BNSF Railway Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County

2011 OK CIV APP 32, 250 P.3d 906, 2010 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 152
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 16, 2011
Docket106,649. Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2011 OK CIV APP 32 (BNSF Railway Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BNSF Railway Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, 2011 OK CIV APP 32, 250 P.3d 906, 2010 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 152 (Okla. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

JOHN F. FISCHER, Presiding Judge.

T1 This is an appeal by BNSF Railway Company from an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Commission) granting the Board of County Commissioners for Tulsa County's (Board) application to open a railroad crossing.

BACKGROUND

T2 To facilitate the development of an industrial park, the Board applied to the Commission for authorization to open a railroad crossing. The cost of the crossing would be paid for by the developer of the park. The proposed crossing would affect two tracks owned and operated by BNSF. BNSF filed a response objecting to the Board's application and also moved to dismiss the application based on jurisdictional grounds. The matter was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found that BNSF's motion to dismiss was without merit and recommended that it be denied. The ALJ also recommended that the Board's application be denied. Both parties appealed to the Commission en bane. The Commission found that it had jurisdiction and granted the *908 Board's application. BNSF appeals both decisions.

13 Two issues are raised in this appeal, the Commission's jurisdiction and whether there is sufficient support for the order granting the Board's application. We find that the Commission does have jurisdiction in this case and that there is sufficient support for the order granting the Board's application, and therefore affirm the order appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

T4 The Oklahoma Constitution provides that, in appeals from Corporation Commission orders, other than appeals involving asserted violation of the parties' constitutional rights, the appellate court's review "shall not extend further than to determine whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, and whether the findings and conclusions of the Commission are sustained by the law and substantial evidence." Okla. Const. art. 9, § 20. Oklahoma has adopted the definition of the United States Supreme Court that "'the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight'" El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 1981 OK 150, ¶ 9, 640 P.2d 1336, 1338-89 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court's review is:

restricted to determining whether the Commission's findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and substantial evidence. Such a review does not include weighing the evidence on appeal, but only determining whether the supporting evidence possesses substance and relevance. This process does not entail comparing the evidence of the parties, but includes determining if the evidence supporting the order furnishes a substantial basis of facts from which the issue could be reasonably resolved.

Samson Res. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 1987 OK 73, ¶ 11, 742 P.2d 1114, 1116 (citations omitted). Further, "[blecause Commission decisions often involve complex issues of economics, accounting, engineering, and other special fields of knowledge, a presumption of correctness accompanies the Commission's findings in matters it frequently adjudicates and in which it possesses expertise." In re Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P., 2007 OK 55, 1 9, 164 P.3d 150, 156 (footnote omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

15 BNSE's jurisdictional argument is premised on the contention that there is no existing highway opened across its tracks. At the proposed crossing, Highway 33 (Southwest Boulevard) runs parallel to the BNSF tracks to the west and the Turner Turnpike to the east. There is an exit from the Turnpike for South 49th West Avenue, the location of the proposed crossing, that runs perpendicular to the Turnpike, Highway 33 and BNSF's tracks. The west end of South 49th West Avenue ends at Highway 83 east of the tracks and the proposed industrial park. BNSF argues that, until a highway is opened immediately west of its tracks, the Commission lacks jurisdiction.

T6 BNSEF's argument admittedly depends on a "literal" interpretation of 17 0.8.2001 § 81, which provides: "The Corporation Commission is given full jurisdiction over all public highway crossings, where same cross steam or electric railroads or railways within the State of Oklahoma." BNSF argued to the Commission that jurisdiction was lacking because "there is no open highway there." In its brief in chief, BNSF argues: "Without an existing, established public highway, which has been opened by the local authorities over the railroad's tracks, the Commission does not have jurisdiction under [seetion] 81."

T7 As pointed out by the Board and the Commission, the extension of South 49th West Avenue to the west, across BNSF's tracks, was designated in the 1988 Tulsa Metropolitan Area Major Street and Highway Plan. And, the Board has adopted a resolution approving the extension of South 49th West Avenue to the industrial park to provide access to Highway 33 and establishing an easement for that purpose.

*909 T8 The ALJ found BNSEF's argument to be "without merit." The Commission also found that it had jurisdiction in this case. We agree. In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. State, 1984 OK 29, 683 P.2d 974, the railroad company had argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue an order designating two grade erossings with signal devices and directing the railroad to construct and maintain such erossings. The order made the railroad's performance contingent on the State acquiring the right of way. On appeal, the railroad argued that the authority conferred on the Commission was "limited to situations where a railroad crosses an established highway." Id. at ¶ 12, 683 P.2d at 977. The Court found "no merit in [the railroad's] argument." Id. at ¶ 13, 683 P.2d at 977.

Tt makes no difference which thoroughfare was laid down first. In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, supra [79 Okla. 142, 192 P. 349 (1920) ], the Court noted that the Legislature, in the exercise of its police powers, may impose on railroads the duty of maintaining highway crossings, although the street or highway was laid across the railroad subsequent to its construction.

Id. at " 12, 688 P.2d at 977.

T9 A finer point is put on BNSE's argument in its reply: "BNSEF's point is not that the proposed highway is not 'established' in the sense that the actual roadway in not yet built. BNSF's point is that the proposed highway is not legally established." This argument is addressed to whether the Board has acquired a right-of-way from BNSF across its tracks at South 49th West Avenue. The only citation to the record supporting this argument is to the Board's resolution, which BNSF argues is "unsigned, unattested" and even if authentic, could not establish a right-of-way by "fiat." BNSF did not object to the introduction of this exhibit at the hearing before the ALJ.

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2011 OK CIV APP 32, 250 P.3d 906, 2010 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 152, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bnsf-railway-co-v-board-of-county-commissioners-of-tulsa-county-oklacivapp-2011.