Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 2, 2026

2024-04173, (Index No. 615945/22)

Hector D. Lasalle, P.J.

Cheryl E. Chambers

Paul Wooten

Helen Voutsinas, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul a determination of the Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst dated July 11, 2022, which, after a hearing, approved and adopted an incentive overlay district and issued a negative declaration of environmental significance pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) with respect to the proposed action, and action for declaratory relief, the petitioners/plaintiffs appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Catherine Rizzo, J.), dated February 2, 2024. The order and judgment granted the separate motions of the respondents/defendants Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst and Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst and the respondent/defendant Pearsall Rock, LLC, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss the petition/complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, denied the petition, and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding/action.

ORDERED that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the separate motions of the respondents/defendants Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst and Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst and the respondent/defendant Pearsall Rock, LLC, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the petition/complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, and adding a provision thereto deeming the separate motions to be for a declaratory judgment in the respondents/defendants' favor, and thereupon granting the separate motions; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents/defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of an amended order and judgment in accordance herewith.

In November 2022, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) commenced this hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to annul a determination of the [*2]respondents/defendants Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst and Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst (hereinafter together the Cedarhurst respondents), which, after a hearing, approved and adopted an incentive overlay district and issued a negative declaration of environmental significance pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) (ECL art 8) with respect to the development of 98 apartment units, and action for declaratory relief. The Cedarhurst respondents and the respondent/defendant Pearsall Rock, LLC, separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss the petition/complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, asserting, among other things, that the petitioners lacked standing under SEQRA. In an order and judgment dated February 2, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the separate motions, denied the petition, and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding/action.

"Standing to bring a SEQRA challenge is a threshold issue, and the burden of establishing standing is on the party seeking review of governmental action on the basis of alleged procedural and substantive SEQRA violations" (Matter of 1160 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v City of White Plains, 211 AD3d 723, 724; see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 769). "To establish standing under SEQRA, a petitioner must show (1) an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and (2) that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA" (Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 AD3d 726, 727-728; see Matter of 1160 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v City of White Plains, 211 AD3d at 724). "Economic injury is not by itself within the zone of interests which SEQRA seeks to protect" (Matter of 1160 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v City of White Plains, 211 AD3d at 725; see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d at 777).

Here, the petitioners alleged environmental injuries that either were economic in nature (see Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d 428, 434; Matter of 1160 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v City of White Plains, 211 AD3d at 724), were not different from those that would be suffered by the public at large (see Matter of Board of Fire Commrs. of the Fairview Fire Dist. v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 156 AD3d 621, 623; Matter of Harris v Town Bd. of Riverhead, 73 AD3d 922, 924), or were too speculative and conjectural to demonstrate an actual injury-in-fact (see Matter of Kopland v Town of Highlands, 241 AD3d 1567, 1569; Matter of Shapiro v Torres, 153 AD3d 835, 836). Such allegations are insufficient to confer standing to challenge the adequacy of the Cedarhurst respondents' environmental review of the overlay district under SEQRA. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, their property was not sufficiently close in proximity to the proposed development so as to confer a presumption of an injury-in-fact as an adjacent property owner (see Matter of Figueroa v Town of Wallkill, 232 AD3d 729, 731; Matter of Nunnally v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of New Windsor, 217 AD3d 950, 952).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the petitioners' remaining contentions.

Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of an amended order and judgment, inter alia, making the appropriate declaration in the respondents/defendants' favor in accordance herewith.

LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court