Board of Commissioners of Montgomery Co. v. Elston

32 Ind. 27
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1869
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 32 Ind. 27 (Board of Commissioners of Montgomery Co. v. Elston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Board of Commissioners of Montgomery Co. v. Elston, 32 Ind. 27 (Ind. 1869).

Opinion

Ray, J.

This was a complaint hy the appellee against the board of commissioners and treasurer of Montgomery county, to restrain a sale of certain personal property, levied upon by the said treasurer by virtue of a warrant to collect the sum of four hundred and eighteen dollars and forty-nine cents, being the amount of tax and penalty on twenty-seven thousand one hundred and seventy-five dollars in the hands of the appellee on the first day of January, 1868.

One-half of this sum was in treasury notes of the United States, known as “greenbacks;” the remaining portion was in the notes of the national banks, designated as “ national currency.” This sum had beenreturned fortaxation under protest.

A demurrer was overruled to this complaint, and a perpetual injunction was granted.

That the moiety of this sum upon which the tax was assessed which consisted of treasury notes was not liable to taxation, has been already decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wal. 26.

While it is ruled, that these notes were issued under the [28]*28authority of the United States and as a means to ends entirely within the constitutional power of the government, and that Congress has in express terms declared, that they shall not be subject to state taxation, the Chief Justice, who pronounced the opinion in that case, proceeds,

“But it was insisted that they were issued as money; that their controlling quality was that of money, and that therefore they were subject to taxation in the same manner, and to the same extent, as coin issued under like authority.

“And there is certainly much force in the argument. It is clear that these notes were intended to circulate as money, and, with the national bank notes, to constitute the credit currency of the country.

“Nor is it easy to see that taxation of these notes, used as money, and held by individual owners, can control or embarrass the power of the government in issuing them for circulation, more than like taxation embarrasses its power in coining and issuing gold and silver money for circulation.

“Apart from the quality of legal tender impressed upon them by acts of Congress, of which we now say nothing, their circulation as currency depends on the extent to which they ai’e received in payment, on the quantity in circulation, and on the credit given to the promises they bear. In these respects they resemble the bank notes'formerly issued as currency.

“But, on the other hand, it is equally clear that these notes are obligations of the United States. Their name imports obligation. Every one of them expresses upon its face an engagement of the nation to pay to the bearer a eertain sum. The dollar note is an engagement to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the coined dollar of the United States; a certain quantity in weight and fineness of gold or silver, authenticated as such by the stamp of the government. No other dollars had before been recognized by the legislation of the national government as lawful money.

•“Would, then, their usefulness and value as means to the [29]*29exercise of the functions of government, be injuriously affected by state taxation?

“It cannot be said, as we have already intimated, that the same inconveniences as would arise from the taxation of bonds and other interest bearing obligations of the government, would attend the .taxation of notes issued for circulation as money. But we cannot say that no embarrassment would arise from such taxation. And we' think it clearly within the discretion of Congress to determine whether, in view of all the circumstances attending the issue of the notes, their usefulness, as a means of carrying on the government, would be enhanced by exemption from taxation; and within the constitutional power of Congress, having resolved>the question of usefulness affirmatively, to provide' by law for such exemption.”

The evident foundation upon which the power of the government to exempt her treasury notes from taxation reposes is, that the sole value of such notes depends upon the promise of the government to ultimately redeem them in gold. They circulate as currency, not, like gold and silver, by reason of their intrinsic value, but by virtue of the pi’omise impressed upon them and the faith given to that promise; in other words, upon the credit of the government. And therefore a tax upon the notes is simply a tax upon that which gives them value, the promise of the government—a tax upon her credit.

It is not a reason why treasury notes should be taxed, that they circulate as bank notes recently issued by private corporations. Such circulation depended upon the credit of the private corporation, and that was a proper and legitimate subject for taxation. These notes circulate by reason of the trust reposed in the credit of the government, and that credit is not a subject within the sovereignty of the state to tax.

It was upon this ground, that it was held, in Weston v. The City of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449,. that a tax imposed by a law of any state on stock issued for loanB to the United States is unconstitutional.

[30]*30This distinctly appears from the opinion pronounced by Chief Justice Marshall. We make this extract: “Ho one [power] can be selected which is of more vital interest to the community than this of boxTowing money on the credit of theUnited States. • Ho power has ’been conferred by the American people on their government, the free and unburdened exercise of which more deeply affects every member of our republic. In war, when the honor, the safety, the independence of the nation are to be defended, when all its resources are to be strained to the utmost, credit must be brought in aid of taxation, and the abundant revenue of peace and prosperity must be anticipated to supply the exigencies, the urgent demands of the moment. The people, for objects the most important which can occur in the px’ogress of nations, have empowered their government to make these anticipations, ‘to borrow money on the credit of the United States.’ Can anything be raoi-e dangerous, or more injurious, than the admissioix of a principle which authorizes evex-y state and every corporation in the union which possesses the right of taxation, to burden the exercise of this power at their discretion?

“If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right whigh in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be earned to any extent within the jurisdiction of the state or corporation which imposes it, which the will of each state and corporation may prescribe. A power- which is givexx by the whole American people for their common good, which is to be exercised at the most critical periods for the most impox’tant purposes, on the free exercise of which the interests certainly, perhaps the liberty, of the whole may depend, may be burdened, impeded, if not an’ested, by any of the organized parts of the confederacy. * * * We have considered it as a necessary consequence from the supremacy of the government of the whole that its action in the exercise of its legitimate powers should be free and unembarrassed by any conflicting powers, in the possession of its parts; that the powers of a state cannot rightfully be so [31]*31exercised as to impede and obstruct tbe free course of those measures which the government of the states united may rightfully adopt.

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Bluebook (online)
32 Ind. 27, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/board-of-commissioners-of-montgomery-co-v-elston-ind-1869.