Board of Commissioners v. Rowland

16 S.E.2d 401, 220 N.C. 24, 1941 N.C. LEXIS 457

Opinion

WiNBORNE, J.

The description involved appears to be sufficiently definite to admit of parol evidence for the purpose of identification. See Self Help Corp. v. Brinkley, 215 N. C., 615, 2 S. E. (2d), 889, and cases cited. Compare Johnston County v. Stewart, 217 N. C., 334, 7 S. E. (2d), 708. But such evidence is absent from the agreed case. Hence, unaided in that respect, the description of itself is insufficient to identify the land.

The statute, C. S., 8037, as rewritten in section 4 of chapter 221, Public Laws 1927, in effect when- the tax foreclosure suit in question was pending, requires that, in the published notice, a description of the real estate, which is in fact and in law sufficient, shall be set out.

Plaintiff contends, however, that the question here is controlled by the opinion in Craven County v. Parker, 194 N. C., 561, 140 S. E., 155. There, the description “Richard Parker, 250 acres, Washington Road, No. One Township,” was accompanied by the admission that “this is the only land owned by Richard Parker in Craven County.” This distinguishes it from the one at bar.

In view of the decision here reached, other points raised are not considered on this appeal..

The judgment below is

Beversed.