BMO Harris Bank NA v. Miller Transportation LLC

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided April 9, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00148·Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

8 BMO HARRIS BANK N.A., a national CASE NO. C20-148 RSM banking association, 9 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION v. 11 MILLER TRANSPORTATION LLC, a 12 Washington limited liability company; and SKY BENSON, an individual resident and 13 citizen of California,

14 Defendants.

15 17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff BMO Harris Bank N.A.’s Motion for 18 Reconsideration Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 or in the Alternative for Relief from Judgment 19 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (“Motion for Reconsideration”). Dkt. #34. Plaintiff seeks 20 reconsideration of the Court’s prior order granting Plaintiff default judgment and awarding 21 money damages and the resultant judgment entered in this case. Dkts. #30 and #31. Plaintiff 22 argues that the Court committed error by mischaracterizing Plaintiff’s replevin claim as an 23 equitable one and improperly limiting Plaintiff’s post-judgment rights by not granting equitable 24 1 relief. See generally Dkt. #34. Having considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, the 2 Court grants the Motion and amends its prior order and judgment as specified in this Order. 3 II. BACKGROUND1 4 This case arises from three loans Plaintiff made to Defendant Miller Transportation LLC 5 (“Defendant Miller Transportation”) under the terms of substantially similar Loan and Security

6 Agreements (the “Agreements”). The loaned funds were used to acquire trucking equipment (the 7 “Collateral”)2 and Defendant Miller Transportation granted Plaintiff a security interest in the 8 Collateral. Defendant Miller Transportation failed to make payments due and defaulted under 9 the Agreements. As a result, Plaintiff accelerated the loans and indicated its intent to take 10 possession of the Collateral. Defendant Miller Transportation has failed to pay the amounts due 11 and owing and has not surrendered possession of the Collateral. By prior order, the Court entered 12 default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, awarded money damages, and denied relief on Plaintiff’s 13 claims for replevin, injunctive relief, and specific performance.

15 A. Reconsideration 16 “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” W.D. WASH. LOCAL RULES LCR 7(h)(1). 17 Consequently, the Court will “ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of 18 manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not 19 have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Id. “This 20

21 1 For the purposes of this Order, the Court merely summarizes the factual background as set forth in its prior order (Dkt. #30 at 2) and the complaint (Dkt. #1). 22

2 More specifically, the trucking equipment constituting the Collateral was: (1) a 2015 23 Freightliner Cascadia Series Tractor (VIN: 3AKJGLD57FSFN3372); (2) a 2011 Great Dane Reefer Van Trailer (VIN: 1GRAA0621BW703560); and (3) a 2015 Freightliner Cascadia Series 24 Tractor (VIN: 3AKJGLD51FSGF7139). Dkt. #1 at ¶ 13. 1 standard is a ‘high hurdle.’ Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). Neither the 2 Local Civil Rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow for a motion for 3 reconsideration, is intended to provide litigants with a second bite at the apple.” Aronson v. Dog 4 Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 5 Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure authorizes relief from judgments for “mistake,

6 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). The rules provide ample 7 support for the conclusion that judges may correct judicial errors within a reasonable time to 8 avoid the inconvenience and expense of an appeal. See Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 9 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.22(3) pp. 235-238); 10 see also United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 717, 720 (D.R.I. 1994) (gathering 11 cases supporting a judge’s discretionary decision to clarify, alter, or amend judgments). 12 Here, the Court finds that reconsideration is warranted. Plaintiff establishes that it was 13 likely entitled to relief on its replevin claim as it is a legal, as opposed to equitable, claim. Dkt. 14 #34 at 3. Plaintiff establishes that the Court may have inadvertently jeopardized Plaintiff’s post-

15 judgment remedies by failing to grant such relief. See id. at 2 . Further, Plaintiff takes issue with 16 the Court omitting relief which Plaintiff and Defendant Miller Transportation had set forth in the 17 Agreements, depriving Plaintiff of the benefit of its contractual remedies. Id. at 3–4. The Court 18 agrees and while the Court noted the factual basis for Plaintiff’s requested relief, it nevertheless 19 denied relief on the basis that additional relief beyond money damages was unnecessary. Dkt. 20 #30 at 6–7. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, however, further clarifies its arguments for 21 an order of possession and injunctive relief and the Court accordingly grants the Motion for 22 Reconsideration and revisits its prior order. 23 // 24 // 1 B. Appropriateness of Legal and Equitable Remedies 2 This action is premised upon Loan and Security Agreements which provide they are 3 governed by the laws of Texas and give Plaintiff the right to “exercise all of the rights and 4 remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code.” See Dkt. #1-2 at 2–6, 8–12, 5 14–17. Texas has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). See TEX. BUS. & COM.

6 CODE Ch. 9 Secured Transactions. Here, the applicable provisions of the UCC specify that upon 7 default, a secured party has remedies under the UCC and the agreement of the parties. See TEX. 8 BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.601(a). These remedies “are cumulative and may be exercised 9 simultaneously.” Id. at § 9.601(c); see also Dkt. #28 at 4 (UCC “allows a secured creditor to 10 ‘repossess the collateral for the purpose of protecting it and concurrently proceed to enforce the 11 debt’ or to ‘sue on the debt and proceed to repossess and sell the collateral’”) (quoting 68A AM. 12 JUR. 2D SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 532 (2009)). 13 C. Replevin 14 Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to an order of possession upon its replevin claim. Federal

15 Rule of Civil Procedure 64 specifically provides that “every remedy . . . under the law of the state 16 where the court is located” is available throughout an action. FED. R. CIV. P. 64(a); see also FED. 17 R. CIV. P. 64 (b) (specifically identifying replevin as an available remedy). Here, Washington 18 law requires Plaintiff to show: 19 (a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property or is lawfully entitled to the possession of the property by virtue of a special property interest, including a 20 security interest . . .; (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by defendant; 21 (c) That the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine pursuant to statute . . .; and 22 (d) The approximate value of the property.

23 24 1 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.64.020(2); see also RCB Int’l, Ltd. v. Labbeemint, Inc., No. 16-cv-3109- 2 SAB, 2017 WL 3026931, at *4–5 (E.D. Wash. May 25, 2017) (quoting Graham v. Notti, 147 3 Wash.

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