the court should reverse the Board’s decision rather
than remand the case because, under Strohl v. Macon County Zoning Board of Appeals, 411 Ill.
559, 565 (1952), the Board’s failure to keep a record of the proceedings on the petition for
5 rehearing constitutes a reversal of its decision. The court granted District 229’s motion to
reconsider and, amending its initial order, reversed the Board’s decision on the January 2016
hearing and the petition for rehearing, thereby reinstating the Board’s earlier decision denying
detachment.
¶ 11 The individual defendants filed a motion for vacation or modification of judgment,
arguing that (1) section 7-6(n) of the School Code did not require the Board to conduct a hearing
on the petition for rehearing, (2) section 7-6(n) did not require the individual defendants to
provide notice of the petition for rehearing to District 229, and (3) the Board had jurisdiction to
hear the claim under section 7-6(n) because the petition for rehearing was filed within 10 days
from the Board’s November 3, 2015, order. The individual defendants also claimed that the
petition for rehearing and the transcript of the January 2016 rehearing provided evidence to show
the Board had sufficient cause to grant rehearing or, in the alternative, remand was the
appropriate remedy. The individual defendants attached Connie’s affidavit to the motion. In the
affidavit, she claimed that she had made an audio recording, and subsequently a transcript, of the
hearing on the petition for rehearing. The court denied the individual defendants’ motion, and the
individual defendants solely appealed.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 I. Jurisdiction
¶ 14 As a preliminary matter, we address District 229’s argument that the Board lacked
jurisdiction to review the petitioner defendants’ detachment petition because it did not have
statutory authority to review a petition when the designated committee of 10 fell below the
requisite number of committee members in violation of section 7-6(c) of the School Code (105
ILCS 5/7-6(c) (West 2016)).
6 ¶ 15 A decision rendered by an administrative agency that lacks jurisdiction over the parties or
the subject matter or that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the decision involved is void
and may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally. City of Chicago v.
Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976). As the supreme court has
explained:
“An administrative agency is different from a court because an
agency only has the authorization given to it by the legislature
through the statutes. Consequently, to the extent an agency acts
outside its statutory authority, it acts without jurisdiction.
[Citation.] The term jurisdiction, while not strictly applicable to an
administrative body, may be employed to designate the authority
of the administrative body to act ***. [Citation.] Thus, in
administrative law, the term jurisdiction has three aspects:
(1) personal jurisdiction—the agency’s authority over the parties
and intervenors involved in the proceedings, (2) subject matter
jurisdiction—the agency’s power to hear and determine causes of
the general class of cases to which the particular case belongs
[citation], and (3) an agency’s scope of authority under the statutes.
***
We acknowledge that, theoretically, anytime an agency
makes an erroneous decision, it acts without statutory authority
because the legislature and the statutes do not give an agency the
7 power to make erroneous decisions. [Citation.] We are confident,
however, that a reviewing court can make the appropriate
distinction between an erroneous decision and one which lacks
statutory authority.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Business
& Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce
Comm’n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243-45 (1989).
¶ 16 Section 7-6 governs the procedures in detachment proceedings. Specifically, section 7-
6(c) states:
“When a petition contains more than 10 signatures the petition
shall designate a committee of 10 of the petitioners as attorney in
fact for all petitioners, any 7 of whom may make binding
stipulations on behalf of all petitioners as to any question with
respect to the petition or hearing ***, and the regional board of
school trustees *** may accept such stipulation in lieu of evidence
or ***. The committee of petitioners shall have the same power to
stipulate to accounting or waiver thereof between school districts;
however, the regional board of school trustees *** may refuse to
accept such stipulation. Those designated as the committee of 10
shall serve in that capacity until such time as the regional
superintendent of schools or the committee of 10 determines that,
because of death, resignation, transfer of residency from the
territory, or failure to qualify, the office of a particular member of
the committee of 10 is vacant. Upon determination that a vacancy
8 exists, the remaining members shall appoint a petitioner to fill the
designated vacancy on the committee of 10. The appointment of
any new members by the committee of 10 shall be made by a
simple majority vote of the remaining designated members.” 105
ILCS 5/7-6(c) (West 2016).
¶ 17 Petitioner defendants complied with committee of 10 requirements under section 7-6(c).
That section does not require, as District 229 argues, that all 10 members must be present at the
hearing, that affidavits of the nonpresent members could not be used to represent the committee,
or that the committee must provide stipulations that all its members authorized defendants to
proceed with the petition for detachment. See Gillespie Community Unit School District No. 7 v.
Wight & Co., 2014 IL 115330, ¶ 31 (“It is improper for a court to depart from the plain statutory
language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the
clearly expressed legislative intent.”). The petitioner defendants initially designated a committee
of 10 in their petition, stating, “We further pray that Michael Stetson, Connie Stetson, Laura
Rose, Kevin Rose, Chad Joos, Joanna Joos, Jeremy Helton, Katie Helton, Carol Kersey and
Mark Stetson be appointed as a Committee of ten to act as attorney-in-fact for us in this matter.”
Moreover, there is no evidence that the committee membership fell below 10 when 6 members
were physically present at the January 2016 hearing and the absent remaining 4 members
submitted affidavits requesting the court to grant the petition. 1 Petitioner defendants initially
complied with the section 7-6(c)’s requirement that the petition designate a committee of 10
when it contains more than 10 signatures and their petition had 12. This requirement ensures that
each member in a large group of signatories is fully represented through decisions of 7 out of 10
1 This issue may actually be moot in this case. 9 members of the group acting pursuant to what is essentially a statutory power of attorney. When,
as here, the number of signatories falls below 10, the statutory obligation becomes superfluous
because the committee of 10 is no longer necessary to serve the purpose of the statute. Therefore,
we reject District 229’s challenge to the Board’s jurisdiction.
¶ 18 II. Record
¶ 19 Next, the individual defendants allege that section 7-6(n) of the School Code, which
governs petitions for rehearing in detachment cases, does not require the Board to keep a record
of the hearing on whether to allow rehearing. Furthermore, the individual defendnats argue that
the Board need not file a record of the hearing on the petition for rehearing when the petition
itself and the transcripts from the October 2015 hearing and the January 2016 hearing show the
Board had sufficient cause to grant the petition.
¶ 20 District 229 contends that the Board erred when it did not keep a record of the hearing on
the petition for rehearing because the trial court can only review the record under the
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)) and, without the record, the
court cannot determine whether the Board had sufficient cause to grant the petition. It argues that
the petition for rehearing does not show sufficient cause to grant the hearing and, even so, the
trial court cannot conduct judicial review without a record consisting of the evidence presented at
the hearing and the Board’s findings. District 229 also claims the Board’s failure to show that it
published notice to the public, posted an agenda of the hearing, and met and approved the
meeting minutes in compliance with the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a)-(b) (West
2016)) supports its argument that the Board failed to provide a record in accordance with the
Administrative Law Review.
10 ¶ 21 The question before us is whether the Board’s failure to provide a record precluded
judicial review of the petition for rehearing. “[W]here the historical facts are admitted or
established, but there is a dispute as to whether the governing legal provisions were interpreted
correctly by the administrative body, the case presents a purely legal question for which our
review is de novo.” Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d 398, 406 (2011).
¶ 22 The individual defendants are correct that section 7-6(n) is devoid of any requirements
that the Board must keep a record of the hearing on the petition. However, in Illinois, it is well-
established that a trial court must not weigh the evidence when reviewing a final administrative
decision but rather it must determine whether, on the record, the administrative agency’s
decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Shallow v. Police Board, 60 Ill. App.
3d 113, 116 (1978). “An order of an administrative agency must thus contain findings to make
possible a judicial review of the agency’s decision.” Id. As the Fifth District explained in
Kozsdiy v. O’Fallon Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 31 Ill. App. 3d 173, 177 (1975):
“It leaves us in the position of guessing what the Board deemed
relevant in deciding to discharge the appellant. There can be no
decision on constitutional issues when it is not clear what evidence
was accepted or rejected or what ground the Board relied on in
reaching its decision. In short, it is impossible for us to fulfill our
function under the purpose and policy of the Administrative
Review Act[2] without knowing the reasons for the appellant’s
discharge.”
The Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, ¶ 264 et seq.) is now known as the 2
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2016)). 11 ¶ 23 The Administrative Review Law governs the trial court’s authority to review a final
decision of an administrative agency. Section 3-108 of the Administrative Review Law (735
ILCS 5/3-108 (West 2016)) concerns an administrative agency’s record on judicial review. It
states, in relevant part:
“(b) Answer. Except as herein otherwise provided, the
administrative agency shall file an answer which shall consist of
the original or a certified copy of the entire record of proceedings
under review, including such evidence as may have been heard by
it and the findings and decisions made by it.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. § 3-108(b).
¶ 24 As set out in section 3-108, the record of proceedings is the answer of the school district.
Absent a record, the District has not answered and is technically in default and cannot prevail.
Section 3-108 derives from Illinois Supreme Court Rule 291(e) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), which states:
“(e) Record on Appeal. The original copy of the answer of
the administrative agency, consisting of the record of proceedings
(including the evidence and exhibits, if any) had before the
administrative agency, shall be incorporated in the record on
appeal unless the parties stipulate to less, or the trial court after
notice and hearing, or the reviewing court, orders less.” (Emphasis
added.)
¶ 25 Our supreme court’s decision in Strohl, 411 Ill. at 563, also provides guidance on this
issue. In Strohl, the defendants challenged the trial court’s reversal of Macon County Zoning
Board of Appeals’ denial of the plaintiffs’ request to rezone their property. Id. at 560. The trial
12 court was not provided with a record. Id. at 561. Instead, the trial court conducted a trial de novo
and based its determination on the record made during the trial. Id. Our supreme court held that,
based on the Administrative Review Act and the Illinois Supreme Court rule, the trial court
failed to comply with the provisions that require the court to review the complete record of the
administrative proceedings. Id. at 562-63. The supreme court based its decision on the parties’
failure to incorporate the record of the proceedings as required by statute and failure to provide
any stipulation to shorten the record. Id. at 563. In particular, the court noted that the trial court
did not have a record of administrative proceedings, a written administrative decision, nor a
transcript or stipulation of the evidence before the administrative agency despite the statutory
requirement that the trial court must make a judicial review of the administrative decision. Id.
¶ 26 The Strohl court explained that the Administrative Review Act does not give an
independent remedy or create a new cause of action but denotes “a method of review, whereby
challenged decisions of the administrative body may be subjected to a review” and provides for a
review of the board’s decision on the record alone. Id. It further stated that section 3.2 of the
County Zoning Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, ch. 34, ¶ 152k.2) required the zoning board to keep
minutes of the proceedings, “keep records of its examinations and other official actions,” and file
any decision of the board. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Strohl, 411 Ill. at 564. The court
stated that if the zoning board complied with section 3.2, “some record of the board’s actions and
of its decision must exist and a judicial review of the final administrative decision must be
predicated upon it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The supreme court stated that if the
procedures that the act established are not applied, the trial court would improperly act as the
zoning board of appeals and “[s]uch a result is not contemplated by either the Administrative
Review Act or the County Zoning Act.” Id. at 565.
13 ¶ 27 Turning to the instant case and looking at the plain statutory language and established
case law, the Board was required to file an answer consisting solely of the entire record of
proceedings during the hearing on the petition for rehearing, including the evidence that was
heard by the Board and the Board’s findings and decisions. Here, no record of proceedings in
accordance with the statutory provisions stated above was filed with petitioners’ three
supplemental answers even though District 229 twice requested that the Board attach the record.
The individual defendants did attach the minutes of the hearing on the petition for rehearing in
their motion to reconsider. However, the minutes do not comply with the statutory requirements
that the record include the evidence the Board heard and the findings and decisions the Board
made (see 735 ILCS 5/3-108(b) (West 2016); Ill. S. Ct. R. 291(e) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016)) nor did the
parties stipulate to less in accordance with Rule 291(e).
¶ 28 The individual defendants cite Board of Education of Rich Township High School
District No. 227 v. Brown, 311 Ill. App. 3d 478, 486-87 (1999), for the proposition that the board
was not required to maintain a contemporaneous record of the proceeding. In that case, the
plaintiffs argued that the board erred in granting the defendants’ motion for rehearing under
section 7-6(n) because the defendants failed to make a showing of sufficient cause. The motion
for rehearing alleged that the board erred in denying the detachment based on the defendants’
failure to prove the number of registered voters in the territory proposed to be detached. The
First District held that the allegations in the motion were supported by case law and, therefore,
the board did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion. Id. at 487-88.
¶ 29 However, the court in Brown did not state whether a record of proceedings was available,
and without this critical information, we decline to extend Brown to this case. Therefore, we find
that the Board was required to provide a record of proceedings, including any evidence it heard
14 and any findings and decisions it made, and that the Board failed to provide an adequate record
for the trial court to properly review its rehearing determination. Because this issue is dispositive
of this appeal, we need not address District 229’s arguments that (1) the Board violated the Open
Meetings Act and (2) that it was not given proper notice of nor afforded an opportunity to be
heard on the petition for rehearing.
¶ 30 III. Remand
¶ 31 Also, the individual defendants argue that the trial court erred when it reversed rather
than remanded the Board’s decision. Specifically, the individual defendants allege that remand is
necessary because it will allow the Board to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. The
individual defendants also assert that remand is necessary to allow the Board to review the audio
recording and transcript of the hearing on the petition for rehearing attached to their motion for
vacation or modification of judgment to determine whether they give a complete account of the
hearing and, if so, to allow the Board to prepare a memorandum of its findings and conclusions
based on the recording and transcript. Furthermore, the individual defendants contend that
reversal would be a harsh outcome because the Board, not the individual defendants, was
responsible for creating and filing a record of proceedings under section 3-108(b).
¶ 32 In reversing and remanding the zoning board’s decision to determine whether a record of
the administrative proceedings were kept, the Strohl court noted that, under the Administrative
Review Act, technical errors in the administrative proceedings do not constitute grounds for
reversal “unless it appears to the trial court that such error or failure materially affected the rights
of any party and resulted in substantial injustice to him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Strohl, 411 Ill. at 565; 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b) (West 2016). It held that “[i]f the board failed to
keep a record of its proceedings as required, we consider their failure to be beyond the scope of a
15 technical error” constituting reversal of the zoning board’s decision. Strohl, 411 Ill. at 565. In
accord with Strohl, we agree with the trial court’s decision that the Board’s failure to keep a
record in accordance with the Administrative Review Law constituted a reversal of its decision.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to reverse the Board’s determination on the
¶ 33 CONCLUSION
¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is affirmed.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
16 No. 3-17-0638
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, No. 16-MR-73; the Hon. Terence M. Patton, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jacob J. Frost, of Spring Valley, for appellants. for Appellant:
Attorneys Allen Wall, Caitlyn R. Culbertson, and Scott E. Nemanich, of for Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee. Appellee: