2024 IL App (1st) 230790-U
THIRD DIVISION January 31, 2024
No. 1-23-0790
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF EDGEWOOD VALLEY ) Appeal from the CONDOMINIUM COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., an ) Circuit Court of Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, ) Cook County ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 2019 CH 11198 ) CEDOMIR FILIPOV, TOSHE FILIPOV, VANJA VISI, ) VANCHO VESELINOV and KLEMENTINA ANDONOVA, ) Honorable ) Caroline K. Moreland, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, Presiding. )
JUSTICE D. B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Van Tine concurred with the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting plaintiff’s request for permanent injunctive relief where plaintiff had standing to assert its claim and complied with the statute when initiating this litigation.
¶2 Defendants Cedomir Filipov, Toshe Filipov, Vanja Visi, Vancho Veselinov and
Klementina Andonova appeal the judgment of the trial court granting a permanent injunction in
favor of plaintiff, the Board of the Edgewood Valley Community Association (“EVCA Board”), No. 1-23-0790
and ordering defendants to replace their nonconforming doors with conforming sliding doors. On
appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in its judgment where the EVCA Board 1) did
not have standing to bring its claim against defendants, 2) failed to satisfy the statutory requirement
that a vote to initiate litigation must take place in a meeting open to all members, and 3) did not
conform its pleading to the proofs. Defendants also argue that the trial court should have granted
their motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendants own units in the Edgewood Valley condominium complex located in
Countryside, Illinois. The complex consists of the “Community Area,” as well as four residential
buildings containing the dwelling units (Buildings A, B, C and D). Both Filipov defendants and
defendants Visi and Veselinov own units in Building A. Defendant Andonova owns a unit in
Building B.
¶5 The Edgewood Valley Condominium Community Association (Community Association)
is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation. The Community Association acts through its EVCA Board,
which consists of an equal representation of delegates from the four residential buildings. Each
building also has its own association, declaration, and board of managers.
¶6 The Community Association was established on March 13, 1973 by recording the
Community Association Declaration (Declaration) in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Cook
County. The document declared “that the following rights, easements, covenants, restrictions,
conditions, burdens, uses, privileges, charges and liens:
(1) shall and do exist at all times hereafter among all parties having or acquiring any right,
title or interest in the Premises which Trustee and Developer hereby subject to this
Declaration;
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(2) shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each Owner ***; and
(3) shall run with the land, and each *** portions [sic] of the Premises hereby subjected to
this Declaration, shall be held, sold and conveyed subject thereto.”
¶7 Relevant to this case, section 8.01 of the Declaration, which pertains to the Community
Area, states that no “exterior addition to or change or alteration” shall be made “unless and until
written plans and specifications *** have been submitted to [the EVCA Board] and approved in
writing as to harmony of external design, color and location in relation to surrounding structures
and topography.” Section 8.02, which applies to “Building Exteriors,” provides that:
“Each Building and Condominium Association shall be required, at the sole cost and
expense of the Owners of the Dwelling Units therein, to maintain and keep their respective
parcels and improvements thereon in good condition and repair. In no event shall the
exterior of any building on the Premises [be] changed in color, materials or otherwise
unless such change is approved in writing by the Community Board or the Architectural
Control Committee. If any Condominium Association shall fail to maintain and repair any
building exterior, the Community Association, in addition to all other remedies available
to it hereunder or by law, and without waiving any of said alternative remedies, shall have
the right *** to enter upon the Common Elements of the Condominium Property and to
repair, maintain and restore the building exterior and any other improvements thereon. Any
sums so spent by the Community Association shall be immediately due and payable ***
by the Owner[s] of such building on demand ***.” (Emphasis added.)
¶8 The declaration of Building A provides that the “Common Elements *** shall include the
land, stairways, entrances and exits, elevators, halls, balconies, patios *** and such component
parts of walls, floors and ceilings as are not located within the Units.” Although the declaration for
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Building B is not in the record on appeal, filings by the parties indicate that it contains a similar
provision.
¶9 The EVCA Board has the authority, pursuant to section 6.02, to “enforce provisions of this
Declaration and rules made hereunder and to enjoin and seek damages from any Owner for [a]
violation of such provisions or rules.” Section 9.02 provides that “[e]nforcement by the
Community Association *** of the covenants and restrictions contained in this Declaration shall
be had by any proceeding at law or in equity against any person or persons violating or attempting
to violate any such covenant or restriction ***.”
¶ 10 In 2018, members of the EVCA Board inspected the premises for violations of the
Declaration. Specifically, they checked for missing screens in windows and doors, as well as “any
type of safety or sanitary type issues that would need to be addressed.” Shawn Campbell, one of
the EVCA Board members who conducted the inspection, noticed that defendants’ units altered
the windows and replaced the doors on their balconies without EVCA Board approval. The EVCA
Board attempted to discuss the matter with defendants, but the issue remained unresolved.
¶ 11 On July 9, 2019, the EVCA Board held a closed executive meeting with six members in
attendance, including Campbell and defendant Veselinov. A written summary of the meeting
indicated that the EVCA Board met with lawyer Kat Formeller due to a conflict with its current
lawyer, who also represented the association of Building A. Some of the unit owners who had
nonconforming windows and doors resided in Building A. At the meeting, the EVCA Board
explained that certain owners did not want to follow the rules, and it was concerned that the
violations would “tremendously” affect the value of the property. Although the EVCA Board was
“not looking to sue anyone,” it wanted to ensure that everyone followed the rules. Formeller
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assured them that these are common issues for condominium associations, “but with a sturdy hand
[they] can be resolved in an amicable manner.”
¶ 12 According to the written summary, EVCA Board members asked Veselinov near the end
of the meeting to recuse himself since he was one of the owners in violation of the rules. Without
Veselinov present, a majority of the members voted to retain Formeller as the new attorney and to
“proceed with injunctions.” The EVCA Board discussed the specific violations with Formeller and
informed her that it wanted to work with Veselinov to resolve the matter amicably, even though
he had been uncooperative. Since this issue involved the EVCA Board and Building A, where
Veselinov owned his unit, “[n]o one lawyer can represent both entities, thus [the EVCA Board]
would need to hire” Formeller as its new attorney.
¶ 13 The EVCA Board scheduled a meeting open to all unit owners for July 15, 2019, when the
EVCA Board would “vote on the new lawyer.” Defendants Toshe Filipov, Cedomir Filipov, Visi,
and Veselinov attended the meeting. According to the written summary, the meeting was “quite
unruly, troublesome and disruptive.” EVCA Board member Veselinov and his family “were some
of the most upset owners as they believe[d] the association want[ed] to sue them.” The EVCA
Board explained that it was not “trying to sue anyone.” However, the EVCA Board was also
concerned that the owners’ noncompliance with the rules would affect property values. It wanted
to ensure that everyone followed the Declaration rules and the bylaws. With three “yes” votes, the
EVCA Board voted to retain Formeller as its attorney. Veselinov voted “no.”
¶ 14 On August 15, 2019, the EVCA Board, through Formeller, mailed each defendant a letter
stating that he or she “altered the exterior of the Building” by installing French doors and removing
screens from windows without obtaining consent from the EVCA Board. The letters set forth the
pertinent provisions of section 8.01 and gave defendants 30 days from the date of the letter to
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comply with the rules. Defendants were warned that if they “fail or refuse to comply with this
letter within the time provided herein, [the EVCA Board] will have no choice but to take legal
action to enforce the provisions of the Common Ground Declaration pursuant to Article 8.02.”
¶ 15 On September 27, 2019, the EVCA Board filed a complaint for injunctive relief against
each defendant. The complaint charged defendants with altering the exterior of their buildings by
installing French doors without EVCA Board approval. In doing so, defendants disrupted “the
uniformity of the doors throughout the Association as all other Units have sliding doors.” The
EVCA Board asserted that it had “an ascertainable right to protect the property and the rights of
property owners and others who reside within the Association and to enforce the covenants
uniformly.” The complaint referenced language in section 8.01 of the Declaration and requested a
“mandatory permanent injunction requiring [each] Defendant to comply with the Declaration and
replace the French doors with sliding doors *** within the specified time period, not to exceed
sixty (60) days.” The complaint also sought attorney fees and costs. The trial court subsequently
granted defendants’ motion to consolidate their cases.
¶ 16 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and raised three affirmative defenses. First,
they argued that the EVCA Board had no standing to file this claim. Second, they contended that
they did not violate the Declaration. Third, they argued that the EVCA Board failed to vote on this
litigation at a meeting open to all unit owners as required by the Illinois Condominium Property
Act (Act) (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 2020)).
¶ 17 At trial, Campbell read aloud sections 8.01 and 8.02 of the Declaration. He testified that
external uniformity mattered in their community as reflected by these provisions. Campbell stated
that when the EVCA Board voted to retain Formeller, they voted to give their new attorney “broad
strokes to handle this and all other violations. To handle it to the letter of the law in any way that
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they needed to.” Campbell testified that the meeting was unruly because “the directors from
Building A and Building B were also in receipt of the violations.” Every meeting since has been
“disruptive, unruly, and just basically outrageous.” Campbell stated that the EVCA Board did not
vote specifically on whether to file the lawsuits against defendants because “it was not necessary.
The original vote granted [Formeller] a broad stroke to handle our legal affairs for us in any way
that [she sees] fit.”
¶ 18 Toshe Filipov and Veselinov testified for the defense. Both stated that the EVCA Board
did not vote to file a claim against them or the other defendants at the July 15, 2019 meeting.
¶ 19 In closing argument, Formeller argued that sections 8.01 and 8.02 of the Declaration clearly
indicate that the Declaration governs both the Community areas and the exterior of buildings on
the premises. In response, defendants’ counsel noted that the EVCA Board only raised section 8.01
in its complaint, and it raised section 8.02 for the first time at trial. Nonetheless, he argued that it
was unclear under section 8.02 whether defendants made an improper change to the buildings’
exterior. Defendants’ counsel further argued that the Act required the EVCA Board to vote on
whether to pursue the present action in an open meeting, but it did not do so.
¶ 20 In rebuttal, Formeller argued that “the declaration needs to be read as a whole” and each
unit owner is “bound by the entire declaration.” Regarding whether the EVCA Board took a proper
vote to proceed with the litigation, she argued that the “vote did occur[,] that it was broad authority
which included the potential litigation.”
¶ 21 In rendering its decision, the trial court stated that the complaints against defendants were
based on violations of sections 8.01 and 8.02 of the Declaration. The court noted language in
section 8.02, which provided that “[i]n no event shall the exterior of any building on the premises
*** change in color, materials, or otherwise.” The court found that the intent of the Declaration
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“is to maintain uniformity on all of the buildings,” and that uniformity “applies to the exterior of
the buildings.” It also found that the Declaration requires owners to conform their units to the other
residential units. The trial court thus determined that defendants violated the Declaration.
¶ 22 The trial court also found that the July 15, 2019 EVCA Board meeting to vote on a new
lawyer was “the only meeting regarding the lawsuit.” It noted that section 18.5 of the Act (765
ILCS 605/18.5 (West 2020)) required the EVCA Board to vote on any litigation matters at a
meeting open to any unit owner. Therefore, the issue before the court was “whether the vote to
approve the new legal counsel *** was sufficient to satisfy 18.5.” In ruling that the vote complied
with the Act, the court found that:
“The board has the authority to enforce the declarations through lawsuits. The board
properly held a meeting to vote on hiring an attorney to enforce the violations. There was
a vote to proceed with injunctions as stated in the meeting minutes. Any further meetings
to discuss litigation were not required. Thus, the board’s decision to file the lawsuit after
the violation letters [were] sent does not invalidate the lawsuit.”
The trial court granted the permanent injunction because “irreparable harm and inadequate remedy
at law are created when the nonconformity affects the property values of the units,” and “there is
a likelihood of success on the merits.” The court ordered defendants to replace the doors with
conforming doors within 90 days. It also granted the EVCA Board’s request for attorney fees.
¶ 23 Defendants filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the trial court misapplied the Act in
finding that the EVCA Board complied with the requirement to hold open meetings when voting
on litigation matters. Defendants pointed to the court’s ruling, which referenced the written
summary of the closed July 9, 2019 executive meeting. At that meeting, the EVCA Board voted
to proceed with injunctions. Defendants also argued that the trial court improperly granted the
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EVCA Board relief pursuant to section 8.02 when the complaint only sought relief for violations
of section 8.01.
¶ 24 In considering the motion, the court acknowledged that it mistakenly referenced an exhibit
containing the July 9, 2019 meeting summary but noted that its reasoning pertained to the July 15,
2019 meeting. The court explained that “[a]ny discussion pertaining to proceeding with injunctions
was meant to point out that the July 15, 2019 open meeting gave the attorney carte blanche to
proceed with representation and that no additional open meeting was required to authorize
injunctive actions.”
¶ 25 The court stated that it had referenced sections 8.01 and 8.02 in its original ruling to notify
the parties that it had considered their arguments regarding both provisions. Reading the
Declaration as a whole, the court found that the “intent was to create uniformity and [the EVCA
Board] had authority to enforce that intent.” Therefore, the court granted the EVCA Board’s
requested relief. The trial court subsequently denied defendants’ motion to reconsider.
¶ 26 Defendants filed this appeal.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 Defendants first contend that the EVCA Board’s complaint should have been dismissed for
lack of standing. They argue that the EVCA Board lacked standing because under section 8.02 of
the Declaration, its cause of action was against the associations for Buildings A and B, not against
individual unit owners.
¶ 29 The doctrine of standing ensures that only parties with a real interest in the controversy file
claims. Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004). “A standing challenge focuses on the
party seeking relief—not on the merits of the controversy—and asks whether that party is entitled
to pursue the legal challenge, either in their personal or representative capacity.” In re Estate of
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Zivin, 2015 IL App (1st) 150606, ¶ 14. Whether the trial court should have dismissed a complaint
for lack of standing is an issue we review de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220-
21 (1999).
¶ 30 The Act, which governs the affairs of Illinois condominium associations, addresses the
EVCA Board’s standing to pursue claims. See Poulet v. H.F.O., L.L.C., 353 Ill. App. 3d 82, 90
(2004). Section 9.1(b) states that the “EVCA Board of managers shall have standing and capacity
to act in a representative capacity in relation to matters involving the common elements or more
than one unit, on behalf of the unit owners, as their interests may appear.” 765 ILCS 605/9.1(b)
(West 2020). This provision makes clear that “the boards of condominium associations have
standing to sue on all matters that affect more than one unit.” Poulet, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 90.
¶ 31 As the trial court found, sections 8.01 and 8.02 of the Declaration clearly evince an intent
to maintain uniformity regarding the exterior of buildings on the premises. The EVCA Board’s
complaint asserted claims against defendant unit owners for installing nonconforming doors, in
violation of the Declaration, so that “the property and the rights of property owners and others who
reside within the Association” may be protected. We find that the EVCA Board had standing under
the Act to pursue, on behalf of all unit owners, an injunction to enforce defendants’ compliance
with the Declaration. See Henderson Square Condominium Association v. LAB Townhomes, LLC,
2015 IL 118139, ¶ 75.
¶ 32 The EVCA Board also had standing to pursue its claim against defendants under the
provisions of the Declaration. Section 6.02(g) provides that the EVCA Board has the authority to
“enforce provisions of this Declaration and rules made hereunder and to enjoin and seek damages
from any Owner for [a] violation of such provisions or rules.” Furthermore, section 9.02 provides
that “[e]nforcement by the Community Association *** of the covenants and restrictions contained
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in this Declaration shall be had by any proceeding at law or in equity against any person or persons
violating or attempting to violate any such covenant or restriction.” Although section 8.02 specifies
a remedy available to the EVCA Board when unit owners make unapproved changes to the
building exterior, the EVCA Board’s right to pursue that remedy is “in addition to all other
remedies available to it hereunder or by law, and without waiving any of said alternative
remedies.” Accordingly, we find that the EVCA Board had standing to pursue these claims.
¶ 33 Defendants next contend that the EVCA Board violated section 18.5 of the Act when it
failed to vote on whether to initiate the present litigation at a meeting open to all unit owners. The
trial court determined that the EVCA Board did not violate the Act because it held an open meeting
to vote on hiring attorney Formeller to enforce the violations. It found that the Act did not require
“[a]ny further meetings to discuss litigation.”
¶ 34 “Condominiums are creatures of statute and, thus, any action taken on behalf of the
condominium must be authorized by statute.” Board of Directors of 175 E. Delaware Place
Homeowners Association v. Hinojosa, 287 Ill. App. 3d 886, 889 (1997). When construing a statute,
courts must ascertain and give effect to the underlying legislative intent. Channon v. Westward
Management, Inc., 2022 IL 128040, ¶ 17. “The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the
statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” V & T Investment Corporation v. West
Columbia Place Condominium Association, 2018 IL App (1st) 170436, ¶ 22. We review the trial
court’s interpretation of the Act de novo. Channon, 2022 IL 128040, ¶ 17.
¶ 35 Section 18.5 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that:
“(4) Meetings of the board of the master association shall be open to any unit owner in a
condominium subject to the authority of the board of the master association, except for the
portion of any meeting held:
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(A) to discuss litigation when an action against or on behalf of the particular master
association has been filed and is pending in a court or administrative tribunal, or when the
board of the master association finds that such an action is probable or imminent[.]
***
Any vote on these matters shall be taken at a meeting or portion thereof open to any unit
owner of a condominium subject to the authority of the master association.” (Emphasis
added.) 765 ILCS 605/18.5(4)(A) (West 2020).
¶ 36 In arguing that the EVCA Board violated this provision, defendants cite Palm v. 2800 Lake
Shore Drive Condominium Association, 2014 IL App (1st) 111290. In Palm, the plaintiff was a
unit owner who filed a complaint against the association board alleging that it violated the Act by
conducting condominium business in meetings closed to unit owners. Id. ¶ 5. The board filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint and the plaintiff subsequently filed two amended complaints.
After each amended filing, the board moved to dismiss the amended complaints. Id. ¶¶ 9, 21.
¶ 37 The plaintiff filed a third amended complaint asserting, in part, that the board acted beyond
its legal authority by violating the open meetings requirement of the Act. Id. ¶ 19. The board
answered the complaint and filed four affirmative defenses and a counterclaim. Id. ¶ 23. The
counterclaim asserted that the board was entitled to attorney fees and costs because the plaintiff’s
claims were not made in good faith. Id.
¶ 38 The plaintiff filed a motion for “partial declaratory and injunctive summary judgment.”
Id. ¶ 24. He argued, in relevant part, that the board violated the Act by making decisions in closed
meetings on whether to commence or defend the instant litigation. Id. The trial court issued an
order enjoining the board from authorizing or allowing litigation without a board vote in a meeting
open to all unit owners. Id. ¶ 28.
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¶ 39 On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. We found that whether to pursue
or defend a lawsuit is a question involving the business of the association because such action
requires the expenditure of association funds and resources. Id. ¶ 87. We determined that although
the Act allows the board to discuss litigation matters in closed meetings, “it specifically provides
that the board must vote on any litigation matter at [a] meeting open to all unit owners.” (Emphasis
added.) Id. It was “uncontested that the board never voted on litigation matters, at open meetings
or otherwise.” Id. ¶ 88. We held that the board’s failure to conduct an open vote to defend the
instant litigation violated the condominium’s declaration as well as the Act. Id. ¶ 89.
¶ 40 Palm is distinguishable from the case at bar where the board in Palm never held an open
vote on any litigation matters. Here, the EVCA Board held a closed executive meeting on July 9,
2019 to discuss the issue of owners who installed nonconforming French doors without permission
of the EVCA Board. At that meeting, the EVCA Board discussed retaining Formeller as new legal
counsel to assist in enforcing the condominium rules. The EVCA Board needed a new attorney
because its previous attorney also represented the association of Building A, where some of the
defendants owned units. The EVCA Board’s immediate intent in hiring Formeller was to address
the issue of nonconforming doors and to demand defendants’ compliance with the rules.
¶ 41 On July 15, 2019, the EVCA Board held an open meeting to vote on whether to hire
Formeller as its new attorney. According to Campbell, it was made clear that the vote for Formeller
was “to ensure everyone follows the rules” contained in the Declaration. The EVCA Board’s vote
gave Formeller a “broad stroke to handle our legal affairs for us in any way that [she sees] fit.”
Although the EVCA Board did not vote specifically on whether to initiate litigation against
defendants, those who attended the open meeting understood that Formeller was being retained to
demand defendants’ compliance regarding their nonconforming doors. They further understood a
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complaint could be filed to that end. In fact, four of the defendants attended the July 15 meeting
and, as Campbell testified, the meeting was “quite unruly, troublesome and disruptive.” Defendant
Veselinov and his family “were some of the most upset owners as they believe[d] the association
want[ed] to sue them.” Veselinov was the only EVCA Board member who voted not to retain
Formeller.
¶ 42 The EVCA Board’s vote on Formeller as the new EVCA Board attorney was, in essence,
a vote on whether the EVCA Board should utilize all means available to enforce the association
rules against defendants, including litigation. Otherwise, the EVCA Board would not have needed
a new attorney at that time. As such, the EVCA Board voted on “probable or imminent” litigation
matters at the open July 15, 2019 meeting. See 765 ILCS 605/18.5(4)(A) (West 2020). We agree
with the trial court that the July 15, 2019 meeting satisfied the requirements of section 18.5.
¶ 43 Defendants next contend that the trial court should not have granted judgment in favor of
the EVCA Board based on section 8.02 of the Declaration where its complaint referenced only
section 8.01. Defendants claim they had no notice regarding a section 8.02 violation. They argue
that, in the interests of justice and fairness, the EVCA Board’s complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice because the EVCA Board raised a new legal theory at trial that did not conform to the
pleadings.
¶ 44 First, we disagree that the EVCA Board raised section 8.02 in this matter for the first time
at trial. Section 8.02 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n no event shall the exterior of any building
on the Premises be changed in color, materials or otherwise unless such change is approved in
writing by the Community EVCA Board or the Architectural Control Committee.” EVCA Board
attorney Formeller’s August 15, 2019 letter stated that each defendant violated the declaration by
installing French doors and removing screens from windows without obtaining consent from the
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EVCA Board. Defendants were given 30 days from the date of the letter to comply with the rules.
The letter further stated that if defendants did not comply with the terms of the letter, “ [the EVCA
Board] will have no choice but to take legal action to enforce the provisions of the Common
Ground Declaration pursuant to Article 8.02.” Although the complaint did not specifically cite to
section 8.02, it did reference defendants’ improper alteration of the exterior of their residential
building by installing nonconforming French doors. This reference comports with the language in
section 8.02, which is titled “Building Exteriors.” Defendants therefore had ample notice that the
EVCA Board’s claims against them could include a section 8.02 violation.
¶ 45 Moreover, defendants never raised the issue of forfeiture before the trial court. Instead,
defendants’ counsel argued the applicability of section 8.02 at trial. When Formeller asked
Campbell to read section 8.02 aloud and she proceeded to argue thereon, counsel did not object.
Although counsel noted in response that the EVCA Board did not specify a section 8.02 violation
in its complaint, he proceeded to argue on the merits that it was unclear whether defendants made
an unapproved change to the buildings’ exterior under that provision. In denying defendants’
motion to reconsider, the trial court explained that it referenced both section 8.01 and 8.02 in its
original ruling to notify the parties that it had considered their arguments regarding both
provisions.
¶ 46 Even if we presume the EVCA Board improperly asserted a section 8.02 violation for the
first time at trial, a party who acquiesces in the admission of improper evidence cannot complain
that such evidence was prejudicial. Russo v. Corey Steel Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 180467, ¶ 75.
“The rule of invited error or acquiescence is a procedural default sometimes described as estoppel.”
In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (2004). As our supreme court explained, “a party’s
‘active participation in the direction of proceedings * * * goes beyond mere waiver’ such that the
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traditional exceptions to the waiver rule do not apply.” Id. at 218 (quoting People v. Villarreal,
198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). Defendants cannot complain of error to which they consented.
¶ 47 On appeal, defendants do not challenge the trial court’s judgment that they violated section
8.02. Since we find that the trial court properly considered defendants’ violation of section 8.02,
we need not address their argument that section 8.01 applies only to the Community Area and thus
cannot be the basis for the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 48 We now address defendants’ contention that the trial court erred in denying their motion
to reconsider. Defendants contend that the trial court misapplied existing law when it ruled in favor
of the EVCA Board. As argument, they only assert that the ruling was inconsistent with Illinois
law and the Declaration “as outlined in Sections 1 through 4 of this Brief.” Since we have found
no error regarding the trial court’s application of the law to those issues, we affirm the denial of
the motion for the reasons already discussed.
¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 51 Affirmed.
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